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Abstract 
 
This is an interdisciplinary project that investigates the influence of the Cultural 
Revolution on the image of women in revolutionary opera films. Because the Cultural 
Revolution is in a socialist context, relations between gender and power in socialist 
discourse are different to power relations in feudal or capitalist gender discourse. 
Previous sociopolitical, anthropological, communication and media studies have 
focused on Chinese women in the Cultural Revolution. However, there is limited 
research through a feminist lens to explore how patriarchal power worked in a socialist 
gender discourse directly formed by Maoist ideology, and ultimately constructed the 
masculinised representation of women in the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, this is 
also a cultural and feminist study that aims to explore the influence of Maoist gender 
politics on women’s identity during the Cultural Revolution. 
 
The revolutionary opera films were chosen as an appropriate study to investigate what 
were the dominant representations of women, and discover how masculinist power 
worked on the representations of women in the period of the Cultural Revolution. 
Examining the image of women in films contributes to knowledge about Maoist 
gender discourse and ideology during the Cultural Revolution. 
 
The key methodology employed for analysing and theorising gender and power in this 
thesis is feminist critical discourse analysis within the framework of constructionist 
feminism. By using a feminist theoretical framework, this study reveals hierarchal 
relations between masculinity and femininity, and undertakes a feminist critique of 
masculinist power and women’s gender identity in the revolutionary opera films. The 
main argument of this study stresses that Maoist gender politics in the revolutionary 
opera films is a masculinist politics that produced another form of patriarchy to 
maintain male dominance. Women were not liberated in the Cultural Revolution but 
rather identified as a masculine gender and oppressed by masculinist power in the 
gender discourse of the revolutionary opera films. 
 
The key contribution of this study is to fill a knowledge gap in the field where, as a 
feminist project, I use feminist methodology and epistemology to identify women’s 
identity, and explore sociological connections between the masculinisation of women 
and patriarchal (masculinist) power in the context of the Cultural Revolution. A 
dynamic power relation between femininity and masculinity from traditional China to 
the Cultural Revolution has also been mapped and elaborated. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Goal of This Study 
 
During the Cultural Revolution1 launched by Mao Zedong (also known as Chairman 
Mao or Mao Tse-tung, hereafter called Mao) in China between 1966 and 1976, Maoist 
gender politics created a new gender discourse that effectively challenged Chinese 
traditional gender norms. The film industry had a role in creating Revolutionary 
propaganda and was deeply enmeshed in politics in order to mobilise Maoist ideology 
at the time. The best known and most influential cinematic productions in this period 
were the revolutionary opera films – eight new forms of Beijing Operas. This thesis 
argues that as the dominant cultural productions during the Cultural Revolution, the 
cultural images of gender created by these revolutionary opera films were profoundly 
shaped by Maoist gender discourse; and that these images exemplified and reinforced 
Marxist gender discourse. 
 
This study focuses on the influence of Maoist politics on the representations of women 
during the Cultural Revolution. With specific reference to eight revolutionary opera 
films made during the Cultural Revolution, this enquiry examines masculinity, 
femininity and power as they are represented in those films, and considers them in 
                                               
1 A term referring to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (无产阶级文化大革命). 
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relation to the historic and cultural context in which they were made. This research is 
structured around the exploration of the following key question: During the Cultural 
Revolution how did Maoist politics influence the dominant representation of women 
in the revolutionary opera films (1966–1976)? 
 
This study deconstructs the gender discourse in the eight revolutionary opera films to 
understand and reveal knowledge of the dominant images of women during the 
Cultural Revolution, how these images were communicated through the opera films, 
and how they contributed to the construction of women’s identity in that particular 
historical context. Therefore, the key focus of this project is the influence of Maoist 
politics on female identity as constructed through the opera films produced during the 
Cultural Revolution. The study is deeply interested in understanding both the shift in 
gender identity mobilised through the films and to interrogate the images from a 
feminist perspective, including understanding how patriarchy (a social system where 
men dominate) is expressed in the gender discourse of the revolutionary opera films. 
 
An Introduction to the Revolutionary Opera Films 
The Revolutionary Opera is a subset of the Model works, also known as yangbanxi(样
板戏 ). The Model works (yangbanxi), “were a small group of visually exciting, 
artistically innovative and ideologically extreme modernized Beijing operas, ballets 
and symphonies, that dominated Chinese public culture during the Cultural Revolution 
(Roberts, 2010, p.1)”. All these original operas and ballet had been staged and 
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performed before they had been filmed in China. Particularly the ballet vision of The 
White-haired Girl was an adaption of dramatic performance from the 1940s. During 
the period of the Cultural Revolution, there were about 17 Model works produced and 
performed. However there were only “Eight Model works” which endorsed as “八大
样板戏” by Jiang Qing in 1967. The eight Model works included five revolutionary 
Beijing Operas: Shajiabang (沙家浜), The Red Lantern(红灯记), On the Docks (海
港), Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy（智取威虎山）and Raid on White Tiger 
Regimen(奇袭白虎团); two ballets: The Red Detachment of Women(红色娘子军)and 
The White-haired Girl (白毛女) and one revolutionary symphony Shajiabang（交响
乐沙家浜）.  
 
The term of “Revolutionary opera films” refers to the revolutionary operas, including 
revolutionary Beijing Operas and revolutionary ballet, produced and released during 
the Cultural Revolution (Clark, 2008). They all feature revolutionary themes such as 
class struggle and Maoist politics of “continuing revolution under the proletarian 
dictatorship” (Zhang, 2004, p. 222), and are identified as a genre in Chinese cinema 
(Teo, 2013). The famous revolutionary opera films include On the Docks 海港 (Xie 
Tieli & Xie Jin, 1972), ballet vision of The Red Detachment of Women (Li, Chengxiang 
and Jiang, Zhuhui, 1970) and the Beijing opera vision of The Red Detachment of 
Women 红⾊娘⼦军 (Chen Yin, 1972)，The White-haired Girl ⽩⽑⼥(Sang, Hu, 
1972), Song of the Dragon River ⻰江颂 (Xie Tieli,1972)，The Red Lantern 红灯
记 (Cheng Yin, 1970), Shajiabang 沙家浜 (Wu ZhaoDi, 1971), Azalea Mountain 
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杜鹃⼭ (Xie Tieli, 1974), Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy 智取危虎⼭ (Xie 
Tieli, 1970), Raid On White Tiger Regiment 奇袭⽩虎团 (Su Li & Wang Yan, 1976). 
Further but less influential revolutionary opera films included Fighting on the Plains 
平原作战 (Cui Wei; Chen Huaikai, 1974); Red Cloud Mountain 红云岗 (Li Ang; Li 
Wenhu,1976) , Boulder Bay 磐石湾  (Xie jin; Liang Tinduo, 1976). This thesis 
focused on the Beijing Opera vision of the Revolutionary Opera films, because the 
Beijing Opera films are identified as a genre in Chinese cinema that combined the arts 
form of the Beijing Opera and the film (Teo, 2013). There were seven Beijing Opera 
vision of the Revolutionary Opera films selected in this research, they are On the 
Docks 海港 (Xie Tieli & Xie Jin, 1972), The Red Detachment of Women 红⾊娘⼦
军 (Chen Yin, 1972)2, Song of the Dragon River ⻰江颂 (Xie Tieli,1972)，The Red 
Lantern 红灯记  (Cheng Yin, 1970), Shajiabang 沙家浜  (Wu ZhaoDi, 1971), 
Azalea Mountain 杜鹃⼭ (Xie Tieli, 1974) and Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy 
智取危虎⼭ (Xie Tieli, 1970). The historical background of the revolutionary opera 
films and a detailed rationale of them will be presented in Chapter Three. 
 
 
                                               
2 The Red Detachment of Women have both the Beijing Opera version filmed by Chen Yin in 1972 
and the ballet version produced by Li Chengxiang, Wang Xixian and Jiang Zhuhui in 1970. The ballet 
vision of The Red Detachment of Women was in the “Eight Model works” and much more popular 
than the Beijing Opera vision. However, this thesis focuses on the Beijing Opera version because the 
Beijing Opera films are recognized as a film genre thereby all selected revolutionary opera films in 
this thesis are Beijing Opera version rather than the ballet version.  
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Debate on Maoist Gender Discourse 
 
The establishment of The People’s Republic of China (hereafter the PRC) in 1949 
empowered the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter the CCP) to establish the absolute 
authority to construct a new gender discourse. Mao was a radical and enthusiastic 
advocate of gender equality, and one of the CCP’s leaders who could impact Chinese 
gender politics with political authority. In the Maoist era, as Mao (1965) cliamed, 
“Times have changed, and today men and women are the same. Whatever men can do, 
women can do too.”3  However, Ravni Thakur (1997) points out that the CCP’s 
understanding of women’s liberation and gender equality was based on productive 
labour, where women could achieve economic independence by participating in 
productive labour. Kam Louie (2002) also argues, “the CCP explicitly puts women’s 
liberation as secondary to class liberation. The major preoccupation of the CCP has 
been the assumption and continuance of political power: women were welcome only 
in as far as they helped to achieve this goal” (p. 47). In summary, the CCP treated 
participation in social productions and class liberation as the key representation for 
women’s liberation and gender equality. 
 
In the Maoist era, particularly during the period of the Cultural Revolution, women 
were encouraged to break the Confucian gender norm of femininity by Maoist politics 
                                               
3 Translated from Mao’s words “时代不同了，男女都一样，男同志能做到的事情，女同志也能
做到” in The People’s Daily, 27 May, 1965. 
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and were approved by the state to participate in social production with labour equal to 
men. Women worked in the public spheres such as agriculture and heavy industry 
during socialist construction, which to some extent challenged traditional views of 
women’s inferiority that were founded in Confucian patriarchy to some extent. 
According to the consensus of scholars, Maoist China was an era of masculinisation 
of women and promotion of gender equality based on masculine standards where 
women behaved and dressed like men, and this phenomenon reached its peak during 
the period of the Cultural Revolution (Croll, 1978; Johnson, 1983; Butler, 1983; Wolf, 
1985; Thakur, 1997; Mayfair, 1999). 
 
Scholars also argue that the image of masculinised women was viewed as the 
representation of women’s liberation in new China by Mao, which differed to women’s 
inferior position in Confucian times (211 BC-1911) and that of the Republic of China 
(1911-1949). (Croll, 1983; Thakur, 1997; Mayfair, 1999; Pei & Ho, 2006; Honig, 
2003). In communist ‘new’ China, especially during the Cultural Revolution, 
traditional female identity, which was feminine, was declared as bourgeois and 
replaced and dominated by a masculine discourse by the state (Croll, 1978; Dai, 1995; 
Bai, 1997; Mayfair, 1999; Honing, 2002, 2003; Cui, 2003; Pei & Ho, 2006). 
 
Significantly, gender roles and gender norms were dramatically changed during the 
Cultural Revolution. For example, scholars point out that the image of “Iron Girls” 
and “Female Warriors” were regarded as role models for Chinese women (Croll, 1977; 
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Johnson, 1983). The term ‘iron girls’ refers to women during the 1950s and 1970s 
China who participated in agriculture and heavy industry, which in previous periods’ 
traditional gender norms were identified as masculine roles. These women displayed 
hard and staunch “iron” characteristics including toughness, fearlessness and ability to 
bear any hardship (Schoenhals, 2010, p. 247). The iron girls often worked in oil fields, 
mines, forestry and fishery. For example, some famous teams were called the “iron 
girl team”, “female oil well drilling team”, “female timbering team”, “female bridge 
construction team”, “female porter team” and “female mine-drilling team” (Lu, 2010; 
Huang, 2016; Wang, 2017). 
 
During the Cultural Revolution, mass media including print, radio and film served as 
propagandistic tools that strongly followed the political agenda and deployed 
propagandistic strategies to construct the new identity of women. Scholars found that 
dominated images of prototypical masculinised women such as iron girls and female 
warriors were permissible in the media during the Cultural Revolution (Pei & Ho, 2006; 
Chen, 2009; Chang, 2010). For example, the covers of popular women’s magazines in 
the Maoist era such as The Women of China only represented agricultural and 
industrial workers who always dressed in austere working uniforms and were satisfied 
with their social conditions (Cheng, 2009; Chang, 2010; Wang, 2017). 
 
Similarly, researchers found that women in socialist fictions during the Mao era also 
usually served as a signifier of proletarian class or were portrayed as heroines to 
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represent the authority of the CCP (Meng & Dai, 1989). In other words, the image of 
women in socialist literature did not portray them as sexual objects of desire, love, 
marriage prospects and so on (Meng & Dai, 1989; Yang, 1998; Dai, 2007). 
 
In the Maoist era, it was believed that Chinese cinema served as a part of sociocultural 
revolution rather an entertainment enterprise (Cui, 2003). Scholars examining socialist 
cinema in Maoist China, particularly during the Cultural Revolution, argue that 
femininity was disavowed and female images had been replaced by a genderless and 
sexless female representation (Meng & Dai, 1989; Dai, 1995, 1999; Cui, 2003). By 
erasing gender difference, women on screen had become a collective symbol and an 
empty signifier to demonstrate equality with men in the “new China” (Meng & Dai, 
1989; Cui, 2003). 
 
In terms of the gender representations during the Cultural Revolution, there are two 
key controversies associated with Maoist gender discourse. The first controversy is 
about the identity of masculinised women in the era of the Cultural Revolution. 
Numerous scholars claim that the identity of women in Maoist China, particularly 
during the Cultural Revolution, was “gender erasing” or “genderless” because gender 
difference is absent (Cui, 2003; Pei & Ho, 2006; Chen, 2009/). Other academics such 
as Elisabeth Croll (1995) deemed the women of Mao’s China as “androgynous” or 
“gender neutral” (Croll, 1995, p. 77). In contrast, Emily Honing (2002) argued that 
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they were neither androgynous nor neutral because men were not encouraged to 
behave like women or to take domestically female roles. 
 
The second controversy is associated with “gender equality” in relation to Maoist 
gender discourse. Socialist state feminists such as Lu (2010) read the masculinisation 
of women as the representation of women’s liberation and Maoist gender discourse as 
a state feminism during the Cultural Revolution. Lu (2010) uses the iron girls 
movement as a case study to argue that Maoist gender discourse in the Cultural 
Revolution represented gender equality. She found that the iron girls movement was a 
great achievement of state feminism and the highest phase of women’s liberation in 
Maoist China. Therefore, Lu (2010) states that Maoist gender discourse was neither a 
patriarchal nor a misogynist discourse, but a form of state feminism. 
 
In contrast to Lu, Wang (2017) contests that socialist state feminists such as Lu (2010) 
lack comprehensive elaboration and theoretical critique of masculinist power in the 
Cultural Revolution. Wang (2017) elaborates that the representation of gender equality 
in the Cultural Revolution was a path for women’s participation in social production 
that was supported by the government. Like men, women were also allowed to practise 
power, which according to the definition of Marxism grants primacy to the category 
of labour. However, Marxist’s understanding of power remains problematic because 
“[M]arxism’s arguments about the social construction of self retain a centering that 
may be understood as a type of cultural essentialism” (Irene & Lee, 1988, p. xii-xiii). 
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In the case of the Cultural Revolution, the official gender discourse asserted 
rhetorically that men and women were equal but gender equality in the Cultural 
Revolution is doubtful (Wang, 2017). 
 
For socialist state feminists such as Lu (2010), the analysis of patriarchy is closely tied 
to a Marxist perspective. Similar to Mao, socialist state feminists who apply the 
methodology of historical materialism interpret patriarchy deriving from private 
property and class exploitation. The struggle for women’s liberation directly links to 
the struggle of the working classes. Indeed, the Cultural Revolution was a 
revolutionary discourse that claimed to deconstruct a patriarchal base, particularly the 
economic substructure of capitalism and feudalism. In comparison with the position 
of Chinese women in Confucian China, which was identified as a feudal and 
patriarchal society, women’s political and economic positions during the Cultural 
Revolution were radically changed. 
 
A feminist critique of patriarchy should extend to deconstruct masculinist power 
structures in a cultural dimension, and not merely examine power of labour in the 
economic or political dimensions. Such theoretical feminist critique contributes to 
reconstruct the power relation between masculinity and femininity in the revolutionary 
discourse, and further reveals the patriarchal (masculinist power) domination during 
the Cultural Revolution. By using gender representations in the revolutionary opera 
films as a case, this study aims to continually explore whether images of women are 
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genderless or gender erasing; whether these women’s images in the Maoist gender 
discourse represent gender equality or another form of patriarchy. 
 
In order to achieve comprehensive elaboration and the cultural analysis of gender 
representations in the revolutionary opera films, this study will apply the methodology 
of feminist critical discourse analysis. Feminist critical discourse analysis is an 
interdisciplinary approach that integrates Foucauldian analysis and a feminist 
approach to examine relations between power, gender and ideology in a hierarchal 
gender discourse (Lazar, 2007). Foucault’s notion of power is that it flows through 
relationships or networks of relationships. There is no powerful man, but only someone 
who is in a powerful position, or has many opportunities to exercise power. Foucault 
indicated that “power is not an institution, and not a structure, neither is it a certain 
strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical 
situation in a particular society” (Foucault, 1990, p. 93). Therefore, the concept of 
power in terms of patriarchy is that the power of men does not exist outside of social 
and gender relationships; it is exactly within these relationships that it comes into play. 
Through a feminist lens, “power has long been masculinist, and a primary target of 
masculinist power has been the subjugation of women.” (Irene & Lee, 1988, p. xiv) 
By applying Foucauldian methodology, a feminist critique of patriarchal power in this 
thesis extends to the culturally justified subordination of femininity, rather than 
examining women’s oppression that is rooted in the sexual division of labour. 
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This is not similar to socialist feminists who adopt Marxist methodology and an 
approach of historical materialism to analyse patriarchy in social participation and 
economic structure. On the contrary, feminist critical discourse analysis contributes to 
deconstruct the hierarchal power structure between masculinity and femininity in the 
gender discourse that influenced ideology during the Cultural Revolution. This section 
only offers an introductory overview of the methodology, which is described further 
in Chapter Two. 
 
The Cultural Revolution: Background 
 
The term Cultural Revolution refers to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (⽆
产阶级⽂化⼤⾰命), a radical political campaign launched by Chairman Mao that 
lasted for 10 years from 1966 to 1976. It is believed that two key reasons led to the 
Cultural Revolution. One, tensions between the Soviet Union and China that made 
Mao and his supporters fear that China would follow the USSR’s path and move 
towards a revisionist (non-orthodox) socialist direction. Another reason was that the 
‘Great Leap Forward’ (⼤跃进) (1958–1959). The Great Leap Forward was a radical 
economic and social campaign leaded by the CCP from 1958 to 1959. Mao aimed to 
largely develop Chinese industry and agriculture and transform China from an 
agrarian economy into a communist society through this campaign. This campaign 
was facing a difficult challenge in Lushan (Mount Lu) Conference in 1959 and thus 
ended in 1959 by a general understanding. It was believed that the Great Leap 
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Forward was a mistake due to the errors of the “Left” in the Party’s ideology (Zhang, 
p.449). As a disastrous radical-utopian economic movement, the Great Leap Forward 
caused a severe economic crisis, and Mao felt his political position was threatened by 
other party leaders. Therefore, Mao gathered a group of radical communists and 
intellectuals, including his wife Jiang Qing, to aid him in securing political power 
from the CCP; and the Cultural Revolution was officially launched on May 16, 1966 
(MacFarquhar, 1974; Schoenhals, 1996). 
 
The Cultural Revolution spanned 10 years and can be divided into three periods. The 
early period is from 1966 to 1969, when Mao focused on “bourgeois” infiltration in 
the CCP, closed all China’s schools and encouraged the youth, known as the Red 
Guards4, to attack traditional and bourgeois values. Mao aimed to fight against the 
party cadres with help of young Red Guards but the movement quickly turned into 
chaos. Numerous intellectuals were identified as counter-revolutionary (named ox-
freaks and snake-monsters); were physically and socially abused and many died. The 
second period started in 1969 and ended in 1971, where the main purpose was to 
oppose Lin Biao ( 林彪 ), who had been officially designated as Mao’s political 
successor by the Ninth Party Congress. To take power quickly, there were numerous 
rival communist that were tortured by Lin Biao. Mao therefore started against Lin Biao 
by joining with Premier Zhou Enlai (周恩来) and Lin was killed in an suspicious air 
                                               
4 Red Guard means a group of young people who swore to advocate and protect Mao in the Cultural 
Revolution. 
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accident in September 1971. The third period is from 1971 to 1976, when Mao 
reinstated Deng Xiaoping (邓⼩平), who was purged earlier for his pragmatic political 
approach. The Cultural Revolution ended with the death of Mao in 1976. 
(MacFarquhar, 1974; Schoenhals, 1996; MacFarquhar & Schoenhals, 2008) 
 
The Cultural Revolution was a CCP’s political movement of the anti-revisionist 
struggle that guided by Maoist Thought which was into a line of Marxism-Leninism 
for ongoing proletarian revolutionary struggle. Mao indicated the importance of the 
Cultural Revolution in 1966. He clarified that the term “cultural” includes ideology, 
social consciousness, world outlook, customs and habits, political viewpoints, legal 
viewpoints, artistic viewpoints, films, sculpture, drama, literature and educational 
system. The term “revolution” meant the proletarian and class struggle, which was 
guided by proletarian ideology i.e., the Communist ideology. Mao argued, 
 
[S]ince changes have occurred in the economic base, our social consciousness, which is 
part of the superstructure, must also change accordingly in order to catch up. We should 
destroy on a massive scale the old ideology and establish a new ideology. Where does 
ideology come from? The Marxism-Leninism Maozedong thought has always maintained 
that ideology comes from matter and that social consciousness derives from social 
existence. (Mao, 1966, cited in Schoenhals, 1996, pp. 5-9) 
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Since the early 20th century, Confucian culture and values were challenged by Chinese 
intellects in the May Fourth Movement in 1919. In the period of the Cultural 
Revolution, traditional culture, old values, in particular Confucianism, was also the 
target of criticism (Zhang & Schwartz, 1997, p. 197-202). Zhang and Schwartz (1997, 
p. 205) indicate that Confucianism and its tradition and proud heritage, such as “the 
preciousness of harmony” and “the doctrine of the mean”, were deliberately attacked 
during the Cultural Revolution. Ironically, the role of religion or Confucian values 
such as filial piety, were not fundamentally abolished but replaced by the personal cult 
of Mao (Wang, 2013). 
 
Literature Review 
 
In this thesis, the literature is integrated within the study and discussed in each chapter 
along with the topics. Hence, there is no separate chapter dedicated to literature review. 
The following section describes the key literature that informs this research. This study 
draws on several studies in relation to gender in the Cultural Revolution and the 
revolutionary opera. However, the literature on gender, culture, politics and films in 
relation to the Chinese context is integrated throughout this thesis, rather than 
congregated in this section. Only significant works have been discussed here in order 
to contextualise the research question and distinguish the research gap this thesis 
addresses. 
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  Gender and Sexuality Studies in Relation to the Cultural 
Revolution 
 
The existing literature in terms of gender, sexuality and women’s studies has focused 
on women’s masculinisation, gender identity and gender equality during the period of 
the Cultural Revolution. Masculine images of women, such as iron girls, the Red 
Guards and the “sent-down” youth are typical examples for exploring gender discourse 
in the Cultural Revolution. For instance, Lu (2010) uses the iron girls as a case of 
women’s liberation and indicates that state feminism in the Cultural Revolution was 
successful. Wang (2017) considers the iron girls as a symbol of women’s 
masculinisation and argues that heterosexual men in post-Mao China complain that 
the iron girls lack “natural femininity”. Emily Honig (2000) and Jin Yihong (2006) 
both apply a sociological methodology to explore the iron girl representation in 
relation to sexual division of labour during the Cultural Revolution. By developing 
archival research and oral history interviews, they both point out that the iron girl 
movement was a state-sponsored contestation of gender roles. The iron girls 
represented that women were expected to perform masculine behaviours and disavow 
feminine behaviours to achieve gender equality (rather than men aspiring to behave 
like women) during the Cultural Revolution. 
 
The Gender of Rebels (Cultural Revolution) by Susan Brownell and Jeffrey N 
Wasserstrom and Thomas Laqueur (2002) and Maoist Mappings of Gender: 
Reassessing the Red Guards by Emily Honig (2002) both investigate gender identity 
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by examining the image of the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. The 
research is concerned with the participation of “female violence” in the construction 
of gender identity in the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Similarly to iron girls 
who behave like men, female Red Guards are a more radical case. Analysis shows that 
female Red Guards did not treat “female violence” as a form of gender trouble, 
disorder or discontent (Honig, 2002). In contrast, they interpreted the radical masculine 
behaviour (violence) as the representation of revolution; a subversion against 
conventions that demonstrate a radical departure from the traditional feminine 
behaviours. Memoirs such as Wild Swans: Three Daughters of China (1991)，Spider 
Eaters (1997) and Red Sorrow: A Memoir of The Cultural Revolution (2012) also 
portray detailed experiences of female Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. 
These biographies are neither gender or feminist research but useful books for 
understanding the gender discourse and women’s experience in the Cultural 
Revolution. Some of Us: Chinese women growing up in the Mao era (2001) is a 
collection of nine memoirs written by Chinese female scholars and most of them 
currently work in the United States. This book contributes to a diversity of individual 
experiences in the period of the Cultural revolution that provides new perspectives of 
understanding gender and culture in this specific historical context.     
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Yang and Yan (2017) examine gender equality by exploring the image and female 
experience of “sent-down youth” during the Cultural Revolution. 5  Through 
examining the experiences of “sent-down youth” women, they found that sex 
discrimination, such as politicised marriage choices, during the Cultural Revolution 
was visible. Thus, Maoist gender discourse cannot claim to achieve gender equality. 
By equating femininity with bourgeois ideology, it is evident that Maoist gender 
discourse is an ideological utopia that disavows women’s gender identity and 
consciousness (Yang & Yan, 2017). 
 
Harriet Evans’s book Women and Sexuality in China (1997) offers an overview of the 
transformation of sexuality from Maoist China to post-Maoist China. During the 
period of the Cultural Revolution, she argues that the government attempted to erase 
sexual difference through promotion of androgyny. The sexual discourses from the 
Maoist period to Economic Reform consistently use medical explanations to denigrate 
women (Evans, 1997). By examining sexual discourse during the Cultural Revolution, 
Emily Honig (2003) argues that although the propaganda proclaimed gender equality, 
women and only women during the Cultural Revolution were treated as the objects of 
sexual scorn. 
 
                                               
5 The term “sent-down youth” refers to millions of urban youth sent to rural areas to live and work 
with farmers in the name of the “Up to Mountains and Down to the Country Side Movement” (上山下
乡运动).   
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The latest English memoir in terms of the Cultural Revolution is Li Li’s book Memory, 
Fluid Identity and the Politics of Remembering: The Representations of the Chinese 
Cultural Revolution in English Speaking Countries, published in 2016. This is the first 
book that focuses on the literature and filmic representations of the Cultural Revolution 
that were produced by Chinese writers and directors in the West, especially in the 
United States. This book provides a different lens through the viewpoint of the Chinese 
diaspora to examine how memories of the Cultural Revolution are produced, 
reproduced and consumed in the English-speaking world. 
 
Huang Wei’s book Self and Others, Women and Women’s Image (1966–1976)（⾃我
与他我， 中国⼥性及形象 1966–1976), published in 2016, is the first Chinese book 
in the area of women’s studies in the Cultural Revolution. It is historical research 
investigating archives and uses the method of typology. Huang found four 
stereotypical images of women in the Cultural Revolution. The first type is the image 
of Faithful Girls (忠诚⼥性) who swear to believe Maoist ideology. The second type 
is the image of Red Guards (红卫兵) who represent a cult of violence during the 
Cultural Revolution. The third type is iron girls (铁姑娘) who engage in industrial and 
agricultural labour in Chinese cities during the Cultural Revolution. The last type is 
named the sent-down youth (知⻘) who grew up in cities but echo Maoist politics and 
participate in agricultural labour in the country during the Cultural Revolution. 
Huang’s research fills the gap of a historical research of Chinese women in the era of 
the Cultural Revolution and offers solid documentation of women’s experiences at this 
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time. Also, Huang identifies the masculinised women, including iron girls, Red Guards 
and other types, as genderless in the Cultural Revolution. 
 
   Gender Studies in the Revolutionary Opera (films) 
 
Chinese scholarship in terms of the revolutionary operas/films has bee divided into 
three types. The first type is the historical studies that explore the historical 
backgrounds of the revolutionary operas through interview and archives. For example, 
in Rumors of The Revolutionary Operas (样板戏的⻛⻛⾬⾬), Dai Jiafang (1995) 
reveals how Jiang Qing influenced the revolutionary operas. In Close to the 
Revolutionary Opera（⾛进样板戏), Pan Zhongji (2002) portrays the destiny of actors 
and actresses after the Cultural Revolution. The second type has focused on texts, 
music, linguistic, narratives and theatre of the revolutionary operas. By using the 
revolutionary operas as texts, Zhu Keyi (2004) explores the linguistic system in the 
revolutionary discourse and interactions between the revolutionary operas and 
revolutionary literature during the Cultural Revolution. Shao Yutong’s (2007) doctoral 
dissertation The Study of Model Operas ( 样 板 戏 研 究 ) examines the historic 
background of model operas and the differences between traditional Beijing opera and 
the revolutionary operas in artistic forms. Hui Yanbing (2010) and Bao Huanran (2012) 
investigates the process of modernisation of model operas including narrative 
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paradigms, music, characters and rhetoric in the revolutionary operas by comparing 
them with traditional Beijing operas. 
 
The third type uses the revolutionary opera/films as a tool to explore gender discourse 
during the Cultural Revolution. In The Narrative of Revolutionary Operas: A Myth of 
Women in the Gaze of the Other（样板戏叙事，他者关照下的⼥性神话），Peng 
Songqiao (2004) uses character analysis and argues that women play an important role 
in the revolutionary operas. The majority of women in the revolutionary opera films 
are female protagonists and also the major heroic figures. Peng Songqiao (2004) 
claims that these female protagonists are masculinised and lack sexual difference. Thus, 
Peng Songqiao (2004) argues that the claim that women were liberated in the 
revolutionary opera is a myth. However, women were no longer subordinated to men. 
Women were marginalised in the patriarchal discourse through the process of gender 
erasure. Cheng Jide (2001) argues that the narrative of revolutionary opera seems to 
enhance women’s position but it is hiding in a discourse of masculine hegemony. The 
image of women in the revolutionary opera functions as an empty signifier to 
interpellate ideological concepts such as revolution and class. Women’s sexual 
subjectivity is missing in the gender discourse of revolutionary operas. Fan Lingna 
(2004) argues the revolutionary opera created numerous images of the heroine. For 
these heroines, they only have class and political identities rather than gendered 
identity. In other words, political identity is more important than their gendered 
identity in the revolutionary discourse. In order to portray women as independent in 
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the revolutionary operas, women were placed into a discourse of phallocentrism that 
forbade women to convey their own difference. Shen Guangming (2007) points out 
that heroines in the revolutionary operas are masculinised and they have no 
consciousness to counter the patriarchy and masculine hegemony. In summary, these 
two studies point out that images of women are masculinised, and thus read women as 
a “genderless” symbol in the gender discourse of revolutionary operas. 
 
The most significant and recent work on the revolutionary opera and gender studies in 
terms of the Cultural Revolution is Maoist Model Theatre: The Semiotics of Gender 
and Sexuality in the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), written by Rosemary 
Roberts and published in 2010. Roberts’s book uses semiotic analysis as a tool to 
examine how linguistic systems, properties, make-up, music and kinesics serve as 
symbols in the construction of division of gender roles in revolutionary opera. She then 
uses fashion theory to explore costume and hairstyles in the representation of 
revolutionary bodies. The book further analyses gender within the form of ballet, 
which is based on a methodology of dance performance. Moreover, it investigates 
gender differences using a case study of Song of the Dragon River. By applying this 
case, she discovered that female leadership differs from male leadership: female 
leadership inherits traditional feminine traits but male leadership does not. In addition, 
one chapter in this book constructs a heroine model about the women warrior in the 
revolutionary operas. It also elaborates the cultural continuum between a fictional 
figure (Hua Mulan) in traditional China and women warriors in the revolutionary 
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operas. In addition, Roberts also examines counter-revolutionary men in the 
revolutionary operas and found that male villains are effeminate.  
 
Roberts argues that the gender paradigm in the revolutionary operas is neither “gender 
neutral” nor “gender erasure”; her argument is contrary to the mainstream view of the 
image of revolutionary opera heroines that is sexless or genderless. According to 
Roberts, gender differences were maintained for both revolutionaries and counter-
revolutionaries. The revolutionary women are masculinised; however, the counter-
revolutionary men are feminised, because the revolutionary operas use theatrical 
systems to “queer” the image of male villains. Roberts (2010) thus argues 
 
Taking gender as a continuum with ultra-femininity at one extreme and ultra-
masculinity at the other, what happened in the Cultural Revolution was not the erasure 
of gender and sexuality from public, and particularly literary, discourse, but a shifting 
of gender parameters along political lines, with the parameters for ‘the revolution’ 
shifted towards the masculine end of the gender continuum and the parameters for the 
“counter revolution’ shifted towards the feminine end. The implications of this model 
for women’s sense of gender identity are much more complex than those of the ‘gender 
erasure’ model. (p. 23) 
 
Roberts’s findings provide powerful evidence against “gender erasure” theory in the 
Cultural Revolution and offers significant insights for further investigating relations 
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among power, ideology and gender, particularly women’s identity in the Cultural 
Revolution. 
 
Roberts (2010) focuses on how the understanding of gender and sexuality are 
constructed in the context of the revolutionary opera, rather than located in the 
discourse of revolutionary opera films. Few works are concerned with gender 
representations and gender issues that are represented in the revolutionary opera films. 
For instance, in The Others in the Screen Centre: Images of Women in the 
Revolutionary Opera Films（银幕中⼼的他者，⾰命样板戏电影中的⼥性形象), 
Song Guangyin (2007) argues that the revolutionary opera films indeed portray women 
as positive figures. The aim of the image of “superwomen” in the revolutionary operas 
is the construction of “social icons” for both revolutionary needs and social 
construction. Cui (2003) explores the gender issues and nation in the trajectory of 
Chinese cinema, from early productions, socialist cinema through to post-Maoist 
cinema. In her book Women Through the Lens, Cui uses The Red Detachment of 
Women (Xiejin, 1962)—which was made before the Cultural Revolution—as a case 
rather than the revolutionary opera film version to reveal how socialist cinema 
produced a collective identity for women that deleted gender difference in Maoist 
China. Zhang’s book Chinese National Cinema (2004) traces the history of Chinese 
national cinema and offers a brief introduction of the revolutionary opera films without 
any detailed film or gender analysis. 
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While examining the literature and scholarship, I found there is a research gap in the 
systemic use of the revolutionary opera films as a tool for exploring Maoist gender 
discourse, and how masculinist power works in the reconstruction of women’s gender 
identity in this gender discourse, during the Cultural Revolution. As introduced earlier, 
for feminists there is an ongoing debate about women’s identity and the understanding 
of Maoist gender discourse during the Cultural Revolution. Socialist feminists such as 
Lu (2010) recognised the masculinisation of women as a representation of gender 
equality in the period of the Cultural Revolution. Numerous scholars treated the 
masculinisation of women as evidence to support the “genderless” argument in the 
Maoist gender discourse. Roberts’s research demonstrated that both masculinity and 
femininity occurs in the gender discourse of the revolutionary opera, and there is 
gender difference in this gender discourse. Roberts’s findings indeed challenge the 
“genderless” or “gender erasure” arguments in terms of women’s masculinisation 
during the Cultural Revolution. Importantly, Roberts’s arguments inspire further 
research to explore relations between the masculinisation of women and masculinist 
power in the period of the Cultural Revolution.    
 
Echoing Roberts’s findings, this research aims to continually reveal the power 
relations between masculinity and femininity by examining gender representations in 
the revolutionary opera films. To extend Roberts’s work, this research combines 
feminist epistemology and Foucauldian theory that focus on examining hierarchal 
relations between masculinity (masculine) and femininity (feminine) in the gender 
 
 
33 
discourse of the revolutionary opera films. By applying the methodology of feminist 
critical discourse analysis, this thesis deconstructs masculinist domination (power), 
patriarchal paradigm and Maoist gender politics (ideology) through exploration of 
women’s representation in the discourse of revolutionary opera films. This research 
significantly highlights masculinist domination (power), and dynamic power relations 
between masculinity (masculine) and femininity (feminine) from Confucian China and 
Maoist China that has been represented in the revolutionary opera films. The analysis 
of masculinist power therefore offers theoretical elaborations of the phenomenon of 
masculinisation of women in a cultural dimension, and a deeper understanding about 
women’s gender identity and Maoist gender discourse in those revolutionary films. 
 
Rationale and Significance 
 
The rationale and significance of this research is to decode gender representations and 
simultaneously reveal the patriarchal domination in the Maoist gender discourse of the 
Cultural Revolution by examining the revolutionary opera films. This study fills the 
gap of the first use of the revolutionary opera films as a tool to explore women’s gender 
identity and masculinist power dominance in Maoist gender discourse during the 
Cultural Revolution by examining gender representations in the revolutionary films. 
In this study, I consider the revolutionary opera films rather than the revolutionary 
opera as ideal material to explore interactions among gender construction, masculinist 
power and Maoist ideology. 
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Firstly, a revolutionary opera film contains multiple forms of textual information 
including images, music and dialogue, which can be viewed as a link in an intertextual 
chain. While the narratives of the revolutionary operas and the revolutionary opera 
films are very similar, the theatrical discourse and cinematic discourse are distinct. 
Screen and stage are identified as different forms of arts that have their own standards. 
Susan Sontag (1966) argues, “[f]ilm is a medium as well as an art, but theatre is never 
a medium” (p. 25). Indeed, film as a narrative medium has its distinct elements for 
textual analysis including camera angles, shot composition, montage, music, editing 
and extra-diegetic sound (McAuley, 1987). In the case of the revolutionary opera films, 
it significantly integrates two art forms, the film and the Beijing Opera. As discussed 
earlier, Roberts’s work used the revolutionary opera as a tool and chose the 
methodology of semiotic analysis to decode the gendered “codes”. Particularly, 
Roberts clearly examined gender difference by decoding kinesics codes in a discourse 
of dance performance of ballet. However, this thesis, using the revolutionary opera 
films for analysis, exemplifies how gender performance, gender meaning and power 
relations between masculine and feminine codes in the discourse of revolutionary 
opera films. Most importantly, analysis of gender representations extends to decoding 
cinematic codes such as lighting, mise-en-scene, sound and cinematography, which all 
constitute (gender) meanings that enhance the understanding of Maoist gender 
discourse in the Cultural Revolution. 
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Secondly, the revolutionary opera films were the most influential media to propagate 
Maoist politics in the Cultural Revolution. To deploy the socialist cinema as an 
effective ideological apparatus, the CCP expanded its film operations by establishing 
state studios in metropolitan cities, sending projection teams to rural areas, and training 
filmmakers to work within communist ideology (Zhang, 2004). In 1967, Mao’s wife 
Jiang Qing claimed at the National Beijing Arts Conference, “We should produce the 
revolutionary opera films to popularise the revolutionary operas”.6  Consequently, 
during the Cultural Revolution, a film genre known as the revolutionary opera films 
was constructed, in which revolutionary ideology was incorporated with opera films 
to effectively propagate the revolutionary politics and consolidate the power of the 
national state (Teo, 2013). Zhang (2004) indicates that Jiang Qing suspended all other 
feature films except the revolutionary opera films in the Cultural Revolution, and thus 
the revolutionary opera film dominated Chinese socialist cinema from 1966 to 1978. 
Therefore, the revolutionary opera films were more popular and more widely seen and 
arguably more influential than the revolutionary operas during the Cultural Revolution. 
 
Thirdly, the revolutionary opera films can be approached from divergent standpoints 
and through different methods. This research uses an interdisciplinary theoretical 
framework: feminist critical discourse analysis, based on gender theory, discourse 
                                               
6 Translated from Jiang Qing’s words “革命的样板戏要普及还是要通过电影”，Jiang Qing’s Talk 
at Beijing Arts Conference, 9 Nov, 1967. 
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analysis and film analysis. Initially, film can be viewed as discourse because film 
analysis must link to social and cultural analysis (Stephen, 1993). This study aims to 
investigate the influence of the Cultural Revolution on the image of women, which 
was impacted by Maoist gender politics represented through the revolutionary opera 
films. Discourse analysis is a significant method of analysing the structure of texts to 
account both for their linguistic content and their sociolinguistic context. 7  In a 
cinematic discourse, each text incorporates elements that come from another text 
(Fairclough, 1995) or what Stephen (1993) identified as the discourse of images, 
allows critical scholars to examine how images are associated with power and ideology 
by focusing on the ideological analysis and critical interpretation. 
 
In addition, it is important to use a feminist critical perspective to interpret causality 
of gender representations, masculinist power and patriarchal ideology in Maoist 
gender discourse during the Cultural Revolution. By adopting feminist critical 
discourse analysis, it not only enables this study to decode gendered symbolism in the 
revolutionary opera films, but also explains what meaning representations of gender 
have and how they play a role in the process of gender construction in a filmic 
discourse during the Cultural Revolution. This research focuses on the analysis of 
power relations between masculinity (masculine) and femininity (feminine). The 
significance of feminist critical discourse analysis is that it methodologically enables 
a theorisation of the revolutionary opera films to reveal and theorise how masculine 
                                               
7 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/discourse_analysis 
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and feminine symbols convey important statements about masculinist power, which 
reconstruct gender meaning in the gender discourse of the revolutionary opera films. 
On the one hand, I intend the analysis of gender representations in the films as an 
approach to investigate the gender discourse in the revolutionary opera films. On the 
other hand, the deconstruction of gender politics in the revolutionary opera films will 
further reveal how patriarchal power works in the Maoist gender discourse, thus gain 
knowledge and insights to a better understanding of women’s identity in the Cultural 
Revolution. 
 
This study is transdisciplinary; it draws on feminist studies, cultural studies and film 
studies. By exploring the role of Maoist politics’ influence in dominant representation 
of women in the revolutionary opera films during the Cultural Revolution, it reveals 
how masculinist power was incorporated with Maoist gender politics that worked in 
the process of women’s masculinisation. The image of women and gender identity in 
the revolutionary opera films have not been discussed from a feminist perspective, 
which is a key contribution made by this research. The expected outcome of this study 
contributes to identify women’s gender identity in the revolutionary opera films to 
elaborate why the masculinisation of women occurred, rather than only describe what 
they looked like in the Maoist gender discourse. Moreover, this study focuses 
specifically on the analysis of power relations between masculinity and femininity that 
reveal patriarchal domination and the patriarchal politics in the revolutionary opera 
films. Thus, the final outcomes of this study will not only contribute to the theorisation 
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of women’s gender identity in the revolutionary opera films, but also produce 
knowledge for feminist critique of masculinist power dominance in the Maoist gender 
discourse. The original contributions of this study are interdisciplinary as feminist 
critical discourse is adopted to explore the political or ideological influence in 
representing women’s characters in films. Within detailed analysis of gender, culture 
and Maoist politics, this research importantly contributes to these feminist studies, film 
studies and Chinese cultural studies. It also contributes to gender and film studies, 
cultural and Asian gender studies, and socialism and gender studies. 
 
Overview of this Thesis 
 
With the aim of exploring How Maoist politics influenced the dominant representation 
of gender in the revolutionary opera films (1970–1976) during the Cultural 
Revolution, this thesis is divided into seven chapters. 
Firstly, this chapter provides introduction to the context of this research. It outlines the 
thesis’ aims, background, problems, scope and main arguments. It introduces the 
historical background of the Cultural Revolution and key literature contests about 
women’s identity within this historical period. The chapter introduces the feminist 
approach to investigate gender, female representation, power and ideology in the 
Cultural Revolution. In addition, the chapter offers a rationale for choosing the 
revolutionary opera film as a tool to explore power and gender in the context of the 
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Cultural Revolution. Chapters Two to Four establish theoretical paradigms, 
contextualise the revolutionary opera films and gender discourses from Confucian 
China to the Cultural Revolution. Chapters Five and Six respond to the research 
question by examining women’s representations in the revolutionary opera films. 
 
Chapter Two explains how and why I apply feminist critical discourse analysis as 
methodology and theoretical framework to build my thesis. By applying Foucault’s 
theories on power and discourse, the idea that gender discourse is a process of 
sociocultural and sociopolitical construction is discussed. Patriarchal domination is 
always interacting with power and ideology. Feminist critical discourse analysis can 
be interpreted as a critical approach that uses Foucault’s theories in exploring power 
and domination within a patriarchal ideology in a discourse such as films. Thus, by 
decoding gender representations in the discourse of the revolutionary opera films, it is 
simultaneously deconstructing patriarchal domination in relation to power and 
ideology within a sociocultural context. 
 
Chapter Three provides a contextualisation of socialist cinema and the revolutionary 
opera films. It explores history in terms of socialist cinema and fundamental principles 
in the production of the revolutionary opera film. It outlines the backgrounds and 
narratives in relation to each of the revolutionary opera films. Also, it offers an 
 
 
40 
overview of previous scholarship on image of women in the Cultural Revolution and 
my critical discussion that establishes my own examinations in the film analysis. 
 
Chapter Four draws power trajectories between masculinity and femininity in a 
historical and sociocultural context that contributes to the understanding about gender 
construction in the revolutionary opera films. Under the framework of social 
constructionist feminism, it uses a method of historical discourse analysis to theorise 
the power structure between masculinity (masculine) and femininity (feminine) from 
Confucian gender discourse to the revolutionary gender discourse. In this chapter, the 
intimate connection between the canon of masculinity and orthodoxy of manhood 
rooted in yin–yang philosophy is discovered. Also, the chapter investigates 
interactions between the reconstruction of Chinese masculinity, the liberation of 
women and construction of national identity in Maoist China. By comparing the 
different roles of feminine power played in the configuration of Chinese manhood, this 
chapter contributes to the understanding about cultural and political discourses in 
relation to the gender discourse in the revolutionary opera films. 
 
In line with the research analysis of the previous chapters, Chapter Five explores the 
gender meaning and power relations between masculinity and femininity in five 
revolutionary opera films. These five revolutionary opera films are, The Red Lantern 
(1970), Shajiabang (1971), On the Dock (1972), Song of the Dragon River (1972), and 
The Red Detachment of Women (1972). Through feminist critical discourse analysis, I 
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investigate power relations between masculinity and femininity by comparing gender 
relations in the revolutionary opera films. By decoding gender symbolism and 
cinematic codes in the revolutionary opera films, this chapter responds to the research 
question and builds the key explorations of this study. This chapter argues that gender 
discourse in the revolutionary opera films is another form of patriarchal domination. 
The new patriarchal paradigm maintains male dominance through constructing 
unbalanced power relations between masculinist power and feminine power, and 
women were identified as a masculine gender. Maoist gender politics was a 
masculinist politics and women were not liberated by this gender politics. Findings in 
this chapter enable me to develop arguments on women’s identity and the gender 
discourse of the revolutionary opera films in the next chapter. 
 
Extending the research of women’s representations from Chapter Five, Chapter Six is 
focused on analysis of the image of female warriors in the revolutionary opera films. 
Two films have been chosen for analysis in this chapter, The Red Detachment of 
Women (1972) and Azalea Mountain (1974). By decoding the image of female 
warriors in these three films, I answer of the question of how Maoist politics as a 
patriarchal ideology incorporates gender discourse that constructs the image of 
masculinised women in the revolutionary opera films. This chapter finds that the image 
of women serves as ideological apparatuses in the revolutionary opera films. Women’s 
bodies play a role of sites of masculinist power in the phallocentric and misogynist 
discourse. The final chapter details conclusions from the study and how the research 
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questions have been answered. It also outlines the significant outcomes of this research 
in relation to the research question.
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Chapter Two: Methodology: Gender, power, 
ideology and discourse; A Foucauldian approach 
   
   Introduction 
 
This study explores the interrelationship between gender, power and ideology through 
decoding representations of women in the revolutionary opera films. This chapter 
elaborates the feminist critical discourse analysis and why it is a useful approach for 
answering the thesis research question. Feminist critical discourse analysis is an 
interdisciplinary theoretical framework that integrates gender theory and Michel 
Foucault’s concept of power to understand how patriarchal power works in a culturally 
specific context. 
The idea that gender discourse is a process of sociocultural and sociopolitical 
construction is discussed using Foucault’s perspective on power and discourse. 
Patriarchal domination always interacts with power and ideology. Feminist critical 
discourse analysis can be interpreted as a critical approach that uses Foucault’s theories 
in exploring power and domination within a patriarchal ideology in a discourse such 
as films. Thus, decoding gender representations in the discourse of the revolutionary 
opera films simultaneously deconstructs patriarchal domination in relation to power, 
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and ideology within a specific sociocultural context. 
 
In this chapter, the relations among discourse, power and ideology will be first 
introduced by using Foucault’s theory, while how film and gender can be read as 
discourses for feminist critical discourse analysis will be elaborated later. In addition, 
terms of gender, masculinity/femininity, masculine/feminine and gender roles adopted 
in this thesis will be defined. Furthermore, the feminist critical discourse analysis, as 
it is defined and used in this thesis, will be outlined along with why and how feminist 
critical discourse analysis offers insights in the deconstruction of patriarchal 
domination, and thus addresses my research question. 
 
   Discourse, Power and Ideology 
 
In Foucault’s work The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language 
(1972), he defines ‘discourse’ as being linked to the production of statements. By 
definition of Foucault, discourse is a form of knowledge or powerful sets of statements 
that systematically interpret the world and power relations. Poster (1982) further 
elaborates, “discourses which are composed of statements, statements that are 
constituted by rules of formation and that have types of relations with other statements” 
(p. 146). According to Foucauldian perspective, the world is formed by discourses and 
it is the ‘statements’ that construct the basic unit of discourses. 
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Foucault (1972) argues that the world works through the principle of “exclusion and 
disclosure”. He states: 
 
It is more a question of determining the conditions under which it may be employed, 
of imposing a certain number of rules upon those individuals who employ it, thus 
denying access to everyone else. This amounts to a rarefaction among speaking 
subjects: none may enter into discourse on a specific subject unless he has satisfied 
certain conditions or if he is not, from the outset, qualified to do so. (p. 224) 
 
Marianne Jorgensen and Louise Phillips (2002) state that Foucault’s concept of 
discourse is not only a method and but also a methodology. The purpose of discourse 
analysis is to reveal the ‘specificities’ of a particular discourse, to uncover interactions 
between power and ideologies, such as ideas, values and opinions, which are both 
explicitly and implicitly presented in texts (Van, 1993, p. 249). In other words, 
“Foucault’s method prompts us to look at what governs statements, what allows them 
to be said in the first place, who says them, who is allowed to say them and how they 
relate to other statements and ways of speaking about a subject” (Thakur, 1997, p. 15). 
In sum, the discourse analysis is a methodology that not only aims to explain the 
content of discourses but also to explore the social relations that constitute and operate 
the discourses (Thakur, 1997, p. 14). 
 
 
 
47 
While scholars mention the concept of discourse or applying discourse analysis, it 
typically links to the concept of power and ideology (Gauntlett, 2002; Pasquino & 
Fonatana, 1984). For example, Pasquino and Fonatana (1984) argue, “Posing for 
discourse the question of power means basically to ask whom does discourse serve” 
(p. 115). In contrast to Marxism, Foucault’s viewpoint of power is as something 
exercised within interactions, rather than exercised by the dominant class under a 
hierarchical society. In The History of Sexuality, Volume One: The Will to Knowledge, 
Foucault (1998) states: 
 
Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from 
everywhere ... Power is not an institution, and not a structure, neither is it a certain 
strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical 
situation in a particular society (p. 93). 
 
Prior to Foucault, power has been viewed by Marxists as a ‘thing’ that is ‘held’ by the 
dominant class (Gauntlett, 2002). Guantlett (2002) argues, “For Marxists, and people 
on the left generally, power was seen as something held by the dominant class, the 
bosses, the owners of the means of production. For (Marxist) feminists, it was men in 
patriarchal society who had the power; women were the powerless” (p. 117). Marxist 
theory sets the stage for changing the constellation of self-understanding, such as for 
bourgeois individuals or proletarian individuals, which merely accounts an 
individual’s economic situation. 
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However, Macdonald (2002) distinguishes the Marxist’s concept of power in terms of 
class struggle and Foucault’s understanding of power as related to social relations: 
 
It was Marx who was all too often elided within the Marxist tradition he encountered 
–when this tradition talked of the “class struggle”8, Foucault noted in an interview, 
they were really more concerned with “defining this class, where it is situated, who 
it encompasses” than the “nature of the struggle.”9 It was particularly in Marx’s 
“non-theoretical, historical works” that this class indexing did not hold as strongly, 
and, for Foucault at least, such works portrayed a multi-layered analysis in which the 
intricate strategic and tactical maneuverings of individuals intersecting with 
economic conditions showed the ultimate contingency, arbitrariness, and viscosity 
of power relations. (pp. 277–278) 
 
As a post-structuralist, Foucault deems power as something that is not solid but fluid 
and flowing through relationships, or networks of relationships. Foucault (1980) 
elaborated that power not only functions as a form of chains but also must be analysed 
in these chains. Individuals are the vehicles of power; power circulates through 
individuals in a net-like organisation (p. 98). Foucault (1986) further elaborates, “[a] 
discourse does not act at the behest of power. It is power” (p. 147). There is no so-
                                               
8 Foucault, “The end of the Monarchy of Sex”, in Foucault Live, p. 154. 
9 Foucault, “The end of the Monarch of Sex”, in Foucault Live, p. 154 
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called ‘power’ without social relationships; it is the existence of social relations that 
ensures the opportunities for accessing and exercise of power (Gauntlett, 2002). Power 
in terms of discourse is not a material or social referent but discourse is an effective 
instance that embodies the deployment of power (Thakur, 1997). Power, like an entity, 
may be shifted from one person to another and may be acquired by one’s position 
within a social hierarchy. 
 
The Marxist notion of ideology has been widely used to describe how the ideas and 
values that comprise these views reflect particular interests. In Marxist tradition, 
ideology is a term to describe the collective beliefs or illusory forms of thought that 
depart from a criterion of objectivity. Macey (2000, p. 198) argues that in The German 
Ideology, Marx and Engels (1845) identify ideology as a camera obscura in which 
social relations are perceived in an inverted form. Gramsci had investigated the linkage 
between the organic ideologies and world-views of social classes, which are associated 
with cultural factors and a further sophisticated elaboration has been drawn out by 
Louis Althusser. In Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, Althusser (1970) 
illustrated that “Ideology is a representation of the imaginary relationship of 
individuals to their real conditions of existence; ideology has a material existence; and 
ideology interpellates individuals as subjects” (p. 153). Althusser’s interpellation can 
be viewed as a mechanism that produces subjects (individuals) in such a way that they 
recognise their own situation in terms of the dominant ideology of the society in which 
they live. 
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One of the aims of discourse analysis is to draw out the ideologies by revealing where 
they might be presented implicitly in texts (Anders & David, 2013). In other words, 
engaging in a discourse analysis is to uncover different ideologies that are endorsed in 
a specific discourse within a specific context. At the same time, the kind of social 
relations that construct the discourse simultaneously reflect these social relations, and 
the discourse as power forms social ideas, values and opinions that have been 
represented by material existence, such as texts and images. 
 
For all feminists, there is the same question to address: “what results in the oppression 
of women and how can that oppression be ended” (Jaggar, 1983, p. 124). In other 
words, the goal of a feminist critique is to understand relationships between patriarchal 
power, male domination and women’s oppression. Foucault’s ideal of power therefore 
provides social constructionist feminists a useful analytical framework to explain 
feminist questions. Firstly, how does patriarchal power work through social relations 
that have been historically and culturally constructed by constitutive powers of 
discourse? Secondly, how constructions of women’s sexuality and gender identity are 
historical and specific, rather than essentialist feminists’ claims of biological essence 
or liberal feminists’ critique of universal phenomenon.  However, Marxist feminists 
include radical and socialist feminists, which are both applying a historical materialist 
method of traditional Marxism, and acknowledge gender and sexuality as historical 
and social constructions (Beasley, 2005; Jaggar, 1983). As discussed earlier, 
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Foucault’s thought of power is different to the Marxist ideal of power. The distance 
between Foucault and Marxist accounts of power is crucial for feminist critiques of 
patriarchal power, male’s domination and women’s oppression in a socialist gender 
discourse. 
 
For example, Marxist feminists adopt a Marxist account of power and treat power as 
a thing that can be possessed, and power comes from the top to bottom in a hierarchal 
social structure. The first problem one encounters in elaborating women’s oppression 
from a traditional Marxist framework is that women’s oppression equals class 
oppression. Second, Marxist analysis highlights economic determinism, thus women’s 
oppression is reduced to an ideological effect and male domination simply elaborates 
as sexual division of labour. For Marxist feminists, women’s oppression is attributed 
to an imbalanced economic position between women and men, and men possess the 
political and economic power in a patriarchal discourse. The potential weakness of 
Marxist feminism is, “by privileging the labour/capital diction, it renders women 
peripheral unless they are engaged in productive wage labour. Women have been 
marginalized by classical Marxism” (McNay, 1992, p. 24). Indeed, women’s 
oppression is more complex than the Marxist account of class oppression, and 
representations of patriarchal power are working everywhere, including the 
sociopolitical and sociocultural dimensions, rather than only in the political dimension. 
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Foucault’s understanding of power possibly contributes in revealing some differences 
to Marxist feminism. As discussed earlier, contrary to the Marxist account of power, 
Foucault does not treat power as a thing, and also rejects Marxists’ Top-Bottom power 
analytical model. For Foucault, power is not any particular ‘thing’ that can be shared, 
owned or possessed, but a process of interactions between different social relations 
that comes from everywhere. For some feminist literature, power has been also read 
as domination. Foucault’s understanding of power strongly encourages feminists to 
think of the representations of patriarchal domination in different social and cultural 
discourses. Patriarchy is not only represented by Marxist accounts of class oppression, 
but also embodied through complex social relations. Patriarchal power trajectories, 
such as domination and subordination, empowerment and disempowerment, are not 
only represented through social interactions between the ruling class/men and the 
oppressed class/women, but also work through social construction between masculine 
and feminine character types. 
 
According to Foucault’s understanding, power follows through relationships or 
networks of relationships, and there is no powerful man but only someone who is in a 
powerful position or has many opportunities to exercise power. Foucault’s theory of 
power contributes to the understanding of the masculinisation of women as cultural 
phenomenon that derives from unbalanced power relations between masculinity and 
femininity. By locating the phenomenon of masculinised women in a cultural 
dimension, Foucault’s approach enables the exploration of masculinist dominance 
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(power) through deconstruction of hierarchy between masculinity (masculine) and 
femininity (feminine) in the gender discourse of the revolutionary opera films.  
 
It has been noted that under the patriarchal gender norm, ‘masculinity’ has been 
viewed as the crucial point to construct male identity, and its central concept is power 
(Connell, 1987; Kimmel, 1987; Brittan, 1989; Segal, 1990; Kaufman, 1994; Chris, 
2005). Feminists have observed that the social construction of sex and gender accord 
specifically masculine and feminine character structures (Mitchell, 1971, 1975; Rubin, 
1975; Chodorow, 1978) that are significant elements in maintaining male dominance 
(Jaggar, 1983). Therefore, a feminist viewpoint is concerned with how masculinist 
power works through patriarchal institutions and ideology that construct a gender 
representation, which in the case of this research examines the masculinisation of 
women in the gender discourse of the Cultural Revolution Meanwhile, it is important 
to uncover which kinds of social, power and hierarchal relations existing between 
masculinity and femininity have been shaped and represented through the filmic texts. 
What are the differences in understanding conceptions of categories of masculinity and 
femininity in the discourse of the revolutionary opera films, and what are the 
epistemological consequences for feminism in relation to the understanding of 
women’s oppression and patriarchal power? 
 
In this study, the most appropriate methodology is therefore to combine Foucault’s 
understanding of power and feminist perspectives to explore interactions among 
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Marxist ideology, patriarchal power and gender constructions that are embodied by 
analysis of gender representations in the revolutionary opera films. On the one hand, 
Foucault’s account of power enables the investigation of patriarchal power as a 
particular masculinist power in multiple dimensions that moves beyond Marxist’s 
economic determinism. On the other hand, feminist critiques can foster a complex 
understanding of women’s oppression, and women’s identity, in socialist gender 
discourse.  
 
 
   Film as Text and Discourse 
 
By definition of Fairclough and Wodak (1997), critical discourse analysis is an 
interdisciplinary approach to the social analysis of discourse. Fairclough (1992) has 
drawn a three-dimensional model for critical discourse analysis. In this model, he 
demonstrates that a discourse refers to language used in a text such as speech, writing, 
visual image, or a combination of these. In addition, it should be a discursive practice 
in relation to processes of production and consumption of text (Fairclough, 1992). 
Furthermore, it should be involved in a wider social practice. Based on Fairclough’s 
three-dimensional model, critical discourse analysts argue that there are some common 
features for critical discourse analysis. 
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First, the aim of critical discourse analysis is to investigate social and cultural 
structures through texts that are viewed as an important form of social practice and 
constitute the social world, including social identities and relations. Scholars elaborate 
that not only written and spoken language can be viewed as linguistic texts but also 
visual images and sound, which contain semiotic systems that can be identified as 
multi-modal texts (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002). Based on the diversity of texts, the 
critical discourse analysis can be applied in a wide range of research, particularly in 
the studies of mass communication, nationalism, identity, democracy and politics 
(Fairclough, 1998, 2000; Chouliaraki, 1999; Van Dijk, 1991; Wodak, 1999). 
 
Second, discourse is a form of social practice that contributes to the construction of 
the social world, but also is constructed by other relevant discourses. In other words, 
discourses do not only constitute social structures, they also reflect social structures 
(Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002; Fairclough, 1992). Third, Louise Phillips and Marianne 
Jorgensen (2002) argue that “language as discourse is both a form of action through 
which people can change the world and a form of action which is socially and 
historically situated and in a dialectical relationship with other aspects of the social” 
(p. 62). Therefore, the analysis of linguistic texts should be analysed within their social 
context. 
 
Significantly, critical discourse analysis functions ideologically, and thus it contributes 
to disclose power relations between communication processes and society in general 
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(Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002; Fairclough, 1992). In summary, critical discourse 
analysis is text-oriented research, and a politically oriented research rather than a 
politically neutral research (Phillips & Jorgensen, 2002). It aims to investigate links 
among texts, social and cultural practices and structures. Therefore, critical discourse 
analysis can be interpreted as an interdisciplinary methodology that combines textual 
analysis and sociopolitical/sociocultural analysis. 
 
Films can be viewed as a discourse and text in the critical discourse analysis. Initially, 
Stephen (1993) argues that film is a semiotic system that can be viewed as linguistic 
text in film analysis. Similar to a book, films are read as texts for ‘reading’ by viewers 
or critics, “with the concomitant implication that such reading activates similar 
processes of semiotic decoding” (Stephen, 1993, p. 16). In addition, Prince (1993) 
states that film can be also viewed as discourse because film analysis must link to 
social and cultural analysis. In the case of films, either linguistic signs or cinematic 
signs can only produce meaning inside the social and cultural context from which they 
have developed (Burnett, 1991). 
 
Stephen Prince (1993) further elaborates that film is a discourse due to its relations 
among cinematic codes, ideologies and social variables. Films are complex structures 
that contain number of signs such as shot/reverse-shot cutting, subjective images and 
other aspects of point-of-view editing. These signs as cinematic codes permit viewers 
to interpret the construction of cinematic discourse and elaborate the semiotic system 
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within the films that Althusserian–Lacanian terms as the interpellation of subjects. 
Like language, films can be interpreted as discourse; using a symbolic system that 
entails being positioned socially, ideologically in and by the categories that the system 
has helped create (Prince, 1993, p. 17). Therefore, cinematic discourse, or what 
Stephen Prince (1993) identified as the discourse of images, allows scholars to 
critically examine how images are associated with power and ideology by using the 
ideological analysis and critical interpretation. Most importantly, cinematic images 
only make sense in an existing discourse that constitutes the meaning of cinematic 
code by history and culture (Heath, 1981; Prince, 1993). 
 
However, there is a range of texts, such as novels, films, posters and picture books, 
that offer an approach to investigate Maoist gender and political discourses during the 
Cultural Revolution (Roberts & Li, 2018). The revolutionary opera films are a unique 
genre in Chinese cinema, which combines two different art forms, the Beijing Opera 
and films (Teo, 2013). On the one hand, the revolutionary opera films can be treated 
as a complex symbolic system containing cinematic codes, i.e. shots, lighting, mise-
en-scene, colour, narrative paradigm and costumes. These cinematic codes construct a 
critical discourse that reflects Chinese cultural specificity. On the other hand, the 
Beijing Opera as a form of performance arts combines music, speech, costumes, 
gestures, acrobatics, props, stage craft and techniques. Since the late 19th century, the 
Beijing Opera has “respond to shifting socio-political contexts, and sought to reflect 
China’s position within the globalised politics of the 20th century” (Thorpe, 2011, 
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p.276). Most significantly, the revolutionary opera films produced in the era of the 
Cultural Revolution played a significant role of propaganda. Therefore, this study 
chose the revolutionary opera films as research material because they are the ideal text 
to examine gender representations during the Cultural Revolution on the one hand, and 
a critical discourse to explore Chinese cultural specificity and Maoist ideology on the 
other. 
 
   Gender as Discourse – A Feminist Perspective 
 
Foucault’s approach has been used successfully by feminists to examine precisely 
gender issues that are usually excluded in a more traditional gender analysis (Martin, 
1988). Firstly, Foucault’s methodology is a way to ascribe gender as a discourse, and 
the relations among gender, power and ideology are complex and subtle (Thakur, 1997; 
Lazar, 2007). According to Foucault’s perspective, power comes from all sides; 
gendered subjects are affected by it in different ways. Therefore, feminists integrate 
Foucault’s understandings of power to elaborate the gendered subjectivity. For 
example, Weedon (1987) defines women’s subjectivity as “The conscious and 
unconscious thoughts and emotions of the individual, her sense of self, and her ways 
of understanding her relation to the world” (p. 32). Kerfoot and Knights (1994) argue 
that subjectivity is constructed through the exercise of power. Gender subjectivity is 
constructed by and through gender discourses; gender/sexual identity of men and 
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women as masculine and feminine subjects (p. 71). By applying these definitions of 
gender subjectivity in my thesis, it is necessary to complement the concept of 
masculinist power as patriarchal dominance within Gramsci’s notion of hegemony to 
investigate how women have been marginalised in the constitution of the meaning of 
power. 
 
According to Antonio Gramsci’s definition, hegemony is not simply an expression of 
dominance, but also means by which a social group or class cannot take governmental 
power unless it has already established its ideological hegemony over society (Macey, 
2000. p. 177). Fraser (1989) and Sawicki (1991) claim that gender is closely bound to 
the question of power, and analysing power is to deeply understand patriarchal 
dominance. Foucault’s understandings of power in diverse ways enables feminists to 
rethink the nature of patriarchal forms of power; its use and abuse. For instance, Robin 
Morgan (1989) argues, “patriarchal power requires the monopolising of power, which 
in turn requires the mono defining of power as a static and singular object, the better 
to monopolise it” (p. 325). Feminists thus argue that the question of patriarchy is how 
the category of ‘women’ has been discursively devalued and subordinated to the 
category of ‘men’ in a discourse of hierarchically gendered social order (Braidotti, 
1989; Kurzwell, 1986; Lazar, 2007). 
 
Though a feminist lens, an interpretation of gender is inextricably bound to questions 
of power and its dynamics between the politics and practices. Analysing power 
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involves an in-depth understanding of patriarchy and its transformations on the other 
(Lazar, 2007; Fraser, 1989; Sawicki, 1991). Importantly, Foucault’s account of power 
can contribute to feminists theorising relations of gender and power, moving away 
from a Marxist perspective that relies on a traditional, economic paradigm of power 
(Radtke & Stam, 1994). In the case of feminist studies, based on Foucault’s theory of 
power, Karlene Faith (1994) analysed how patriarchal power causes disadvantages for 
women in a male-dominated discourse. Deborah Kerfoot and David Knights (1994) 
examined the link between the ‘nature of gender’ and power relations. 
 
Lazar (2007) argues there is a complex dynamic that exists between power, ideology 
and gender (identity) in a critical feminist discourse. Kerfoot and Knights (1994) argue 
that gender is a product of power relations while gender relations reflect gendered 
subjectivities that are constructed by power relations, and thus these power relations 
produce/reproduce gender inequality and men’s domination. Connell (1987) argues 
that masculinity plays an important role in the power structures that construct gender 
relations. Different frameworks of gender/sex politics further influence gender orders 
and gender relations, while the state regulates gender relations and also controls the 
transformation of gender relations. 
 
According to numerous feminist critics, the conception of gender is an ideological 
structure related to the biological organism (Lazar, 2007; French, 1994; Connell, 1990) 
but in fact, gender is a social rather than natural product (Lazar, 2007; Butler, 1993; 
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Connell, 1990; French, 1994). Since societies have been dominated by patriarchy, 
ideologies are representations of practices formed from patriarchal interests to 
maintain patriarchal power relations and dominance (French, 1994; Lazar, 2007). 
Gender ideology is hegemonic in that it often does not appear as dominant at all; 
instead it seems largely consensual and acceptable to most in a community. The 
winning of consent and perpetuation of the otherwise tenuous relation of dominance 
(Grasci, 1971) is largely accomplished through discursive means, especially in the way 
ideological assumptions are constantly re-enacted and circulated through discourse as 
commonsensical and natural (Lazar, 2007). For example, gender norm constructs a 
gender dichotomy based on the sexual difference. However, feminists critique that 
sexual difference only makes sense within the framework of gender structure. For 
example, Grant (1993) argues, “it is true that the structure of gender acts through and 
is inscribed on sexed bodies, but the whole idea of two sexes only has meaning because 
those meanings are required by the gender structure in the first place” (p. 185). 
Particularly for Marxist feminists, gender (structure) can be understood as an 
ideological structure that divides individuals into two hierarchical classes: men as the 
dominant class and women as the subordinated class. Patriarchy therefore is viewed as 
an ideological system that interacts with complex ideologies, such as corporatist and 
consumerist ideologies (Lazar, 2007). 
 
Gender is not an individual property but of the behaviours to which members of a 
society ascribe a gendering meaning (Sakar, 2014). Feminist theory has concentrated 
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on showing how the category ‘women’ has been discursively degraded and 
subordinated to the category ‘men’ (Braidotti, 1989). Feminism has also focused on 
showing how ‘women’s discourse’ or women’s participation in representation has 
been limited and their discourse marginalised. Thus, women have been marginal in the 
constitution of meaning and, therefore, power (Kurzwell, 1986). Haraway (1990) 
describes the different attributes that are given to men and women as ‘gender identity 
paradigms’, which in turn are historically and socially specific. Consequently, the 
different discourses that exist about gender in society function as paradigms that 
construct women’s identity. 
 
According to Haraway (1990), the formulations of ‘gender’ have changed in meaning 
since the concept was first introduced by feminists. While earlier definitions centred 
around distinguishing gender as a concept from biological sex, these definitions failed 
to question the political and social history of concepts that emerged. She argues that 
the women’s movement has constructed women’s experience as much as it has 
uncovered or discovered it. (Harway, 1990) Thus, it is not a matter of recovering true 
female nature that is socially instead of biologically constructed, or female nature as 
constructed through women’s relation to the modes of production and the organisation 
of labour in society, but a matter of seeing how the gender discourse provides a 
paradigm through which female identity is constructed in different discourses and in 
different sites (Owens, 1985; Harway, 1990). 
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‘Gender’ in this thesis is located within a framework of Social Constructionism. From 
a social constructionist's feminist perspective, there is no core essence in terms of 
gender difference. Individuals are made or marginalised as different by relations of 
power (Jackson & Scott, 1966, pp. 11-12). It is power that creates the domination and 
gender difference. I choose Scott’s gender theory to define the term of gender in my 
thesis: 
 
Gender is an analytic category. Gender is a constitutive element of social relationships 
based on perceived differences between the sexes, and gender is a primary way of 
signifying relationships of power. Gender is a primary field within which or by means 
of which power is articulated. When historians look for the ways in which the concept 
of gender legitimizes and constructs social relationships, they develop insight into the 
reciprocal nature of gender and society and into the particular and contextually 
specific ways in which politics constructs gender and gender constructs politics. (Scott, 
1986, pp. 1066-1073) 
 
Historically speaking, gender is a type of ‘cultural construction’, a way of referring to 
subjective identities of men and women, a social category imposed on the sexed body. 
The term patriarchy describes how the male dominates the female, and the process of 
reproduction of men’s domination (Scott, 1986, 1999). Social Constructionism is 
against ‘essentialism’ where presumed gender is the essential core to gender/sexual 
difference, and the category of women is a ‘fixed feminine way of being’ (Beasley, 
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2005). For Social Constructionists, gender ‘difference’ is not apprehended as an 
essence but constructed by relations of power (Jackson & Scott, 1996). Social 
Constructionism can be viewed as located in the ‘side’ of Modernist/Postmodern 
border (Beasley, 2005). Therefore, Social Constructionist feminists reject modernist 
feminists’ – such as Gray’s (1993) – emphasis on ‘women centred’ gender difference 
(Jackson, 1996, 1998). They claim there is no pre-existing inner core to self; 
womanhood and manhood are variable processes in specific historical cultural settings 
(Burr, 1995). 
 
My study aims to investigate relations between power, gender and politics in a 
historical context. The Social Constructionist approaches enable me to investigate 
identity categories within a perspective of social relationships and historical 
construction, which focus on changing social-structuring effects of power rather than 
essentialists’ concern about biological parameters. By applying Social Constructionist 
approaches, this research is a valuable inquiry to investigate dynamic relations 
between the masculinisation of women, gender politics and power from a historical 
perspective. In the context of the Cultural Revolution, significance of women’s 
masculinisation is the collective activities that were mobilised by the state’s ideology: 
a Socialist ideology rather than an individual choice. Thereby, it could be viewed as a 
critical case to investigate how the gender politics produced by a Socialist ideology 
constructed the masculinisation of women. 
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  Gender Role: Masculinity/Femininity 
 
The terms ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ are significant and fundamental to gender 
analysis that avoids confusions of gender and sex. Connell (1995) elaborates: 
 
If we speak only of differences between men as a bloc and women as a bloc, we would 
not need the terms ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ at all. We could speak of ‘men’s’ and 
‘women’s’, or ‘male’ and ‘female’. The terms ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ point beyond 
categorical sex difference to the ways men differ among themselves, and women differ 
among themselves, in matters of gender. (p. 69) 
 
In this research, terms of masculinity/femininity or masculine/feminine are defined by 
the rationale of the masculinity and femininity Scale test. In 1930s, psychologists 
Lewis Terman and Catherine Miles first applied the rationale of the masculinity and 
femininity Scale test (hereafter referred to the M/F scale) to measure the degree of 
‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ in terms of different sex (Terman & Miles, 1936). The 
M/F scale represents the stereotypical but also popular understanding of masculinity 
and femininity. According to the rationale of M/F scale, the masculine traits and 
behaviours should contain characteristics including courage, roughness, self-reliance, 
confidence, ambition, aggression, analyticality, assertiveness and athleticism. These 
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psychological characteristics have been viewed as positive to the opposing feminine 
characteristics involving tenderness, dependence, prudishness, frivolity, 
querulousness, affection, cheerfulness, childishness, compassion (Terman & Miles, 
1963; Archer & Lloyd, 1985; Williams & Bennett, 1975). 
 
By applying Social Constructivist approaches, it is important to note that both 
masculinity and femininity are not fixed terms. Scholars argue that the M/F scale 
possibly has been influenced by gender ideology, sexual orientation, biological 
hormones, cultural values and social practices (Thompson & Pleck, 1995; Luyt, 2005; 
Lucia, 1985; Helen & Lee, 1979; de Cillis & Orbison, 1950). In some specific contexts, 
it is possible that masculinity and femininity do not match the M/F scale that identifies 
masculinity/femininity, but denote masculine/feminine traits. Men and women are 
identified as different sexual categories but they are not necessarily ‘masculine’ or 
‘feminine’. 
 
The stereotypical definition of masculinity and femininity according to the M/F scale 
can be argued as an essentialist and patriarchal logic. For example, Connell (1995) 
argues that the simple definition of masculinity/femininity constructs the so-called 
pattern masculinity/femininity that statistically discriminates between groups of men 
and women. Connell (1995) also emphasises, “[M]/F scale test is unavoidably a 
process of social attribution using common-sense typologies of gender. Positivist 
procedure thus rests on the very typologies of gender” (p. 69). Thus, terms including 
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masculinity/femininity and masculine/feminine in this thesis refer to definitions of the 
M/F scale. However, it is acknowledged that the meanings of masculinity and 
femininity are socially, culturally and politically constructed, and the standards of 
femininity and masculinity in the M/F scale are based on a (patriarchal) binary logic. 
 
A gender pattern that Connell deems as a combination of the gender regimes10 of 
social organisations and a gender order of a society that influences the performances 
of gender roles, is structured according to the division of masculinity and femininity 
(Connell, 2009). The term ‘gender role’ is derived from ‘role theory’ that is based on 
a theatrical metaphor that all social behaviours are deemed as a kind of performance 
(Nigel & Margaret, 1996, p. 102). In terms of the sex/gender role, it means that our 
society is an arena, gender is a role and gender behaviour is a kind of performance in 
accordance with social construction. 
 
According to the book Gender roles, a handbook of tests and measures, the M/F scale 
sets ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ as a single bipolar dimension that influences men 
and women playing two opposite gender roles (Beere, 1990). Typically, both women 
and men perform or behave in ways that are socially prescribed (Hargreaves, 1986). 
For example, the masculine personality has been viewed as exhibiting predominance 
of instrumental interests, needs and functions; while the feminine personality tends 
                                               
10 “Gender regime” refers to the state of play of gender relations in a given institution such as school, 
family and neighbourhood (Connell, 1987, p. 20). 
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more to the primacy of expressive interest, needs and functions (Talcott & Bales, 1953, 
p. 101). Therefore, the orthodox male role in relation to gender roles requires men to 
perform male behaviours that represent masculine traits, and simultaneously avoid all 
feminine behaviours and traits. 
 
The stereotypical masculine roles include technical, executive and judicial roles due 
to masculine traits, which are typecast as dominance, intelligence, independence, 
confidence and strength (Talcott & Bales, 1953; Weisgram & Dinella & Fulcher, 2011). 
In contrast, feminine roles are viewed to serve most supportive, integrative and 
tension-managing roles resulting from stereotypical feminine traits including altruist, 
sensitivity and gentleness (Dinella & Fulcher, 2011).  
 
Indeed, this stereotype of gender roles shapes the majority of gender performances and 
behaviours in most societies, and thus these stereotypical roles contribute to the 
reproduction and socialisation of gender norms. However, there are some gender 
performances and behaviours that diverge from the traditional binary paradigm of 
gender roles, such as homosexuality, transsexuality, female masculinity, male 
femininity and androgyny. 
 
In the meantime, because social institutions such as families, schools, workplaces and 
media can facilitate the internalisation of gender roles for both men and women, it is 
arguable that women may also learn how to perform male behaviours through a 
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combination of observation, imitation and indoctrination (Mischel, 1970; Bandura, 
1977). In particular, the masculinised women have the awareness to actively imitate 
the male roles through their male families, colleagues, friends or some other male 
media role models. Women who practise masculinity would counter strongly the 
cultivation of the female role arising from social agents. Consequently, a process of 
the combination of an avoidance of female roles and an imitation of male roles 
ultimately contributes to masculinised women performing masculine behaviours and 
roles. 
 
On the one hand, role theory focusing on men and women as two biologically 
distinctive categories results in two different gender roles. On the other hand, role 
theory supports an important way to explore women’s masculinisation in participation 
in the public sphere. First, it demonstrates that the masculinisation of women possibly 
embodies masculinity and the practice of masculine power through practising the male 
role. Second, from Butler’s perspective, the concept of gender has been viewed as 
performative rather than natural; it cannot be absolutely restricted by bodies (Butler, 
1993). Butler (1990) argues that gender is doing, gender is performed. By Butler’s 
definition, gender performance means the role of a man or a woman is acting, but 
gender performativity means a series of effects that has been produced by gender 
performance (Butler, 1990). Thus, women may compete with men in the social 
participation and ask for social recognition via performing masculine roles. 
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By applying the Social Constructionist feminist framework, this study treats the gender 
construction as a social process of dynamic power relations between masculine and 
feminine characteristics. Therefore, this study aims to examine the dynamic roles of 
masculinity (masculine) and femininity (feminine) played in different historical 
discourses, from Confucian China to Maoist China. Also, this study drives the 
exploration of how the patriarchal (masculinist) power incorporated the Maoist gender 
politics that influenced the understanding of gender in the discourse of the 
revolutionary opera films. Particularly, this study highlights how masculinity and 
masculine roles shape women’s representations i.e. women’s bodies, gestures and 
gender performance in the revolutionary opera films. 
 
  Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
To explore relations among the gender representations, ideology and patriarchal power 
in the gender discourse of the revolutionary opera films, feminist critical discourse 
analysis is employed as key methodology. Feminist critical discourse analysis is a 
feminist political perspective on gender concerned with analysing the complex 
interrelationships of gender, power and ideology in discourse within a hierarchically 
gendered social order. Through examining language and other semiotic and symbolic 
modalities such as visual images, layouts, gestures and sound, the feminist critical 
discourse analysis aims to make an enriching and insightful feminist critique of 
discursive constructions of gender (Lazar, 1999, 2000, 2007). 
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Feminist critical discourse analysis is a feminist approach that attempts to reveal the 
complex workings of power and ideology in discourse that exists in a hierarchically 
gendered social order. Lazar (2007) demonstrates the importance of feminist critical 
discourse analysis (CDA): 
 
Feminist CDA has the advantage of operating, at the outset, within a politically invested 
program of discourse analysis. CDA offers a sophisticated theorisation of the relationship 
between social practices and discourse structures, and a wide range of tools and strategies 
for close analysis of actual, contextualised uses of language. Further, under the umbrella 
of CDA research, explicit analyses of various forms of systemic inequalities have been 
developed. For feminist discourse scholars, much can be learnt about the interconnections 
as well as particularities of discursive strategies employed in various forms of social 
oppression that can feed back into feminist strategies for social change. The marriage of 
feminism with CDA, in sum, can produce a rich and powerful political critique for action. 
(p. 5) 
 
From the perspective of feminist Social Constructionism, patriarchy is an ideological 
system that historically produces asymmetrical power relations that degrade and 
diminish the category of women and simultaneously maintain men’s dominance. The 
central concern of feminist critical discourse analysis is “[c]ritiquing discourses which 
sustain a patriarchal social order; that is, relations of power that systematically 
 
 
72 
privilege men as a social group and disadvantage, exclude and disempower women as 
a social group” (Lazar, 2007, p. 5). Thus, feminist critical discourse analysis can be 
viewed as theory and a political praxis (Lazar, 2007). It focuses on analysis of gender 
discourse, which discursively shows working of patriarchal power in an ideological 
social structure and relations via examining various discursive strategies emergent in 
different texts, and thus contributes to ongoing contestation of the conception of 
gender. 
 
This project aims to investigate the influence of the Cultural Revolution on the image 
of women in terms of the understanding of female identity produced in and 
demonstrated by the revolutionary opera films. Indeed, the ‘image of women’ in the 
revolutionary opera films is the subject of my project, which can be understood as the 
textual representations of gendered social praxis during the Cultural Revolution. Also, 
the image of women can be viewed as the statement of gender discourse within the 
revolutionary opera films. Thus, a discourse analysis will contribute to the exploration 
of the questions including: What is the dominant statement/image of women in the 
gender discourse? Who is authorised to portray this dominant image? What does the 
dominant image look like and how is it relevant to other subjects in the gender 
discourse? Because the main research question is How did Maoist politics influence 
the dominant representation of gender in the revolutionary opera films During the 
Cultural Revolution (1970–1976), applying feminist critical discourse analysis is the 
most productive method to examine this question. 
 
 
73 
 
By applying the feminist critical discourse analysis, this study is not only in relation 
to the subject ‘image of women’ but also a study of discourses around which the 
‘subject’ is constructed. Based on discourse analysis, the dominant representation of 
gender can be read as the statement of gender discourse in the Cultural Revolution. 
Maoist ideology formed this gender discourse, and national state-empowered media 
institutions such as the film producers implanted this gender discourse into the 
representation of women in the revolutionary opera films. Meanwhile, the image of 
women in the revolutionary opera film can be understood as the praxis of the dominant 
gender discourse. Therefore, my project can be viewed as a critical study that explores 
where power goes in a hierarchal gender paradigm and how power works in the 
construction of gender in a historical cultural context. 
 
The feminist critical discourse analysis will facilitate the complex analysis of power. 
It contributes to uncovering how the complex gendered assumptions and hegemonic 
power relations are produced and reproduced through different contexts and 
communities (Lazar, 2007). Thus, the task of feminist critical discourse analysis is to 
examine how power, in particular patriarchal power and dominance, are discursively 
produced and/or resisted in a variety of ways through textual/symbolic representations 
of gendered social practices, and through interactional strategies of language. 
Feminists have shown that gender is a process of ideological construction that varies 
in cultural and historical contexts (Lauretis, 1987). Thus, feminist critical analysis can 
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be understood as a feminist political action to deconstruct the specificity of cultural, 
historical and institutional frameworks (Lazar, 2007), and this project undertakes this 
in relation to the opera films of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. 
 
The aim of this study is not only to depict gender representation, but also investigate 
how patriarchal power and ideology work on gender representations. As introduced in 
Chapter One, the masculinisation of women in Maoist China was encouraged by state 
feminism in accordance to Marxist gender theory. Within the continuity of applying a 
classic Marxist method, the power structure in relation to dominance and gender 
hierarchy in the revolutionary opera film can be only examined in political and 
economic dimensions. In contrast, Foucault’s concept of power is moving away from 
Marxist power that is based on economic conditions. Based on Foucault’s concept of 
power, the feminist critical discourse analysis extends the exploration of image of 
women in a cultural dimension; a broader scope. By applying feminist critical 
discourse analysis, this study not only contributes to an investigation of how 
patriarchal power dominates the power relations between men and women, but also 
helps to rethink the tension between masculinity and femininity in a Chinese cultural 
discourse. 
 
To understand the representation of gender during the Cultural Revolution and its 
relevant gender discourse, this project will be divided into two parts. The first part 
aims to investigate the transformation of power relations between masculinity and 
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femininity from ancient China to Maoist China. As discussed previously, the aim of 
feminist critical discourse analysis is to deconstruct the gender discourse in the 
revolutionary opera film and simultaneously elaborate the interrelationships among 
gender, power and ideology in this gender discourse. Most importantly, gender is a 
variable and contextual notion and the performativity of gender has been realised as a 
relatively unstable construction that is formed and reproduced through power and 
institutions (Butler, 1990; Connell, 2009; Gauntlett, 2002). Therefore, it is important 
to investigate the transformation of gender meanings through different sociopolitical 
and cultural discourses. Based on feminist critical discourse analysis, a consideration 
of historical discourses in certain kinds of diachronic change of gender provides a 
fuller understanding of process change of power relations between masculinity and 
femininity from traditional China to the Cultural Revolution. The deconstruction of 
hierarchal relation between masculinity and femininity further contributes to discovery 
on how patriarchal power was incorporated with ideologies such as Confucianism and 
Marxism in the construction of gender meanings in the dynamic historical context.  
 
In the second part, feminist critical discourse analysis is employed to decode the 
images of women in selected revolutionary opera films. Feminist critical discourse 
analysis is an arm of critical discourse analysis that offers a sophisticated theorisation 
of the relationship between social practices and discourse structures, and a wide range 
of tools and strategies for close analysis of actual, contextualised uses of language. 
Taking a perspective of critical discourse analysis, the textual analysis in isolation is 
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not sufficient; it must link macro-sociological analysis and thus possibly deconstruct 
relations between text and social and cultural processes and structures (Fairclough, 
1992). Since a film contains multiple forms of texts elements including images, music 
and dialogue, each text in films can be viewed as a link in an intertextual chain that, 
according to Fairclough (1995), incorporates elements from other texts elements. In 
addition, a detailed textual analysis shows how through discursive processes, gender 
is represented in cinematic texts. Moreover, the intertextual chain in film further 
reveals power relations among different discourses. 
 
By applying feminist critical discourse analysis, I will analyse how these gendered 
signs are produced and what meaning these signs convey in the filmic discourse. 
Initially I will decode the filmic form such as camera angle, height, level, distance and 
movement. Due to the fact that the revolutionary opera films represent two artistic 
forms including film and opera, decoding symbolic sets in the films will enhance the 
understanding of gender and sociopolitical discourse in the revolutionary opera films. 
Using semiotics as a tool for film analysis will contribute to identifying the subjects of 
analysis in the filmic content. In addition, I will focus on the filmic content that provide 
signs which contain gendered meaning. In terms of the revolutionary opera films, 
images of women clearly embody gender meanings through women’s gestures, 
movements, make-up, costumes and speeches. Thus, this research will seek to make 
use of multiple interrelated ‘codes’ to interpret the image of women and its gender 
message in the revolutionary opera films. Simultaneously, a more specific social and 
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cultural analysis to explore patriarchal power and ideology that accounts the 
perspective of feminist critical discourse will contribute to a comprehensive 
understanding of coding and decoding image of women in the discourse of 
revolutionary opera films. 
 
   Data Generation 
 
The revolutionary opera films refer to the revolutionary Beijing Opera films that were 
subsets of the Model Works or Yangbanxi, a small group of ideologically extreme 
modernised Beijing operas that were filmed from 1970 to 1976 during the period of 
the Cultural Revoluton.  
 
This thesis focused on seven revolutionary Beijing Operas The Red Lantern 红灯记 
(Cheng Yin, 1970), Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy 智取危虎⼭ (Xie Tieli, 1970) 
Shajiabang 沙家浜 (Wu ZhaoDi, 1971), On the Docks 海港 (Xie Tieli & Xie Jin, 
1972), The Red Detachment of Women 红⾊娘⼦军 (Chen Yin, 1972), Song of the 
Dragon River ⻰江颂 (Xie Tieli,1972) and Azalea Mountain 杜鹃⼭ (Xie Tieli, 
1974). Those seven Beijing Opera films are considered as appropriate research 
materials to explore this thesis’s research question, because they are very popular and 
much more influential and famous than their late work such as Fighting on the Plains 
平原作战 (Cui Wei; Chen Huaikai, 1974), Boulder Bay 磐石湾 (Xie jin; Liang 
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Tinduo, 1976) and Red Cloud Mountain 红云岗 (Li Ang; Li Wenhu,1976). The film 
Raid On White Tiger Regiment 奇袭⽩虎团 (Su Li & Wang Yan, 1976) was a 
powerful revolutionary opera films but excludes from the thesis’s data selection, 
because the film sets in a discourse of North Korea war that outside the Chinese context 
and a Chinese female figure is absent in this film. 
 
Furthermore, this research focuses on images of women that arose in a specifically 
historical context: the Cultural Revolution. Historical material related to political 
agenda, including state public policies, government documents, documentaries, news 
reports and photos during the Cultural Revolution are research material. Secondary 
data, including literature, are also necessary to support the gender, political and 
cultural analysis. Literature is examined from the field of gendered studies; in 
particular, masculinity studies, the studies on Chinese women, film studies and 
historical studies in relation to the Chinese Cultural Revolution will facilitate 
conducting the discourse analysis. Moreover, classic Chinese literature, such as 
Confucian texts, are selected to support a sophisticated cultural analysis. 
 
   Conclusion 
 
This chapter explains how and why film and gender can be viewed as discourse, and 
therefore the feminist critical discourse analysis as a method productively progresses 
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this research. Foucault’s theories on discourse and power are intrinsic for a 
contemporary understanding of patriarchal ideology and power in the gender discourse 
of the Cultural Revolution. This study adopts Foucault’s theories in conjunction with 
critical feminists’ theories to create a framework for analysing the image of women in 
the discourse of revolutionary opera films. Foucault’s theories of power enables this 
research to examine patriarchal power within a cultural dimension that moves beyond 
Marxist understating of patriarchal power, which merely locates power in economic 
and political dimensions. Thus, decoding the image of women in the revolutionary 
opera films contributes to theorisation of women’s representation and patriarchal 
power and ideology within a broader sociocultural context.
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Chapter Three: Socialist Cinema and the 
Revolutionary Opera Films 
     
  Introduction 
 
In order to deconstruct gender discourse during the Cultural Revolution through 
decoding gender representations in the revolutionary films, it is necessary to 
contextualise the revolutionary opera films. Clark (2008, p.4) indicates that ‘culture’ 
was put at the centre of the movement of the Cultural Revolution. Despite the essential 
purpose of the Cultural Revolution being the CCP’s internal politics, one of the goals 
of the Cultural Revolution was to critique old culture and simultaneously establish a 
new revolutionary culture. Thus, cultural productions during this period, such as opera, 
films, dance, music and drama, played an important role as propaganda to launch a 
proletarian culture (Clark, 2008, p.2). This chapter draws a history of the revolutionary 
opera films during the Cultural Revolution by investigating Socialist Cinema, 
particularly focusing on evaluating the background of the revolutionary opera films 
produced and released during that period. In addition, this chapter examines the 
relation between the political agenda and the revolutionary opera films by elaborating 
the logical connection that the revolutionary opera films are propaganda films 
reflecting the political and cultural discourses during the Cultural Revolution.  By 
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reviewing existing scholarship of the women’s image in the period of the Cultural 
Revolution, this chapter offers a feminist critique about women’s identity during that 
period. 
 
   Socialist Cinema of the People’s Republic of China 
 
The term ‘socialist cinema of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’ refers to film 
produced from 1949 to 1976 in Maoist China. The socialist period began 1 October 
1949 when the CCP founded the PRC, and ended with Mao’s death in 1976. Since 
1949, there were four phases that contributed to socialist cinema and which were 
different from China’s early film industry (1928-1949) that was controlled by the 
Nationalist Party government. Initially, when the Korean War broke out in June 1950, 
all Hollywood films were suspended in Shanghai in November 1950 (Zhang, 2004). 
Many scholars argue that until that time the Hollywood films were a popular culture 
that dominated Chinese market, particularly in the metropolitan cities such as Shanghai, 
Beijing and Tianjin from 1930 to 1941 (Lee, 1999; Wang, 1998; Zhang, 2004). Zhang 
(2004, p. 71) points out that in 1933, there were 431 imported films and 82 per cent 
(355) of them were from Hollywood while only 89 domestic films were produced that 
year. Significantly, Hollywood was powerful to the extent that it forced the Chinese 
theatres to suspend the showing of Chinese films in the 1930s (Wang, 1998, p. 58). 
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However, the domination of American films in the Chinese market was terminated by 
the CCP in Maoist China. Meanwhile, the China Film Bureau and a censorship 
committee were launched in 1950. It required all film scripts, including animation and 
documentary, to be censored by the Bureau prior to production (Zhang, 2004). This 
state regulation meant that socialist cinema was different to a film industry that is 
driven by market consumption or entertainment; rather, it was an ideological 
instruction subject to strict censorship (Zhang, 2004; Cui, 2003). In addition, the China 
Film Corporation was governed by the China Film Bureau, and was founded in 1951 
with the duties and responsibility of managing all domestic and overseas film 
distribution and exhibition (Zhang, 2004, p.101). It is important to note that domestic 
exhibition outlets of Chinese film sharply increased from 646 in 1949 to 2,285 in 1952 
(Clark, 1987, p.82). The final phase in the construction of socialist cinema was the 
CCP’s establishment of the state studios, such as Beijing studio in 1956, Changchun 
studio in 1955 and Shanghai studio in 1953 (Zhang, 2004, p.79). Through the four 
phases known as the nationalisation of cinema, Chinese film production and 
filmmakers came under the control and the censorship of the CCP. 
 
In Maoist China, films served as an effective tool of propaganda, and cinema as a state 
apparatus rather than as social criticism (Cui, 2003; Zhang, 2004). Cui (2003) 
concludes that the term socialist cinema refers to how the CCP transformed the cinema 
system from a director-centred and entrepreneur-owned popular media for the urban 
audiences in modern China into an ideology-centred and state-controlled national 
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institution for mass audiences, in particular workers, peasants and soldiers in Maoist 
China. Scholars argue that the function of socialist cinema in Maoist China was an 
ideological state apparatus (Cui, 2003; Zhang, 2004). Socialist cinema as a sprawling 
bureaucracy served as propaganda that presents ideology to mass audiences through a 
technique that Louis Althusser calls interpellation. 
 
In Lenin and Philosophy, Althusser (1971, 1993) argues: 
 
Ideology “acts” or “functions” in such a way that it recruits subjects among the individuals 
(it recruits them all), or “transforms” the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) 
by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can 
be imagined along the lines of the most common everyday police hailing: “Hey, you there! 
(Althusser, L, 1971. p. 174)” Such recognition and misrecognition work as well in the 
social world at the level of the ideological; the human subject is given back through 
ideology an imaginary construction of his own autonomy, unity, and self-presence 
(Althusser, L, 1993. p. 567). 
 
In the context of socialist cinema in the Maoist era, scholars argue that socialist cinema 
played a role of ideological apparatus and would ‘hail’ or ‘interpellate’ mass audiences 
participating in class struggle (Cui, 2003; Zhang, 2004). Cui (2003, p.85) elaborates 
that the socialist cinema constructs or emphasises an imaginary relationship that ties 
the mass audiences to their class identities. 
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The mass audiences identified their social identities through cinematic images of 
peasants, workers and soldiers on the screen (Cui, 2003; Dai, 1993). Cui (2003) argues, 
“the engagement between representation and perception goes beyond the imaginary 
relation and moves into a symbolic sphere. Ideological interpolation encourages its 
proletarian spectator to transcend the identity of one oppressed by the old society and 
to ascend as a master of the new state” (p. 54). On the one hand, these cinematic images 
contribute to the mass audiences’ identification with their social conditions of 
existence (that they suffered class oppressions in the old society). On the other hand, 
film constitutes this imaginary image from a perspective of the proletarian class and 
in the language of communist ideology that offers the mass audiences a subject 
position that is not a social victim but a revolutionary participator. 
 
  The Revolutionary Opera Films 
 
The revolutionary opera films were an important constituent of socialist cinema in 
Maoist China, however they came to dominate the genre in the Cultural Revolution. 
During the Cultural Revolution, particularly from 1967 to 1972, Mao’s wife Jiang 
Qing successively authorised eight modernised Beijing operas as the following eight 
model film works: Shajiabang (沙家浜), The Red Lantern (红灯记), On the Docks (海
港), Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy (智取威虎山), Raid on White Tiger Regiment 
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(奇袭白虎团), The Red Detachment of Women (红色娘子军), Azalea Mountain (杜
鹃山), and Song of the Dragon River (⻰江颂) , Fighting on the Plains (平原作战), 
Boulder Bay (磐石湾) and Red Cloud Mountain (红云岗). From 1970 to 1976, Jiang 
Qing required directors to film all the Revolutionary Beijing Operas. 
 
The term ‘revolutionary Beijing opera’ initially emerged in 1967 during the Cultural 
Revolution. In 1967, the CCP’s three propagandistic publications The People’s Daily 
（人民日报）, People’s Liberation Army Daily （解放军报）and Red Flag （红旗）
continually published articles about the revolutionary Beijing opera, based on Jiang 
Qing’s speech “On the Revolution in Traditional Chinese Opera ” (谈谈传统京剧的
⾰命) during the Cultural Revolution. Particularly, in 1967, Issue 5 of Red Flag（红
旗）published a leading article that argued: “the new thing is powerful and must 
overcome decayed things. Through studying the great Maoist thought and led by 
comrade Jiang Qing , our revolutionary comrades have created the revolutionary opera. 
As a new genre of Beijing opera, it replaced the traditional Beijing opera which was 
based on paradigms of generals and ministers or beauties and scholars.” 11 
Subsequently, the ‘revolutionary opera’ became an official term and these model 
operas were disseminated rapidly as propaganda during the Cultural Revolution. It is 
also a specific term in relation to the sociopolitical and sociocultural context of the 
Cultural Revolution. 
                                               
11 Translated from Chinese, “新生的力量终究是要战胜腐朽的东西的。在伟大的毛泽东思想的光
辉照耀下,在江青同志的指导下,在京剧界广大同志的努力下,革命的新京剧终于冲破重重阻力,
从帝王将相,才子佳人的旧营垒中杀出来了.”Red Flag, 1967, Vol. 5, No. 10 
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It is important to note that the CCP’s propaganda, in particular the print media such as 
Red Flag, played a significant role in propagating the ‘revolutionary opera’. Red Flag 
launched in 1958 during the Great Leap Forward campaign and existed until 
publication ceased in 1988. As a mouthpiece of CCP’s propaganda in the Cultural 
Revolution, Red Flag was controlled by Jiang Qing and thus became a literal arena of 
enacting the ‘revolutionary opera’. For example, in The Study of Revolutionary Opera, 
Shao (2007) found that there were 47 articles about the ‘revolutionary operas (films)’, 
including librettos, film scripts and film/opera reviews, published by the outlet from 
1967 to 1976. 
 
Lin Biao, who was expected to be Mao’s political successor, strongly supported the 
aims of Jiang Qing’s ‘Revolutionary Beijing Opera’ before the Cultural Revolution. 
However, during the Cultural Revolution, “Lin Biao entrusted Jiang Qing” thus cannot 
be viewed as a supporter of ‘Revolutionary Beijing Opera’ that was expressed in the 
“Summary of the Forum on Literature and Art work in the Armed Forces” in February 
1966. (Liu, 2010, p.378) Therefore, the majority of the revolutionary films were 
produced in 1970s, after Lin Biao’s Incident in 1971. Meanwhile, the revolutionary 
opera films also responded to Lin Biao’s Incident and the change of CCP’s internal 
power struggle. For example, Roberts (2010) demonstrates, “Azalea Mountain and 
Song of the Dragon River, each featuring a strong women leader who could be 
 
 
88 
regarded as performing the role of preparing the Chinese public for Jiang Qing’s 
assumption of the nation’s top job (p.7).”  
 
In 1964, Jiang Qing recommended The Red Lantern and Taking Tiger Mountain by 
Strategy for national audiences in the name of ‘Revolutionary Beijing Operas’. By 
May 1967, all eight modern Beijing operas were ready and performed in Beijing, thus 
Revolutionary Beijing Operas were viewed as a milestone in the development of new 
proletarian art forms by the chief of CCP organisations (Zhang, 2004). 
 
The fact is that each Revolutionary Beijing Opera work had been selected by Jiang 
Qing herself from numerous existing works. Despite the model works (operas) having 
been impacted by popular taste, they were chosen for development by Jiang Qing from 
a selection of modern works that had already proven themselves successful locally or 
nationally. Thus, they also were generally well received and enjoying genuine 
popularity. The characters, songs and spoken lines became part of the popular culture 
of the nation. As such, “[t]he model operas and ballets, in particular, can be considered 
to reflect not only the official discourse but to a significant extent also the popular 
discourse of the period” (Roberts, 2010, p. 2). Roberts (2010) argues that the 
Revolutionary Beijing Opera therefore not only reflects the heavily politically 
controlled official discourse but also extends it. 
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Scholars claim that Jiang Qing also played the most important role in the construction 
of the revolutionary opera films during the Cultural Revolution (Cui, 2003; Zhang, 
2004; Roberts, 2010). Jiang Qing participated in both traditional Chinese opera theatre 
and modern Western-style theatre in Shanghai in the 1930s, and had 10 years of 
experience in working in the film sphere. Due to her experience and knowledge in the 
cinematic domain, she served as director of the Film Bureau, which was under the CCP 
central committee’s propaganda department in the 1950s (Roberts, 2010; Zhang, 2004). 
In the early 1960s, Mao faced increasing opposition within the party so he allowed 
Jiang Qing to return to the political arena to lead the counterattack in the cultural sphere 
(Luo, 1995; Roberts, 2010). At Mao’s request, Jiang Qing had watched numerous 
performances of traditional Beijing Opera in order to create an ideological state 
through China’s theatre. Consequently, Jiang Qing’s political ambitions and cinematic 
experience led her to ultimately develop a genre of “Revolutionary Beijing Opera” to 
assume leadership of the Cultural Revolution12 (Luo, 1995; Roberts, 2010). 
 
It was Jiang Qing who first proposed to film the revolutionary operas in 1967. In order 
to enlarge their influence, Jiang Qing stated, “the revolutionary opera should be spread 
everywhere via numerous channels, particularly the film.”13 Premier Zhou Enlai (周
                                               
12 The CCP official historiography blames Jiang Qing, as the head of the ‘Gang of Four’ (四人帮), 
with ultimate responsibility for the atrocities committed during the Cultural Revolution, thus 
exonerating Mao and other leaders of their involvement. 
13 Translated by the author of this thesis from Jiang’s speech “我们的革命样板戏, 就是要通过各种
途径，主要说通过拍成电影普及到全国各个角落”, in The talk of Jiang Qing at Beijing National 
Arts Conference. 9 November 1967. 
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恩来) supported Jiang’s thought and indicated it was necessary to produce the films 
of revolutionary opera because of diplomatic needs.14 Chinese scholars such as Shi 
and Zhang (2009) point out that Jiang Qing played multiple roles in producing the 
revolutionary opera films: artist, theorist, director, film producer and publisher.15 
Wang Zhengqi (汪曾祺, 2006)，one of the founders of the revolutionary opera films 
recalls, “Although Jiang Qing did not film the revolutionary opera films, she controlled 
the process of producing the revolutionary opera films. All the scripts, scene, librettos, 
costumes and props and each detail of the films were to be examined by Jiang Qing.”16 
While the revolutionary opera films were filmed by different directors, they have a 
similar style because Jiang Qing was the chief director of all the revolutionary opera 
films. 
 
From 1970 to 1976, many revolutionary films had been successively filmed. Taking 
Tiger Mountain by Strategy (智取威虎山), filmed in 1970, was directed by Xie Tieli 
(谢铁骊) and produced by Beijing Film Studio (北京电影制片厂) as an adaption from 
the revolutionary novel Forest-ocean and Snow-prairie (林海雪原) by Qu Bo (曲波) 
                                               
14 See Zhou Enlai’s words: “All foreign friends are asking for the film copy of revolutionary opera, 
therefore we must film them (外国朋友都希望我们给他们片子,无论如何我们要搞电影)”， in The 
Instruction of the Beijing revolutionary opera on 9 September 1968. 
15 Translated by the author of this thesis from “从样板戏理论到实践， 从内容到形式， 从政治
方向的严格把关到艺术创作的精心经营，从创作过程到社会宣传，江青在上述活动扮演了作为
艺术家， 理论家， 导演，制片人， 发行人等多重角色。”, In Shi & Zhang (2009), The 
history of the revolutionary opera, Writers Publishing House, Beijing. 
16 Translated by the author of this thesis from “江青诚然没有亲自动手做过什么， 但样板戏确
实是她抓出来的。她抓的很全面， 很具体， 很彻底， 从剧本选题， 分场， 推敲唱词，舞
台艺术， 服装直至铁梅衣服上的补丁， 沙奶奶家门前的柳树，事无巨细，一抓到底。”, In 
Wang (2006), Wang Zhengqi Critiques Operas, Shangdong Pictorial Publishing House, JiNan. 
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based on a real-life story and published in 1955. The film’s narrative is set in the winter 
of 1946, during the period of Chinese civil war. The male protagonist Yang Zirong (杨
⼦荣), a platoon leader of CCP troops assigned a mission spying on the local bandits 
in Tiger Mountain. Other communist soldiers are meanwhile mobilising local villagers 
to participate in the war. Yang Zirong successfully spies on the enemy camp and 
achieves the bandits’ trust. While he pretends to assist training the bandits’ troop, he 
secretly collects military intelligence and sends a report to CCP troops. At the birthday 
party of the bandits’ leader, Yang Zirong pushes every bandit to get drunk and orders 
the guards on duty to join the drinking as well. The CCP troops can then easily attack 
Tiger Mountain and capture all bandits. It is important to note that each revolutionary 
opera film uses different quotations of Chairman Mao (hereafter called Maoist 
Quotations, ⽑泽东语录) to highlight different ideological themes. In Taking Tiger 
Mountain by Strategy, the Maoist Quotations include: “The revolutionary war is a war 
of the masses; it can be waged only by mobilising the masses and relying on them.”17 
Therefore, the ideological message in Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy emphasises 
the masses’ unity in the revolutionary war. For example, there is a sequence where 
Yang Zirong talks with female figure Changbao about her mother who was kidnapped 
by bandits, which represents Maoist ideology and the film’s political theme. 
 
                                               
17 Translated by the author of this thesis from Maoist Quotations “革命战争是群众的战争， 只有
动员群众才能进行战争，只有依靠群众才能进行战争”, In “Be Concerned with the Well-Being of 
the Masses, Pay Attention to Methods of Work” (27 January, 1934), Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 147. 
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The Red Lantern （红灯记）was filmed by August First Film Studio（八一电影制
片厂）in 1970 was directed by Cheng Yin (成荫). The Red Lantern is based on a film 
named There will be followers (自有后来人) made in 1963, which is adapted from the 
novel There will be Followers of the Revolution (革命自有后来人) by Qian Daoyuan 
(钱道源) in 1958. The novel is in turn based on a true story of communist undercover 
agents working at Huicui (辉崔) railway station in Huling. They were fighting the 
Japanese invaders during the Second World War. The Red Lantern (1970) is set in the 
city of Longtan in northern China in 1938 and tells the story of male protagonist Li 
Yuhe (李玉和), a railway switchman who was engaging in underground communist 
work by misdirecting the Japanese trains. After Li Yuhe has been arrested by Japanese 
special agents, Grandma Li (Li’s mother) tells the female protagonist Li Tiemei (李铁
梅 , Li’s 17-year-old daughter) the facts about her family: how her parents have 
sacrificed their lives in the communist revolutionary struggle. After Li Yuhe and 
Grandma Li are killed by Japanese special agents, Li Tiemei decides to follow her 
family’s path and participate in the endless revolution through counterattacking the 
Japanese army. The quotation from Maoist Quotations in The Red Lantern is 
“Thousands upon thousands of martyrs have heroically laid down their lives for the 
people; let us hold their banner high and march ahead along the path crimson with their 
blood!”.18 Thus, The Red Lantern responds to this political theme of revolutionary 
                                               
18 Translated by the author of this thesis from Maoist Quotations “成千上万的先烈，为着人民的利
益， 在我们前头牺牲了，让我们高举起他们的旗帜，踏着他们的血迹前进吧”, In On Coalition 
Government (24 April,1945), Selected Works, Vol. III, p. 318. 
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faith by focusing on telling audiences how Li Yuhe’s sacrifice awakes the rapid growth 
of Li Tiemei during the revolutionary war. 
 
In 1971, Shajiabang was filmed by Changchun Film Studio（⻓春电影制片厂）and 
its director was Wu ZhaoDi (武兆堤). Shajiabang（沙家浜) is based on a revolutionary 
memoir named Bloody name, the struggle of thirty-six wounded soldiers (⾎染着的姓
名－三⼗六个伤病员的⽃争记实). The film is set in 1939, during the anti-Japanese 
war in Shajiabang village, part of which is alongside a Japanese blockade in Jiangsu 
province. The female protagonist A Qing (阿庆嫂) is a teahouse owner in Shajiabang 
and is also a undercover communist. Before the enemy’s troops enter Shajiabang, A 
Qing receives a political mission to hide and look after 18 wounded communist 
soldiers until communist reinforcements can liberate the village. A Qing successfully 
uses her teahouse as cover to protect communist soldiers and meanwhile applies her 
intelligence to destroy the enemy’s plan to hunt the wounded communists. Ultimately, 
the CCP’s troops defeat the enemies, and villagers and soldiers celebrate their victory. 
Shajiabang highlights the Maoist quotation “Without violent struggle, neither the 
proletariats, the masses, nor the Chinese Communist Party would have any standing at 
all in China, and it would impossible for the revolutionary triumph”.19 To emphasise 
the ideological theme of ‘violent struggle’ in a revolutionary discourse, this film 
                                               
19 Translated by the author of this thesis from Maoist Quotations “在中国，离开了武装斗争，就没
有无产阶级的地位，就没有人民的地位，就没有共产党的地位，就没有革命的胜利”, In 
Introducing The Communist (4 October, 1939), Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 292. 
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constructs a story line that strongly highlights the ‘war scene’ and the significance of 
military power. 
 
It is important to point out that 1972 was a fruitful year for the production of 
revolutionary opera films: there were three, including The Red Detachment of Women, 
On the Docks and Song of the Dragon River, which were produced by Beijing Film 
Studio. Chen Yin (成荫) directed The Red Detachment of Women based on real 
historical events first filmed in 1960 by director Xie Jin (谢晋), and further adapted 
by revolutionary opera and ballet. The original film (1960), ballet (1971) and the 
Revolutionary Beijing Opera (1972) film The Red Detachment of Women all share the 
same narrative set during the 1930s Civil War in Hainan Island (now Hainan province). 
The female protagonist Wu Qinghua (吴箐华) is enslaved to a regional landlord and 
follows the guidance of communist representative Hong Changqing (洪常⻘) to join 
the female revolutionary detachment. Through studying Maoist ideology, such as 
“only by emancipating all mankind can the proletariats achieve its own emancipation” 
( 只 有 解 放 全 ⼈ 类 ， 才 能 解 放 ⽆ 产 阶 级 ⾃ ⼰ ), Wu Qinghua enhances her 
understanding about emancipation from an individual liberation into a proletarian 
liberation. This proletarian revolution not only saves Wu Qinghua’s life but transforms 
her gendered role from a female slave into a female warrior, from a social victim into 
a social saviour. After the sacrifice of Hong Changqing, Wu Qinghua replaces Hong’s 
political position and further leads the female detachment to defeat villain Nan Batian 
(南霸天). This film uses female warriors as an example to represent the importance of 
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a people’s army for the CCP. Three different Maoist quotations have been included in 
this film to strongly emphasise this theme: “Without a people’s army, the people have 
nothing”20; “The revolutionary war is a war of masses; it can be waged only by 
mobilizing the masses and relying on them”21; “Every communist must know the truth, 
political power grows out of the barrel of a gun”.22 
 
Song of the Dragon River (1972) was filmed by director Xie Tieli. This opera is set in 
the period of socialist construction in 1963, in Fujian province. The female protagonist, 
Jiang Shuiying (江⽔英), is the party’s branch secretary of Dragon River Union and 
announces to the masses that there is a political mission to establish a dam at their 
brigade to provide irrigation to the neighbouring communes. However, the dam will 
raise the water level and will flood many productive rice fields, and some peasants are 
against this decision. The class enemy Huang Guozhong (⻩国忠）, henchman of a 
former landlord, aims to spoil this political mission by mobilising selfish peasants 
against Jiang’s decision. By studying Maoist works with these peasants, Jiang Shunyin 
successfully persuades them to agree to her decision and reveals the class enemy’s 
                                               
20 Translated by the author of this thesis from Maoist Quotations “没有一个人民的军队,便没有人民
的一切“ in On Coalition Government (24 April, 1945), Selected Works, Vol. III, p. 267.  
21 Translated by the author of this thesis from Maoist Quotations “革命战争是人民的战争，只有动
员人民群众才能进行战争。只有依靠群众，才能进行战争。” in Be Concerned with the Well-
Being of the Masses, Pay Attention to Methods of Work (27 January, 1934), Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 
147.  
22 Translated by the author of this thesis from Maoist Quotations “每个共产党员都应该懂得这个道
理，枪杆子里面出政权” in Problems of War and Strategy (6 November, 1938), Selected Works, 
Vol. II, p. 224. 
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conspiracy. Finally, the dam is completed and contributes to the irrigation of the 
neighbouring communes. During the harvest time, both the neighbouring communes 
and Dragon River Brigade have a remarkable harvest. Everyone is joyful to celebrate 
the agricultural achievements, the spirit of communism and the greatness of Maoist 
ideology. The political theme of Song of Dragon River comes from Maoist Quotations: 
“We should encourage every communist to take interests in the whole situation. Every 
communist, each action and speech must proceed from the whole interests of the CCP; 
this is the Party’s basic principle that cannot be violated”.23 This political theme 
informs the film story whereby the Dragon River Brigade would give up 300 rice fields 
to assist the neighbouring communes, but the class enemy attempts using people’s self-
interested weakness to destroy the revolutionary construction. 
 
The film The Dock (1972; 海港）was codirected by Xie Tieli and Xie Jin, and is set 
in a dock on the Huangpu River in Shanghai in 1963. There is an important political 
mission that 8,000 bags of seed rice need to be shipped to Africa due to an impending 
typhoon. The villain Qian Shouwei (钱守维) is spying on the docks for KMT enemies 
and attempts to destroy this mission. He makes plenty of trouble, such as creating a 
bottleneck of goods and blocking the rice seed from being loaded on time. However, 
the female protagonist Fang Haizhen (⽅海珍), the Communist Party branch secretary 
                                               
23 Translated by the author of this thesis from Maoist Quotations “要提倡顾全大局，每一个党员，
每一个局部工作，每一项言论或行动，都必须以全党利益为出发点，绝对不许违反这个原
则。” in Rectify the Party’s Style of Work (1 February, 1942), Selected Works, Vol. III, pp. 49-50. 
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of the dockers’ Brigade, successfully applies Maoist ideology—in particular the class 
struggle—and ultimately unveils Qian’s conspiracy. Finally, Qian is arrested and the 
cargo of seed rice leaves on time for Africa. The film’s political theme is to highlight 
‘class struggle’ and ‘internationalist heroism’, informed by the Maoist quote “The 
people who have triumphed in their own revolution must help those still struggling for 
liberation. This is our internationalist responsibility”.24 In order to respond to this 
ideological theme, the plot of The Docks tells the story of international aid for African 
friends (that was a primary mission for the Socialist China), however the counter-
revolutionary intended to destroy this international aid.  
 
Azalea Mountain (1974, 杜鹃⼭）was produced by Beijing Film Studio and directed 
by Xie Tieli. It is set on the border of Hunan and Jiangxi provinces in 1927 and tells 
how the female Communist Party representative Ke Xiang is rescued by a local 
Nationalist Army and becomes their leader. Initially, all the male corps members 
question her abilities because she is a female leader. However, Ke Xiang indicates her 
remarkable strategic skills and leadership capabilities and finally wins the trust of the 
unit. Under her supervision, the self-defence corps successfully overthrows the local 
tyrant and combines with the larger communist forces. The political theme of Azalea 
Mountain focuses on identifying the revolutionary class, especially the peasant class. 
This film quotes “The class struggle of the CCP is a peasants’ war led by the 
                                               
24 Translated by the author of this thesis from Maoist Quotations “已经获得革命胜利的人民，应该
援助正在争取解放的人民斗争，这是我们的国际主义的义务。” in Talk with African Friends (8 
August, 1963), Selected Works, Vol. III, p. 78. 
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proletarian class (中国共产党的武装⽃争，就是在⽆产阶级领导下的农民战争)”, 
which derives from Maoist Quotations: “It was the class struggles of the peasants, the 
peasant uprisings and peasant wars that constituted the real motive force of historical 
development in Chinese feudal society”.25 This Mao’s quotation indeed reflects the 
historical experience of the Chinese communist revolution that the peasant’s war must 
be placed into the primary task for the CCP. Therefore, the representation of the small 
village in the film indicates the significance and difficulty of leading the peasants’ war 
for the CCP. 
 
Raid on White Tiger Regiment (奇袭⽩虎团) was filmed by Changchun Film Studio 
in 1976 by directors Su Li (苏里) and Wang Yan (王炎). Its story is adapted from 
reports published in The People’s Daily in 1953 and is set in in July of that year during 
the American–Korean War. The male protagonist Yang Weicai is the leader of a 
reconnaissance platoon of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army in Korea. Yang and 
his men are passing through the village of Anpyongri. Yang captures the commander 
of White Tiger Regiment (South Korean army), and other platoon volunteers capture 
the US advisor. Commander Wang arrives with Chinese deep-trust battalion, and they 
all celebrate the victory for the Chinese–Korean people’s alliance and Maoist military 
thought. Similarly to The Docks, the ideological theme in Raid on White Tiger 
Regiment echoes Maoist Quotations: “The people who have triumphed in their own 
                                               
25 Translated by the author of this thesis from Maoist Quotations “在中国封建社会里，只有这种农
民的阶级斗争， 农民的起义和农民的战争，才是历史发展的真正动力。” in The Chinese 
Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party (December, 1939), Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 308. 
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revolution must help those still struggling for liberation. This is our internationalist 
responsibility”.26 This ideological theme identifies the political understanding of the 
American–Korean War as a war between the Korean revolutionary class and American 
imperialists. Therefore, the Chinese army should follow Maoist ideology such as 
internationalism and aid the Korean revolutionary army to fight the American army 
for Korean liberation and independence. 
 
The Cultural Revolution was a period when opera was named “Eight revolutionary 
operas for eight hundred million people” (八亿人民八部戏).27 This phrase refers to 
the dominance of the revolutionary opera and the absence of other forms of 
performance and entertainment for almost 10 years (Berry, 2004, p.68). In the 
cinematic sphere, from 1966 to 1970, only the eight revolutionary opera films had been 
produced and permitted for release due to political reasons. In other words, the 
revolutionary opera films monopolised the socialist cinema of the PRC in during the 
Cultural Revolution. 
 
Initially, to follow Mao’s instruction about the Cultural Revolution, all Chinese 
socialist films produced from 1949 to 1966 were suspended by Chinese cinemas 
because of the potential ‘political risks’ (政治⻛险 ). In addition, socialist films 
                                               
26 See notes 14. 
27 See Barbara Mittler (2010), “Eight Stage Works for 800 Million People: The Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution in Music----A View from Revolutionary Opera,” Opera Quarterly Vol. 26.2-3, 
pp. 377-401. 
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imported from China’s ‘communist brothers’ such as North Korea, Yugoslavia, 
Romania, Vietnam and Albania were suspended by Jiang Qing. It was consensus and 
a political objective of Jiang Qing and the CCP that only the revolutionary opera films 
could be viewed as the ‘politically correct films’ （政治正确的影片） of Chinese 
cinema. 
 
Chris Berry (2004) argues that the revolutionary operas/films were the only 
entertainment option for Chinese audiences however they played a role of propaganda 
during the Cultural Revolution. In urban areas such as Shanghai, in May 1974, the 
revolutionary films had been showed about 18,400 times in total in that month. To 
assist Shanghai’s audiences such as students in Fudan University to understand the 
revolutionary films properly, some CCP’s cadres may presented pre-screening talks 
on the film’s features, such as the characters, costumes and lighting, and a post-film 
discussion with audiences (Lu, 2008). During the period of the Cultural Revolution, 
cinema houses in China significantly increased from 65,000 in 1965 to 86,088 in 1976. 
Most importantly, 59,000 cinemas were rural and played a remarkable role in both 
disseminating the revolutionary films and enlarging the number of audiences (Rao, 
2005. p.503).  
 
It is important to note that although Western films were derided as “poisonous” during 
the Cultural Revolution, they were not totally banned throughout China. For example, 
Jiang Qing and her colleagues in the Cultural Revolution Central Committee and 
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Subcommittee could access some Western European, Soviet Union and even the US 
Hollywood-based films. These films were also released to very limited audiences, 
including CCP senior officers and their family or friends, as “films for inner circulation 
(内参⽚)” (Cao, 2010). Most importantly, directors of the revolutionary opera films 
learned some cinematic techniques from Hollywood films before they made the 
revolutionary opera films. In 1967, Jiang Qing gathered all directors of the 
revolutionary opera films in Beijing and asked them to watch Hollywood films (Li, 
2009), claiming “The content and theme of Hollywood films are pretty bad. However, 
she felt that in order to film the revolutionary opera, they should learn cinematic 
techniques such as shot, lighting, mise-en-scene, scene from Hollywood movies”.28 
Therefore, while Hollywood films were banned in public during the Cultural 
Revolution, they were still distributed to the CCP’s senior officers and played a role 
in producing the revolutionary opera films, which were influenced by the cinematic 
techniques and the geographical imaginations of ‘Western’ directors. 
 
The phenomenon of the monopoly of the revolutionary opera films in China was 
terminated in the late Cultural Revolution period. At a talk in July 1972, Mao critiqued 
the dominance of revolutionary opera films, which counteracted his concept of a 
“bloom of a hundred flowers ( 百 花 ⻬ 放 )”. 29  Premier Zhou Enlai therefore 
                                               
28 See Li Wenhua (2009) Memoria: Watching American films leading by Jiang Qing, Southern 
Weekend, No. 7.   
29 At a National talk in July 1972, Mao asserted, “the number of films and plays is too small” and 
voiced his worries over the possible “disappearance of the 100 flowers”. 
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encouraged film studios to produce new films. From 1973, the Changchun Film Studio 
began new productions, followed by the Shanghai Film Studio, Beijing Film Studio 
and August First Film Studio (Liu, 2005). Four films were released in 1973: The Red 
Hot Time （⽕红的年代） produced by Shanghai Film Studio, and The Pine Ridge 
(⻘松岭), Conquering the Flood (战洪图) and Bright Sunny Sky (艳阳天) made by 
Changchun Film Studio. There were 15 films produced in 1974, 15 films produced in 
1975, and 22 produced in 1976. A total of 76 films were produced and released from 
1973 to 1976. After the Cultural Revolution, the CCP treated these 76 films as 
evidence of wrongdoing by Jiang Qing and the Gang of Four, and suspended all of 
them. 
 
Chris Berry (2004) argues that it is a loss that these 76 films were cast out because 
most of them are valuable works, in particular The Red Hot Time (1973), Pine Ridge 
(1973), Conquering the Flood (1973) and Bright Sunny Sky (1973). These first four 
films share many thematic and technical features. Thematically, all four films are about 
‘socialist production’, showcasing the achievements in agriculture and heavy industry 
under collectivism. All four are set in a time prior to the Cultural Revolution. Their 
focus on economic activities before the Cultural Revolution showed signs of economic 
recovery and anticipated the things to come after 1978. 
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   The Fundamental Principles of Revolutionary 
Opera Films 
 
Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, Marxism, Leninism and Maoist ideology 
formed the orthodoxy within cultural discourse in China. In terms of film discourse, a 
theory of socialist realism had become the officially approved style in the Soviet Union 
in 1930s, and an official standard in Maoist China (Zhang, 2004). Originally, the 
concept of socialist realism came from a literary slogan propagated by Soviet writers 
such as Gorky in the 1930s (Zhang, 2004; Thakur, 1997); Boorman (1963) identifies 
the notion of socialist realism during the first All Union Congress of Soviet Writers in 
August 1934: 
 
Socialist realism is the basic method of Soviet literature and literary criticism. It demands 
of the artist the truthful, historically concrete representation of reality in its revolutionary 
development. Moreover, the truthfulness and historical concreteness of the artistic 
representation of reality must be linked with the task of ideological transformation and 
education of workers in the spirit of Socialism. (p. 17) 
 
Soviet socialist realism became the guiding principle for all cultural works, including 
literature, theatre and films, in China. Maoist ideology broadened the understanding 
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of Soviet socialist realism and ultimately became the fundamental principle of 
cinematic criticism in Maoist China. Roberts observes that the direct theoretical origin 
of cinematic criticism was Mao’s Talks at the Yanan Forum on Literature and Art in 
1942 (Roberts, 2010), where he clearly stated that revolutionary literature and art are 
important components of the revolutionary machine for fighting enemies. Mao directly 
indicated that revolutionary arts work should serve the interests of masses, particularly 
the workers, peasants and soldiers. Furthermore, Mao defined four standards, 
including a class stand, attitude, audience and study, which led the way in producing 
the ‘right’ revolutionary art work. Class stand meant keeping the stand of the party’s 
policy, which was to identify the proletariat and masses. Attitude meant that the anti-
revolutionary enemy should be criticised, while the revolutionary people and 
proletariat could be praised. Furthermore, the revolutionary art works should be 
produced for workers, peasants, soldiers and revolutionary cadres. Finally, all 
revolutionary artists should learn Marxism and Leninism and have a deep 
understanding of the laws of historical materialism (Mao, 1980, pp. 58-59). 
 
It is important to note that “Yanan Talk” (1942) was within a wider framework of 
Marxist literary criticism and can be viewed as a development of the Left-Wing/New 
Culture Movement that began after the May Fourth Movement30（五四运动） in the 
1920s (Chow, 1960; Roberts, 2010; Thakur, 1997). However, “Yanan Talk” (1942) 
                                               
30 The May Fourth Movement, also known as ‘New Culture Movement’(新文化运动) was an 
intellectual revolution and socio-political reform occurred in China (1917-1921), which intended to 
challenge traditional Chinese values and culture. 
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paved the way for a significant emphasis on populism, which moved Chinese art works 
from a European model that had dominated Chinese arts and culture since the May 
Fourth Movement to another national form (Holm, 1984, p. 279). Thakur (1997) 
therefore argues that regardless of whether “Yanan Talk” (1942) served as a political 
or cultural function, it apparently set the political and artistic agenda and became the 
ultimate source of legitimacy for all artistic work (Thakur, 1997, p. 72). 
 
It is also believed that from “Yanan Talk” (1942) to the PRC establishment (1949), the 
relationship between cultural works and ideological control entered a new phase in 
China (Thakur, 1997. p.72). The cultural project, particularly socialist cinema, 
emphasised the important part of the overall project of socialist reconstruction and the 
propagation of a new revolutionary ideology. For instance, Thakur argues that arts and 
cultural works in Maoist China were seen as a reflection of reality, an idea from Lenin, 
and cultural workers were supposed to create positive images of life under socialism 
and help in the creation of a “new democratic civilization” (Thakur, 1997). In 1953, 
premier Zhou Enlai redefined socialist realism as “the combination of revolutionary 
realism and revolutionary idealism” (Chen, 1989, p. 116). He then praised socialist 
cinema highly for creating this new style of socialist realism (Zhou, 1953 cited in 
ZDYYZ, 1995:224). 
 
To follow the fundamental concept of socialist realism, Jiang Qing established the 
principle of “three prominences” to formulate the construction of revolutionary 
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Beijing Opera films as “always give prominence to positive characters among all the 
characters, to heroes among the positive characters, to the principal hero among the 
heroes” (Zhang, 2004, p. 219). In the case of revolutionary opera film production, this 
principle was represented by following guidelines: positive characters are more 
prominent than other characters; heroic characters are more important than the positive 
ones; and the main heroes are grander than the other heroic figures (Zhang, 2004, 
p.219). 
 
First, the positive characters, such as revolutionary heroes/heroines, must be located 
at the centre of the frame. Second, the positive characters must be depicted in a close-
up and low-angle shot. In contrast, counter-revolutionary characters must appear in a 
long and high-angle shot. Moreover, in the scheme of colour, a positive character must 
be bathed in warm and high-key lighting and counter-revolutionary characters must 
appear in cold and low-key lighting (Cui, 2003; Zhang, 2004) Furthermore, the 
revolutionary opera film must focus on the concept of class struggle and Maoist 
ideology, such as “continuing revolution under the proletarian dictatorship”（⽆产阶
级专政下继续⾰命）and “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” (枪杆⼦
⾥出政权), were represented in the staged confrontations against class enemies. 
 
For instance, Zhang (2004) argues that the revolutionary opera films codified 
revolutionary masses including workers, peasants and soldiers as new screen 
heroes/heroines rather than Confucian intellectuals and bourgeoisie. The revolutionary 
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opera films are usually in a public setting —political spaces such as factories, mines, 
villages and military camps—while reducing the number of domestic, private and 
personal spaces. The stereotypical plot definitely ends with the triumph of proletarian 
heroes after verbally and physically struggling with counter-revolutionary enemies 
(Zhang, 2004). 
 
The revolutionary opera films therefore claimed to follow the principle of socialist 
realism but the evidence indicates that it overrode the ‘realism’ and tended to a genre 
of ‘romanticism’. Zhang (2004) elaborates that the idealisation of revolutionary heroes, 
the typical setting of positive and negative characters, the black-and-white 
dramatisation of ideological conflicts and the stereotypical triumph from physically 
violent struggles all prove the revolutionary opera films were not made according to 
any principles of realism to educate national audiences, but based on a romanticism 
that intended to interpellate Maoist ideology to mass audiences (Zhang, 2004). The 
revolutionary opera film as an important component of socialist cinema played a role 
of propaganda that ‘interpellates’ ideology to mass audiences though a way of 
worshipping Mao. Zhai (1995) states that “the revolutionary opera films are like a 
‘religious art’, and thus the socialist cinema played a role of the church; films served 
a role akin to the bible; the typical heroes/heroines performed like the priests, and the 
mass audience were the worshipers” (p. 199). 
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Here, it is important to note that the revolutionary opera films (as films of Beijing 
Opera) which cannot be deemed as a realist art form. The stylisation of women’s role 
types and women’s movement in the discourse of Beijing Opera interacted with Maoist 
ideology and thereby produced a paradox for audiences who attempt to understand 
women’s representations in the revolutionary opera films. From a Chinese perspective, 
some Chinese audiences complain that the heroines in the revolutionary opera film are 
overly aggressive and that contrasts with their expectations of women’s images in 
traditional Beijing Opera (Lu & Xiao, 2000). However, Western academics such as 
Roberts (2010) observes that heroines in the revolutionary opera “remain within the 
traditional parameters for the women warrior in Chinese culture.” (p.213) Therefore, 
Chapter Six will future explores the image of female warriors in the revolutionary 
opera films by deconstructing relations among patriarchal power, gender roles and 
women’s body. 
 
  
 Research on Women’s Image during the Cultural   
Revolution 
 
As outlined in the Introduction, the masculinisation of women as a political agenda 
also influenced the media agenda in Maoist China. In the sphere of media, images of 
women in this period were always portrayed as masculinised workers and heroines. 
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For example, covers of popular women’s magazines in the Maoist era such as The 
Women of China only represented agricultural and industrial workers who always 
dressed in austere working uniforms and were satisfied with their social conditions 
(Chang, 2010; Cheng, 2009). Moreover, through analysing socialist literature in 
Maoist China, researchers found that women in socialist fictions usually served as a 
signifier of proletarian class or were portrayed as heroines to represent the authority of 
CCP (Meng & Dai, 1989, p.108-109). In other words, the image of women represented 
obvious subjectivity that from a male subject position rather than portraying women 
as a sexual object of desire, love object, marriage prospect, etc (Meng & Dai, 1989; 
Yang, 1998; Dai, 2007). For instance, Meng and Dai (1989) elaborate: 
 
Socialist fiction uses the female image to signify a certain class or socio-political group 
or the authority of the Communist Party itself. The combination of authentic political 
identity with womanhood is a double play. On the one hand, the state’s political discourse 
translated itself through women into the private context of desire, love, marriage, divorce, 
and familial relations, and, on the other, it turned women into an agent politicizing desire, 
love, and family relations by delimiting and repressing sexuality, self, and all private 
emotions…Female images in socialist literature functioned as a special agent of the 
state’s appropriation of the ‘public’ (p. 118). 
 
There is no doubt that films also played a significant role in presenting and 
constructing an ideal image of women that was dominated by national ideology during 
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this historical period. In the context of socialist cinema, it served as a part of 
sociocultural reform rather an entertainment enterprise. According to political agendas, 
women in Maoist China film production were usually portrayed as ‘masters of the new 
state’ to demonstrate the triumph of women’s (class) emancipation. Similarly to 
Meng’s argument that women served as a sexless symbol in the socialist literature 
(Meng, 1989), Cui (2003) also argues that women on screen had become the sexless 
and collective symbols to demonstrate equality with men in “new China” through 
erasing gender difference (Cui, 2003). She further elaborates: 
 
Film production and the apparatus of the nation-sate integrate women into the 
construction of socialist discourse. The discourse, under the catchphrase of “gender 
equality” conceals gender difference with class categories. By “de-gendering” the 
female body and erasing sexual difference, the screen image of women is transformed 
from a “ghost” of the old society to a “master” of the new state, from an unlearned 
individual to an enlightened heroine. Her primary visibility as the signifier of socialist 
ideology coincides with her unremarked status as the sign of suppressed gender 
difference, and this dual function lies at the heart of the myth of the socialist cinema. 
(Cui, 2003, p. 56) 
 
The evidence of erasure of gender difference and the masculinisation of women is also 
found in socialist cinema. Researchers claim that the image of women in the 
revolutionary films initially did not serve as an object of sexual desire or romantic 
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thought but became heroines, a signifier of Party authority and ideology (Cui, 2003; 
Meng & Dai, 1989; Dai, 1995, 2007; Bai, 1997). 
 
For example, Meng and Dai (1989) found that the revolutionary operas films Azalea 
Mountain, The Red Detachment of Women, Song of the Dragon River and On the 
Docks showed women’s access to the public sphere through performing masculine 
gendered roles, and also served to represent an authentic political identity the same as 
men. Particularly, in Song of the Dragon River and On the Docks, the female 
protagonist is the only signifier of the CCP’s power, and all males under her authority 
dramatically change traditional gendered hierarchy. Bai (1997) claims that these 
heroines are not sexual and have no family. To represent political and ideological 
correctness, they dropped traditional gender roles (wife, mother) and natural feminine 
traits, and thereby each film establishes a logical connection between erasure of 
femininity and women’s powerful sociopolitical status (p. 143).  Cui (2003) argues 
that the revolutionary woman in the revolutionary film abandons female subjectivity, 
female experience, female voice and sexual desire to attain a political gender identity 
(p. 86). Therefore, the cultural revolutionary has been viewed as a “genderless 
revolutionary” because of the absence of “female figures” (Li, 2000), and women can 
be only identified/categorised via their class as they represent masculine traits rather 
than feminine traits (Yang, 1998; Cui, 2003). 
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In contrast, Roberts (2010) argues that it is unreasonable to describe women’s identity 
during the Cultural Revolution, particularly the image of women in the propaganda of 
the Cultural Revolution, as genderless or gender erasure. Through examining gender 
representations in the revolutionary opera, Roberts (2010) states that the absence of 
conventional gender roles could not support the gender erasure assumption because 
women’s gender identity is not only represented by traditional gender roles (Roberts, 
2010, p. 20). Roberts (2010) argues that women’s gender identity is not only expressed 
through stereotypical roles including mothers, wives and lovers. Women’s gender 
identity can also be embodied through political or social roles in the participation of 
social authority and power. She explains: 
 
I have not come across any criticisms of male heroic characters in the revolutionary opera 
being genderless because they are not depicted as husbands and fathers. In this patently 
masculinist discourse an authentic male gender identity can incorporate social and 
political leadership roles and may or may not include roles of husband, father, lover and 
son, but an authentic female gender identity can only be expressed through sexual and 
reproductive relationships with men. (p. 20) 
 
Furthermore, Roberts (2010) found that the women’s gender identity in the model 
works is more complex than being genderless because of the erasure of femininity. 
Through comparing the image of revolutionary women and male counter-
revolutionaries in the revolutionary operas, she found that the positive representations 
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of women are masculinised and evil men are feminised. Based on these findings, 
Roberts (2010) argues, if one takes gender as a continuum from ultra femininity to 
ultra masculinity, gender remained differentiated in the culture during the Cultural 
Revolution culture, with the revolutionary class located towards the masculine end of 
the gender spectrum and the counter-revolutionary class located toward the feminine 
end of the gender spectrum. (p.23) 
 
  Critical Discussion 
 
Roberts’s findings indicate that the Cultural Revolution did not erase gender difference 
fundamentally. The masculinisation of good women and feminisation of evil men in 
the revolutionary operas indeed reformed traditional understanding of gender, the 
gender hierarchy and gender order. Therefore Roberts (2010) states that the gender 
discourse in the Cultural Revolution was definitely not a gender erasure or genderless 
model. Inspired by Roberts’s findings, this study continually explores women’s 
identity by deconstructing the power dynamic between masculinity and femininity in 
the discourse of the revolutionary opera films. 
 
Although the representation of women in the Cultural Revolution distinctly showed 
the masculine traits, masculinisation of women cannot be defined as ‘genderless’, 
because masculine gender is a gender. The dominant argument that neglects to 
acknowledge masculine women as a female identity can be contested as an essentialist 
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argument (Roberts, 2010, p.21.). For instance, Yang (1998) claims that an important 
task of Chinese feminists in post-Maoist China is the reconstruction of female identity 
rather than a deconstruction of existing gender identity. It seems that Yang treated 
gendered identity as merely occurring through gender differentiation, which could be 
argued as an essentialist position. From a social constructionist feminist perspective, 
gender identity is not nature but a process of social construction and performances. 
Gender identity can be varied through social construction including economy, politics, 
culture, race and religion. Traditional gender norms as gender binary is the mechanism 
by which notions of masculine and feminine are produced and naturalised. Therefore, 
in the context of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese women exhibited masculine traits 
rather than feminine traits. This cannot be simply identified as genderless, because 
masculine gender is a gender. 
 
The term ‘gender role’ is based on the ‘role theory’ that I elaborated in the previous 
chapter, where all social behaviours are deemed as a kind of performance. Thus the 
‘gender role’ means that our society is an arena, gender is a role and gender behaviour 
is a kind of performance in accordance with social construction (Nigel & Margaret, 
1996). Therefore, mothers, wives, daughters and lovers are typecast as women’s roles. 
Historically, these stereotypical gender roles have formed most gender performance 
and behaviours including in film representations, and thus these normative roles 
contribute to the reproduction and socialisation of gender. In a specific cultural context, 
it is possible that there are other gender performances and behaviours that are playing 
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out the stereotypic gender roles. Stereotypically, regardless of the economic system, 
masculine roles usually represent aggression, competition, professionalism and control. 
On the one hand, it could be argued that women who chose to perform the “masculine 
roles”, such as female Red Guards and Iron Girls, did so because they possibly regard 
the masculine role as an equivalence of the “practice of power” in the Cultural 
Revolution. 
 
During the Cultural Revolution, the CCP claimed that women were equal to men. For 
example, female ‘sent-down youth’ and Iron Girls participated in masculine modes of 
labour and recognised themselves not only as physical labourers but also purely 
political actors to achieve gender equality during the Cultural Revolution (Wang, 2017; 
Yang & Fei, 2017). Echoing Maoist ideology, the masculinisation of women, 
particularly the Iron Girls, treated “masculine representations” as a political symbol 
that demonstrated women engaging in equal power to men via performing masculine 
roles (Wang, 2017, p.221-233). In other words, it can be argued that pursuing 
‘masculinity’ was viewed as a feasible approach for Chinese women to grasp power 
or achieve gender/sex equality in the context of the Cultural Revolution. 
 
For example, Connell (2005) argues that men can maintain dominant status or women 
are able to challenge their subordinated position through engaging in actions that 
include practices of power. If masculinity implies power under patriarchal ideology, 
the praxis of masculinisation of women in the Cultural Revolution possibly indicates 
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a way for women to access masculinist power or a powerful position the same as men. 
From a feminist perspective, it can be argued that this kind of gender equality is a 
rhetorical ‘gender equality’ that merely referred to a masculinist understanding of 
power. Thereby, women’s eagerness to gain masculinist power through preforming 
masculine roles can be argued as another form of patriarchal dominance rather than 
gender equality. 
 
Most significantly, it could be argued that the masculinisation of women during the 
Cultural Revolution is a specific female identity in a specific cultural context. This 
identity refers to the masculine/male identity that is a part of the progressive arm of 
masculine politics that can also be produced, reproduced and socialised. First, the 
phenomenon of masculinisation of women indicates that ‘masculinity’ has been 
dominated by men, but it also can be performed and embodied by women in an 
extremely masculine discourse such as the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Second, it is 
possible that the masculinisation of women in the Cultural Revolution as an unordinary 
phenomenon that was not restricted by sexual orientation, but which represented 
masculinity as the opposite of the normal, conventional female identity that advocates 
femininity. In addition, masculinised women were influenced by masculine values and 
participating in power through performing masculinity on the one hand, and rejected 
femininity on the other. Thus, the impact of masculine values has been expressed 
through women’s bodies, personality, traits, behaviours, interests and aesthetics. 
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In contrast to Roberts’s work that focuses on exploration of gender differentiation in 
the revolutionary opera, this study adopts Foucault’s theory to deconstruct the power 
dynamics between masculinity, femininity and ideology in the construction of gender 
in the revolutionary opera films. Through closely examining gender representations in 
the film texts, it explores the relations between gender construction and 
masculinisation of women during the Cultural Revolution. This study therefore 
contributes to an understanding of masculine politics in a revolutionary discourse that 
possibly reshaped hierarchical relations between men and women, which are viewed 
as separate identity groupings in a traditional gender paradigm. In locating the 
dominant image of women in the revolutionary opera films, it will enhance the 
understanding of how patriarchal power dominated women in another way that 
emphasises masculinity but simultaneously devalues femininity. ‘Being’ or ‘doing’ 
masculinity through practising masculine roles implicitly reflects the truth that 
patriarchy, through different forms of masculinist domination, produces and recycles 
political and cultural ‘meaning of gender’. This chapter merely discussed the 
masculinisation of women from a general gender viewpoint, a detailed feminist 
analysis in terms of women’s representations in the revolutionary opera films will be 
provided in Chapters Five and Six. 
 
  Conclusion 
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This chapter evaluated socialist cinema, particularly the revolutionary opera films that 
dominated socialist cinema in the period of the Cultural Revolution. It explores the 
sociopolitical and sociocultural context in relation to the revolutionary opera films to 
facilitate the discourse analysis of revolutionary opera films in the following chapters. 
Also, a short overview of revolutionary opera films has been provided that contributes 
to understanding the background of each film. Simultaneously, this chapter examined 
previous scholarship of the image of women in terms of the revolutionary opera/films. 
A critical discussion about the masculinisation of women during the Cultural 
Revolution is provided, which contributes to feminist critiques of women’s 
representations in the revolutionary opera films in Chapters Five and Six. 
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Chapter Four: Smashing of the Four Old Ways: The 
transformation of construction of masculinity and 
women’s roles from Confucian China to Maoist 
China  
     
  Introduction 
 
From a social constructionist feminist perspective, gender is not a biological 
phenomenon but a process of specific cultural and historical construction. Social 
constructionist feminists argue that the social construction of gender is not focused on 
masculine and feminine physical types but the social life of masculine and feminine 
character types (Mitchell, 1971; Chodorow, 1978). An individual’s body and 
behaviour thus are gender structured and those gender structures are constituted of 
masculine and feminine character types (Jaggar, 1983). In terms of the masculinisation 
of women during the Cultural Revolution, an unordinary gender performance not only 
subverts the traditional gender norm but also represents its cultural specificity to the 
Chinese context, particularly the understanding of masculinity and masculine 
characters. Although, the conception of masculinity is a contextual notion, “[i]t is 
neither trans-historical nor culturally universal, but rather varies from culture to culture 
and within any culture over time (Kimmel & Messner, 1995, p. 21).” To achieve a 
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complex understanding of gender representations in the revolutionary opera films, 
feminist critical discourse analysis first requires an overview of Chinese gender 
discourse historically and critically. A brief introduction of different cultural 
understandings of gender, and the distinctions of masculine and feminine character 
structures from Confucian to Maoist discourse significantly supports a sociopolitical 
and sociocultural analysis of gender representations in the revolutionary opera films. 
 
The meanings of gender i.e., masculinity and femininity, are all identified as a 
relatively unstable construction that is formed and reproduced through power and 
social institutions (Butler, 1990; Connell, 2009; David, 2002). By applying the 
feminist critical discourse analysis, this chapter applies a feminist lens to review 
gender constructions in different historical contexts. This chapter aims to explore the 
different roles of masculine and feminine elements at play in the constitution of gender 
that is influenced by Confucianism and Maoism/Marxism respectively. Through 
exploration of masculine and feminine character structures in different gender 
discourse, the outcome will first outline the cultural context that helps to identify and 
analyse the masculine and feminine symbols in the revolutionary opera films. 
Secondly, this chapter fosters a full understanding about trajectory of masculinist 
power from Confucian to Maoist gender discourse. A historical overview of variable 
power structures between masculinity/masculine and femininity/feminine in China 
contributes an ongoing investigation of the patriarchal paradigm and the masculine 
dominance that is represented in the revolutionary opera films. 
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   Empowerment of Feminine Characteristics in 
Confucian China: Yin-Yang and Confucian 
Masculinity 
 
In the Chinese context, yin–yang philosophy is the fundamental base that ontologically 
constructs the understandings of gender and gender relations for all Chinese people. 
The notion of yin–yang is applied to elaborate many binary opposites regarding both 
natural and social phenomena including dark and light, female and male, earth and 
heaven, death and birth. In the gender and sexuality domain, yin refers to femininity, 
feminine characteristics and females; yang refers to masculinity, masculine 
characteristics and males (Humana & Wu, 1971). There is no significant distinction 
between the definition of femininity (yin) and masculinity (yang) in both Chinese yin–
yang philosophy and contemporary psychoanalysis. As I introduced in the Chapter 
Methodology, according to the rationale of the masculinity and femininity Scale test 
(M/F Scale), stereotypical masculine characteristics including courage, roughness, 
aggressiveness, and athleticism are positioned as yang; and the opposite characteristics 
such as tenderness, dependence, peace and affectionateness are viewed as yin by yin–
yang philosophy. The term yin–yang originated in all ancient Chinese philosophy; 
different schools of Chinese philosophy adopt conceptions of yin and yang differently. 
However, they share a consensus that feminine traits are powerful, and the most 
powerful from a Daoist perspective. 
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Chinese yin–yang can be treated as ontology associated with cosmology that balances 
the benefits of yang (men, masculine) and yin (women, feminine) simultaneously 
against the masculinist ideology (Saldenha, 2012). Daoism is a non-hierarchal and 
dialectical philosophy that applies the traditional framework of yin–yang philosophy 
and treats yin and yang as equal and complementary beings. Most significantly from 
Daoist understanding, the feminine traits are more valuable and powerful than the 
masculine traits. For example, Daoist sages such as Lao Zi (老子) and Zhuangzi（庄
子） treated feminine characteristics including weakness, softness and tenderness as 
virtues and power.31 Daoism was not the dominant ideology/politics in ancient China 
but it is an influential school of thought that constitutes numerous Chinese ‘inner’ lives 
and social praxis. For example, Daoists suggest individuals apply a feminine harmony 
rather than masculine struggle to approach “Dao (道)” (the infinite harmony and most 
fundamental principles of the cosmos). Because Daoism highlights feminine power 
and advocates to deconstruct hierarchy, scholars argue that Daoism is a school of 
effeminate philosophy and its canons are very close to contemporary feminist critiques 
(Zhang, 2012; Liu, 2010; Nelson & Gu, 2012). 
                                               
31 Laoz Zi asserts, “Using the male, being a female, being the entrance of the world. You embrace 
harmony, and become as a newborn.” (知其雄，守其雌，为天下溪，为天下溪，常德不离，复归
于婴儿。) Lao Zi also emphasises, “Nothing in the world is as soft and yielding as water, yet nothing 
can better overcome the hard and strong, for they can neither control nor do away with it. The soft 
overcomes the hard, the yielding overcomes the strong; every person knows this, but no one can 
practise it. Who attends to the people would control the land and grain; who attends to the state would 
control the whole world; truth is easily hidden by rhetoric.” (天下莫柔弱于水，而攻坚强者莫之能
胜，以其无以易之。弱之胜强，柔之胜刚，天下莫不知，莫能行。) 
http://www.deepspirits.com/words-of-wisdom/tao-te-ching/taoteching78.php   
 124 
 
In contrast to Daoism, Confucianism was the dominant ideology in ancient China and 
strongly advocates the construction of a hierarchal society. During the era of Spring 
and Autumn (770–476 BC), Confucius was traditionally said to have written Shi Yi 
(十翼) to elaborate the yin–yang philosophy, which was included in the book Yi Zhuan
（易传). One of the most significant changes in terms of yin–yang theory was that 
Confucius clearly defined the hierarchy between yin and yang. In the Yi Zhuan, 
Confucius writes, “The sky is honour, the earth is shame. Therefore, qian as yang and 
the sky, kun as yin and the earth. Yang has been placed in a higher position and yin has 
been placed in a lower position; this is a nature principle which has been established 
by the cosmos” (天尊地卑，乾坤定也，卑高以陈，贵贱定也).32 This passage makes 
it clear that males/masculinity and females/femininity refer to yin–yang theory and 
have been ordered hierarchically by Confucius. 
 
Since then, a patriarchal gendered discourse based on Confucian interpretations of yin–
yang philosophy was constructed. The original notion of yin–yang as a simple and 
natural theory had been transformed into a systematic and complicated system. Robert 
(1999) argues that the book of Yi Zhuan played the role of cosmology that linked the 
Confucian political and ethical claims to the nature of the cosmos. In terms of 
Confucian gender politics, Confucianism constructed a gender discourse of male 
                                               
32 Translated by author of this thesis in Cheng Yi (2012) shi yi, Huangshang Publishing. Hefei, 
China. Chapter 1.p. 1.  
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domination that males are superior and women are inferior. According to Charlotte 
Furth’s (1988) work on yin-yang cosmology and Confucian ideas about gender, Louie 
and Edwards (1994) argue: 
 
The gender order implied by the Confucian stipulations relating to social organisation, 
clearly placing male above female, implies that the mutuality of yin and yang, qua 
sexually defined forces, must have been counteracted by an alternative sex-specific 
discourse legitimizing and naturalizing the imbalance in power between the sexes. (p. 
139). 
 
While Confucianism is a patriarchal ideology, it nonetheless endorses feminine 
characteristics in the constitution of an ideal manhood and strongly emphasises the 
significance of feminine characteristics, including caring and love. The crucial notion 
of Confucianism is “Ren (仁)” , however there are various definitions for this term;  
the consensus is that Ren refers to love and goodness. For example, Dubs (1951) 
defined Ren as benevolent love, perfect virtue, goodness or even human-heartedness. 
Because the core of Ren is caring for and loving others, feminists claim that 
Confucianism, similar to Christianity, both embody a feminine caring and love ethic 
(Sellmann & Rowe, 1998; Hopfe, 2004). 
 
Based on the concept of Ren, Confucius creates an ideal masculinity called Junzi-hood 
(君子), which represents ‘harmony of yin–yang’. Both masculine characteristics (i.e. 
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justice, courage, intellect, faith, integrity, agility and loyalty) and feminine traits (i.e., 
etiquette, kindness, gentleness, harmony, respectfulness, forgiveness and love) are 
enclosed in the constitution of Junzi-hood.33 Through a process of performing or self-
interacting masculine and feminine traits, a man can achieve harmonisation and can 
be called Junzi. Therefore, like Confucianism, Junzi-hood not only admits that both 
feminine and masculine psychology possibly exist in male consciousness, but also 
encourages men to perform the different gendered behaviours. This gendered 
understanding influenced Chinese men’s gender performance for two millennia and 
had not been broken until the Cultural Revolution. I will elaborate on the gender 
representations in the revolutionary opera films in Chapter Five. 
 
In the book of Theorizing Chinese Masculinity, Kam Louie (2002) sets out a paradigm 
of wen–wu (⽂武) to theorise Chinese masculinity. He asserts that the paradigm of 
Chinese masculinity is composed of a binary opposition called wen and wu (Louie, 
2002). The term wen implies mental or civil power, accomplishment and civilisation 
that distinguishes civilised men from untutored barbarians (Creel, 1970, p. 67), while 
wu is a concept that embodies martial and military power (Louie, 2002, p.133). The 
Confucian interpretation of yin–yang as a theoretical footstone constructs Junzi-hood 
in relation to the wen–wu paradigm. This wen–wu paradigm exactly refers to the yin–
                                               
33 The Junzi-hood involves 14 virtues separately called justice, etiquette, faith, courage, intellect, 
kindness, gentleness, harmony, integrity, agility, respectfulness, loyalty, forgiveness and love (义, 礼, 
信, 勇, 知, 惠, 温, 中 , 直, 敏, 恭, 忠, 恕, 爱). 
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yang philosophy, and thus in the Chinese context wen is read as the yin symbol and 
wu is read as the yang symbol in the yin–yang system (Louie, 2002, pp.15-17). 
 
Most importantly, the wen–wu paradigm is hierarchal and ideologically divided men’s 
social hierarchy in Confucian China. Confucius claims that Junzi-hood should 
represent both wen and wu masculinity, 34  however he argues that wen is more 
powerful and valuable than wu masculinity.35 Louie (2002) elaborates wen and wu as 
two different forms of masculinity that are portrayed as complementary opposites and 
significant to constructing the ideal masculinity. However, Confucius claims “The 
Junzi is well-versed in wen”（⽂胜于武）because wen, as superior in the hierarchy, 
dominates wu in Chinese society. Thus, Louie (2002) argues: 
 
Wen is generally understood to refer to those genteel, refined qualities that were 
associated with literary and artistic pursuits of the classical scholars, and can thereby 
be partly analysed as a leisure-class masculine model (p. 14). Through the process of 
                                               
34 “The master says if a man has more zhi (wu) than wen, he will be vulgar; when a man has more 
wen than zhi (wu), he will be a pedant. If he has a well-balanced mixture of these two qualities, he is 
then a Junzi.” (质胜文则野，文胜质则史.文质彬彬，然后君子). See The analects of Confucius, 
Book six, Chapter 16, An online Teaching Translation,  
http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Analects_of_Confucius_(Eno-2015).pdf  
35 “The virtues of wen are superior, the greatness of wu is lower, and this has always and will always 
be the case”. It also emphasised that “The master said of the king of Shun that it was both perfectly 
beautiful and perfectly good, and the king of wu that it was perfectly beautiful but not perfectly good.” 
(子谓韶，尽美矣，又尽善也。谓武，尽美矣，未尽善也。) See The analects of Confucius, 
Chapter 6, ibid. <http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Analects_of_Confucius_(Eno-2015).pdf 
 http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Analects_of_Confucius_(Eno-2015).pdf  
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education and enculturation using wen, a man with the right amount of ‘zhi’ substance 
will turn in to a genteel Junzi. Wen thus encompasses all the qualities that sublimate 
nature into culture (p. 44). 
 
Thus, Confucian scholars which was read as wen/ scholar gentry (士大夫) in feudal 
China that had dominant power of society and their social class was on the top of social 
hierarchy. This type of leisure-class masculinity is best typified by the image of groups 
of men writing poetry and literature for mutual amusement or political critique. 
Importantly, only scholars were able to participate in politics through the wen 
examination (科举) – a national legal, official system used to select officials that was 
established in the Sui Dynasty (隋朝) and ended in the Qing Dynasty (清朝) (605 to 
1905 ). Therefore both scholar–gentry (⼠⼤夫), as officials who were competing for 
power, and non-government scholars (儒⽣), who had to pass wen examinations to 
access power, were broadly respected by other social classes including businessmen, 
the military and peasants. Through the ideological division between wen and wu, the 
scholar–gentry represented Confucian masculinity placed into the top class that 
dominated political power compared with other social classes. This class hierarchy had 
been deconstructed by Maoist ideology during the Cultural Revolution, which I will 
explore in the Chapter Five. 
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   Isolation of Women in Confucian China 
 
As discussed earlier, according to yin–yang philosophy, feminine characteristics have 
been included in the constitution of orthodox manhood in the Confucian gender 
discourse. However, scholars state that the inferior position of women in ancient China 
resulted from Confucianism (Louie, 2002; O’Hara, 1945; Thakur, 1997). Indeed, 
Confucianism was a patriarchal ideology with a hierarchal social structure that not 
only governed behaviours of women but also formed gender relations, gender roles 
and shaped men’s perspectives on women. 
 
Gender separation in Confucian China divided gender roles and assigned women the 
domestic role and granted men the privilege to access public spheres. From a 
Confucian perspective, men and only men could access the political sphere through 
wen power or wu power, in particular the wen power because it was more powerful 
than wu power. However, women were not allowed to participate in either wen or wu 
activities, which meant that women were kept out of political power. However, 
Confucianism identified women as inferior beings who were absolutely excluded from 
the practice of Junzi-hood. The Analects states. “Of all people, women and xiaoren are 
the most difficult to educate. If you are familiar with them, they lose their humility. If 
you keep distance with them, they are discontented.” (唯女子与小人难养，近之不
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逊，远则怨。)36 Xiaoren is a term that means inferior man; in contrast to Junzi. 
Confucius defined all women as xiaoren, which firstly rejected any possibility for 
women to achieve a respectable position and secondly instructed men to distrust 
women. 
 
An orthodox Confucian discourse in terms of women’s behaviours and roles were thus 
constructed by the “three obediences and four virtues”（三从四德）in traditional China. 
Three obediences dictated that an ideal woman should submit to her father before 
marriage, her husband after marriage and her son in case of becoming widowed. ‘Four 
virtues’ inform behaviour, speech, demeanour and employment (O’Hara, 1945). 
Significantly, all the female roles were only in relation to family and household. As 
Ravni Thakur (1997) argues, “women were denied participation in any of the 
government or local community institutions. They had no access to the system of 
examination through which men improved their social status” (p. 36). Without the 
opportunity of social participation, the legitimacy of employment and the right to 
inherit property, women were truly subordinate to men. In ancient China, a woman 
had no power or legitimate position and was forced to depend on men such as her 
father, husband and son (Lang, 1946; Snow, 1967; Thakur, 1997). In the traditional 
Chinese context, women as a biosexual category even cannot be identified in the 
                                               
36 The analects of Confucius, Chapter 25, An online Teaching Translation, 
http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Analects_of_Confucius_(Eno-2015).pdf 
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traditional linguistic system. In other words, there was no traditional Chinese logogram 
to describe females that is equivalent to ‘she’ or ‘women’ in English. Women’s female 
identity can be only identified by their gendered roles, such as daughters (女) before 
marriage, wives (妇) after marriage and mothers (母) after giving birth. The ‘three 
obediences and four virtues’ represented Confucius’ understanding about women: 
Women were inferior and trivial, however they could achieve individual worth by 
supporting or sacrificing for their fathers, husbands and sons. This subordinated 
position of women resulting from Confucian principles and bias was thus produced 
and reproduced in traditional China, and was not fundamentally changed until Maoist 
China. 
 
Kam Louie (2002) argues that women in traditional China are “another class of people 
who are considered troublesome and who should be eschewed” (p. 45). Although 
women’s feminine gender role was emphasised in Confucian gender discourse, 
women’s femininity was seen by Confucius as dangerous. To Confucian 
understanding, the most significant risk that could be caused by women is the 
possibility their femininity arouses men’s sexual desire, which further harms men’s 
Junzi-hood. Hence, Chinese men should control their sexual desire for beautiful and 
sexy women. Meanwhile, the suppression of men’s love for women was identified as 
the proper action to prove ‘self-control’ towards Junzi-hood. Confucians believed that 
women’s beauty as sexual allure could destroy men’s self-control and thus 
heterosexual romance had been deemed evil rather than virtuous. For example, the 
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traditional novel Yingying zhuan (莺莺传) by Confucian scholar Yuan Zhen (元稹, 
779–831) clearly demonstrated this misogynist bias. The story described a scholar 
Zhang Shen, who seduced a pretty woman named Yingying but finally abandoned her 
to prove his scholarly self-control. This misogynist perspective continually influenced 
China and possibly was one cultural reason to explain why femininity was viewed as 
evil and shameful by Chinese men and women, and thus resulted in very weak 
resistance to de-feminisation in the era of the Cultural Revolution. A further 
elaboration will be provided in Chapters Five and Six. 
 
   Disempowerment of Confucian Masculinity in 
Maoist China 
 
Recent research indicates that from a Eurocentric or occidental perspective, oriental 
males, particularly East Asians such as Chinese and Japanese men, lack masculinity 
and are regarded as effeminate (Louie, 2002; Louie & Low, 2005). Henry Yu (2001) 
argues that Asian men such as diasporic Japanese and Chinese men in America are 
typecast as passive, weak and willing to do women’s work that self-respecting white 
men would not perform (p. 131). Compared with Western masculinity, Longji (1983) 
claims that China lacked “real men”. He asserts Chinese men everywhere have been 
feminised; the tendency towards the “eunuchisation” of the Chinese male is a universal 
phenomenon (Sun, 1983, p.213).  
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On a global scale, the modern pattern of white masculinity is “hegemonic masculinity”; 
the export of European–American masculine norms to the colonised world (Connell, 
1995; Mosse, 1985). The term of hegemonic masculinity refers to modern masculine 
standards including strength, steadfastness, skilfulness, aggression, ambition, money, 
rationality, assertiveness, autonomy and independence. In contrast, Confucian 
masculinity highlights the power of feminine characteristics such as love and 
tenderness, and disempowers masculine traits including violence and aggression. In 
the paradigm of hegemonic masculinity, femininity and feminine characteristics have 
been understood to represent weakness, volatility, passivity, emotion, intuition, 
duplicity, triviality, incapability and dependency, which are all negative and 
insignificant (Connell, 1987; Lorver, 1995). 
 
Numerous scholars also point out that hegemonic masculinity sets a standard to 
formulate gender order and simultaneously mitigate other forms of masculinity; it is 
more than an ideal but the quality of appearing to be ‘natural’ in modern society 
(Connell, 1995; David, 1992; Donaldson, 1993; Nagel, 1997). In the case of China, 
the hegemonic masculinity changed the notion of ‘real men’ and Chinese men have 
been influenced by Western macho culture (Louie, 2002).37 For example, Chinese 
men who pursue Confucian masculinity are misread as effeminate, sick, weak and 
impotent (Louie, 2002; Louie & Low, 2005; Walsh, 2010). The negative descriptions 
                                               
37 “Macho culture” refers to masochism, a construction of masculinity representing emasculation, 
sacrifice and victimisation (Walsh, 2010). 
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associated with Chinese men indicate that Confucian masculinity was regarded as 
lacking ‘power’ or, in other words, ‘powerless’ in comparison to hegemonic 
masculinity. Feminist critics such as Rew Chow (1991) further argue it is not only 
Chinese men who have been feminised, but also the image of China has been feminised 
in the Western imagination. 
 
To feminist understanding, the hegemonic masculinity and orthodoxy of ‘maleness’ 
represents power and domination, which is opposite to female inferiority and 
subordination (Jeffery, 2012). Butler (1998) argues that hegemonic masculinity not 
only represents “maleness” but also functions as a symbol of power, domination, 
legitimacy and privilege. Also, this type of masculinity links to the power of the state 
and to uneven distribution of wealth. In general, occidental masculine standards value 
masculine characteristics such as toughness, courage, decisiveness, adventurousness 
and a proclivity to violence. These typecast standards shape a Western understanding 
of the “real man” (Dubbert, 1979; Herek, 1986; Kaufman, 1987). 
 
In contrast, the standard of a “real man” like junzi in China is ren with a focus on 
feminine traits including peace, care, love, intelligence and morality, rather than 
physical characteristics like ‘sexual’ or ‘macho behaviours’. Similarly, to the 
philosophers of ancient Greece and the English gentlemen in colonial times, junzi-
hood or Chinese ‘soft’ masculinity has been described as undesirable and unattractive 
masculinity in the context of hegemonic masculinity. This phenomenon not only 
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represents how the “West sets ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ standards of masculinity” (Louie, 
2002, p. 9), but also embodies the global extension of masculine dominance. 
 
According to Chinese yin–yang philosophy, masculine and feminine characteristics as 
two different qualities are equally powerful and complement each other. However, 
based on the standard of hegemonic masculinity, being a man means rejecting 
feminine behaviours and traits, which are the opposite of maleness and are linked to 
inferiority and subordination. This is different to the Chinese understanding of yin–
yang balance, where there is femaleness in maleness or there is maleness in femaleness. 
The logic of hegemonic masculinity is that men should, and only men could, perform 
as masculine. In contrast, Junzi-hood encourages people to ‘love’ and be ‘caring’ by 
avoiding violence and aggression. Thus, Confucian masculinity has been placed in a 
subservient position to hegemonic masculinity. 
 
Consequently, orthodox manhood as Confucian masculinity was challenged by 
Chinese Nationalists. Since China’s defeat in the two Opium Wars38 (1839–1860), the 
Qing Empire became increasingly weakened, and thus the 19th century was viewed as 
the ‘century of humiliation’ by Chinese Nationalists (Janin, 1999). Establishing a 
powerful national identity of a flourishing China that resisted Western ‘others’ was the 
primary task for Chinese Nationalists from the late Qing dynasty to the Cultural 
                                               
38 The First Opium War (1839–1842) was fought between the Qing Empire and British Empire, and 
the Second Opium War (1856–1860) was fought by Britain and France against the Qing Empire. The 
outcome was foreign countries gaining commercial and political privileges in China. 
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Revolution. In the 1920s, Chinese men started to adopt Western ideas, including 
political, economic and cultural structures. Significantly, violence and physical and 
military power were advocated by Chinese Nationalists (Louie, 2002; Louie & Low, 
2005). It can be viewed as the beginning of Westernisation of Chinese masculinity 
(Thakur, 1997). Through the process of modernisation and Westernisation, 
‘masculinity’ was the crucial point of masculinity politics and hence contributed in 
constructing conventional male identities (Beasley, 2005). Confucian masculinity had 
thus been critiqued but it had not been fundamentally abandoned. However, during the 
Cultural Revolution, Chinese masculinity and the gendered order had been absolutely 
reformed by calling for “Smashing of the Four Old Ways” (破四旧).39 In the context 
of the Cultural Revolution, discourse in terms of class struggle and anti-imperialism 
were promoting a new national identity. Therefore, junzi-hood and Confucianism were 
discarded by the state, feminine traits were discouraged, while violent and radical 
activities were encouraged; thus a macho masculinity based on white masculinity was 
established. 
 
Confucius as the representation of wen lost all his former glory through the 
mobilisation of anti-Confucianism during the Cultural Revolution. A very critical 
argument about Confucianism during this period was that the concept of ren only 
worked for the dominant class, such as feudal gentry. The ‘masses’ such as peasants, 
                                               
39 “The four old ways” is a phrase from the Cultural Revolution, and first emerged in the People’s 
Daily, 1 June, 1966. It includes old ideologies, old cultures, old customs and old manners.  
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workers, soldiers and women actually did not benefit from ren (Zhao, 1962). 
Confucianism was not therefore encouraged in the new China and scholars such as 
Confucius could not be a role model for Chinese men (Louie, 2002, p. 48). Another 
masculine paradigm of “worker–peasant–soldier” (Gong Nong Bing, 工 农 兵 ), 
combining the Marxist notion of the proletariat with Chinese peasant, was established 
during the Cultural Revolution. The most significant element of “working class” 
masculinity was “struggle”, which reflects Mao’s understanding of power through 
hegemonic masculinity such as aggression, violence and machos. Young Red Guards 
consequently produced chaos, spoiling cultural relics or applying violence as practices 
of their new identities. Wen (yin) traits were replaced by wu (yang) traits, traditionally 
soft masculinity was corrupted and simultaneously the militaristic, working class and 
peasant class flourished. Gender meaning, particularly the power relations between 
masculinity/masculine characteristics and femininity/feminine characteristics, were 
reformed by state politics that I will explore in Chapter Five. 
 
  Women’s liberation from the Late Qing Dynasty to 
the May Fourth Period 
 
As mentioned earlier, since the end of the Second Opium War (1860), China’s last 
imperial dynasty, the Qing (1644–1911), began to seek a path of national development. 
It was a period when large regions of China became part of the Western sphere of 
interest, and China’s urban elites became radically influenced by Western policies and 
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culture (Thakur, 1997). Many scholars argue that the issue of women’s rights was first 
pointed out by nationalists during the late Qing period, because they considered the 
oppression of women as one of the factors that resulted in China’s weakness (Croll, 
1978; Rankin, 1975; Tse-Tung, 1960).  
 
To make a strong and powerful nation state like Western countries, male nationalists 
advocated improving the position of women. For example, the famous nationalist 
Liang Qichao (梁启超)40 translated feminist work such as Biography of Madame 
Roland for Chinese readers and discussed the thoughts of women’s liberation within 
the public sphere. The first thing that concerned nationalists in the late Qing period 
was dropping illogical customs such as women’s footbinding, which symbolised the 
purity and morality of women in Confucian China. Moreover, education of women 
had been prioritised in terms of women’s emancipation (Beahan, 1975; Levy, 1966; 
Thakur, 1997; Croll, 1978; Brownell; Wasertrom & Laqueur, 2002). 
 
During this period of late Qing Dynasty, women were strongly impacted by the 
thoughts of women’s liberation and nationalism, and thus participated in public 
activities such as launching newspapers and schools. In 1897, The Chinese Female 
Society was founded and played an important role in the social and political reform in 
Chinese society (Lv & Zheng, 1990). In the meantime, Chen Xiefen (陈撷芬)41, the 
                                               
40 Liang Qichao was a Chinese nationalist and philosopher who first pointed out the concept of 
“Chinese nation” in China. 
41 Cheng Xiefen was a Chinese feminist who founded the Female Journal in 1899. 
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editor of Female Journal (女报) and Qiu Jin(秋瑾)42, the editor of The Journal of 
Women (中国女报) published a lot of articles to debate sexual equality and women’s 
independence . Consequently, those feminist articles shared a common understanding 
of “Patriotic Women” that advocated Chinese women to be patriotic, which meant 
Chinese women should concern women’s liberation and also national independence 
(revolution). (Lv & Zheng, 1990. P.168). Edwards (2008) thereby argues that a 
Chinese nationalist movement and Chinese women’s movement emerged almost 
simultaneously from the late 19th century to the early 20th century. The intersection 
among gender, politics and nationalism which responded to the socio-political and 
sociocultural transformation from the late Qing period to Maoist China that I will 
discuss in the Chapter Six. 
 
According to the perspective of ‘Patriotic Women”, there were numerous Chinese 
women played a role in the anti-Qing movement in the early 20th. They joined Sun 
Zhongshan’s (孙中山) Revolutionary Alliance (同盟会) which officially recognised 
equal political rights between women and men. It is important to highlight that women 
formed their own military that contributed to the triumph of the 1911 Revolution (Lv 
& Zheng, 1990; Edwards, 2008). The 1911 Revolution was a landmark for Chinese 
Women’s movement , it demonstrated that women participated in political activities 
with male nationalists and terminated China’s feudal society. (Lv & Zheng, 1990) 
                                               
42 Qiu Jin was a Chinese feminist and national heroine who founded The Journal of Chinese Women 
in 1907 
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After the 1911 Revolution, China was in a period of Republic of China (1912-1949). 
Edward (2008) points out that Chinese women was oppressed by the “Han patriarchy” 
rather than previous Manchu patriarchy during this period (p.65). However, from 
1910s to 1920s, Chinese women’s movement was impacted by West feminism that 
focused on gender issues including suffrage rights, individual liberation and 
patriarchal orders, which all represented in the May Fourth Movement.  
 
The May Fourth Movement criticised Confucianism, particularly Confucian patriarchy 
which led to women’s inferior position in their family and marriage in Chinese context. 
Consequently, woman as a gendered category, and Chinese women’s rights in terms 
of modern values including humanist equality, voting rights, justice and freedom, had 
been highlighted since the May Fourth Movement in 1919. Simultaneously, women 
activists were able to mobilise female students, female labour and other female 
organization to participate in this movement. (Lv & Zheng, 1990) As Rew Chow (1960) 
states, “The movement also accelerated the decline of the old family system and the 
rise of feminism. Above all, the authority of Confucianism and traditional ethics 
suffered a fundamental and devastating stroke and new Western ideals were exalted” 
(p. 2). Furthermore, Ravni Thakur (1997) elaborates that the position of women was 
viewed by Chinese elites as a visible sign of feudalism that should be deconstructed in 
the process of modernisation. Consequently, an old orthodoxy of gender discourse 
based on Confucianism was continually deconstructed by modern ideology since the 
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May Fourth Movement. At the same time, a new gender discourse according to 
Marxist/Maoist ideology was constructed by the CCP (Thakur, 1997), and the gender 
representations in the revolutionary opera films reflect this gender discourse that I will 
elaborate on in Chapters Five and Six. 
 
 
   Women’s Liberation in Maoist China 
 
The emancipation of women was viewed by the CCP as an important task since its 
establishment in 1921. Scholars argue that Marx and Engels provided the theoretical 
basis for the emancipation of women in their works, and the ideology of women’s 
liberation in Communist China is a hybrid of “Marxist Theory of Women” with 
“Maoist characteristics” (Thakur, 1997; Yuan, 2005). Marxist analysis of women’s 
inequality saw the oppression of women as resulting from economic dependence and 
class exploitation. By employing Marxist theory, Mao presented women’s liberation 
in depth: as the most oppressed group, women needed class struggle (Yuan, 2005). 
However, Kam Louie (2002) argues,  
 
The CCP explicitly puts women’s liberation as secondary to class liberation. The major 
preoccupation of the CCP has been the assumption and continuance of political power: 
women were welcome only in as far as they helped to achieve this goal. (p. 47) 
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Marxist theory emphasised the economy including capital, production and labour. 
According to sexual division of labour, woman could only achieve emancipation by 
participating in productive labour. Thus, in the beginning of a communist-led women’s 
movement, the CCP realised that they should draw women workers into productive 
labour and organise them along class lines. The PRC was established in 1949, allowing 
the CCP to establish the absolute authority to construct and exercise its orthodox 
discourse on gender. As argued earlier, the CCP treated participation in social 
production as the key point for women’s emancipation and female equality. Thus, 
Mao’s China focused on the reconstruction of female roles, and saw a new female 
identity formed through participation in productive labour and political roles. 
 
The Constitutional law of the PRC launched in 1954 which legalised women’s equal 
rights to participate in social production. In the rural areas, women were given land in 
their own names, which challenged the conventional understanding that historically 
women did not have inheritance or land ownership rights. In urban areas, the numbers 
of women becoming involved in factory and office work, light industry and junior 
teaching meant these areas were dominated by women (Andors, 1981). The social 
position of women increased, particularly due to the new labour laws (Thakur, 1997). 
Because of legislative change and improved law enforcement, Chinese women 
believed that they would no longer be slaves of men, and traditional roles of female–
male subordination were dramatically changed in the Maoist state. Scholars argue that 
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women played a significant role in China’s economic growth during The Great Leap 
Forward (GLF) (Sidel, 1974; Brugger, 1981; MacFarquhar, 1983). 
 
The GLF launched in 1958 and terminated in 1960, and both urban and rural areas 
followed the policy of participation in production. Andors (1975) states that in order 
to mobilise masses of people to participate in social production, the strategy of the 
GLF policy was to identify women as mass labour (p. 34). The social reality is that 
women could gain economic independence through paid jobs legally guaranteed by 
state policies and laws. The inequalities between men and women were significantly 
changed because women benefited from many support programs provided by the state, 
such as free medical care and paid maternity leave for childbirth and breastfeeding. 
 
Because the CCP enabled Chinese women to leave the domestic scene, gender roles 
were reconstructed by Marxism and Maoism. Women’s lives traditionally focused 
around family roles based on the Confucian perspective but were changed with 
multiple roles, including political, family and workforce. Ravni Thakur (1997) 
indicates that in the Maoist era, the importance of women’s roles as workers was 
greater than as wives, daughters and mothers (p. 52). 
 
From the Marxist feminist perspective, paid work is a significant source of masculine 
authority under a patriarchal system. Collinson (2007) notes, “For many men, 
employment provides the interrelated economic and symbolic benefits of financial 
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rewards, skills, careers, power and status (p. 69).” A traditional view of women’s roles 
always links to familial duties such as supporting their husbands, raising their children 
and looking after old family members. Indeed, these traditionally female roles have 
been formed by patriarchal ideology. However, the universal understanding of the 
position of unpaid domestic labour as lower than paid social employment is also 
patriarchal. In Maoist China, the official ideology of women’s emancipation, 
associated with the “Marxist Theory of Women”, arguably had a male bias – women 
became equal, which entailed assimilation to male standards (Acker, 1999). Therefore, 
it is reasonable that feminine roles such as domestic labour were treated by the CCP 
as inferior to masculine roles such as productive labour. While women did improve 
their social status through participation in masculine labour, it can be understood as a 
process of internalisation of masculine values. 
 
During the Cultural Revolution, participation in politics rather than economic 
construction was considered a primary task for the CCP and Chinese citizens (Thakur, 
1997, p. 52). Scholars indicate that women’s most significant role during this period 
was the “class struggle”, such as “Anti-Lin Piao” and “Anti-Confucian moral values” 
(Croll, 1978; Schoenhals, 1996; Thakur, 1997). Over the decade to 1976, Confucian 
values were regarded as feudal ideology of the oppressive ruling class and should 
therefore be rejected. Both femininity and Confucian “soft masculinity” faced the fate 
of deconstruction. The Cultural Revolution is therefore the period most associated with 
the masculinisation of women in Maoist China. 
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There is no doubt that the Cultural Revolution called for a macho culture, hence 
women were not only portrayed by propaganda as masculine but also behaved or 
performed in reality as macho. As argued earlier, by applying Maoist and Marxist 
ideologies, women were supposed to work and dress like men, which can be identified 
as a process of masculinisation. The familiar image of women as Red Guards 
represents clearly masculine traits in the Cultural Revolution. The representation of 
female Red Guards indicates that women were not only portrayed as masculine by 
state propaganda, but also preformed masculinity, and considered undertaking 
masculine behaviours as revolutionary. They dressed like female soldiers in army 
green uniforms and thick leather belts. Most importantly, these masculinised women 
identified themselves as Mao’s young generation and participated widely in physical 
and linguistic violence in revolutionary activities (Schoenhals, 2010; Honig, 2002). In 
her thesis Maoist Mappings of Gender: Reassessing the Red Guards, Emily Honig 
(2002) elaborates that women in the Cultural Revolution rejected femininity and used 
violence, and some female Red Guards were more violent than men. Feminine 
behaviours and traits were identified by revolutionary critics as counter-revolutionary 
elements, so women should prefer masculinity. She argues: 
 
Indeed, the seemingly obvious point that female behaviour assumes that such conventions 
prevailed as a kind of static entity prior to the Cultural Revolution. Women themselves 
may have understood and described female violence as a radical departure from the past, 
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but closer scrutiny may well reveal that the very articulation of those conventions—
during and after the Cultural Revolution—was a means of explaining seemingly 
inexplicable behaviour (p. 266). 
 
In some sense, Chinese women achieved greater equality in the Maoist period 
compared with traditional China, but gender inequity remained unresolved in the 
broadest sense. Initially, Mao’s standpoints in terms of women’s liberation is the 
dominating voice that suppressed women’s free speech. For example, Mao did not 
allow women’s organisations such as the All-China Women’s Federation to make any 
decisions on policies for women, or a separate policy from that of the CCP. In 1966, 
the magazine Women of China published two articles, “What do women live for?” and 
“By which criteria should one chose a husband?”. These articles were criticised for 
focusing on women’s biological and domestic roles, turning women’s attention away 
from political and revolutionary issues, and encouraging them to individualise. The 
editor of this magazine was consequently criticised as a revisionist and punished. 
There was no free speech associated with women’s issues and little information or 
coverage beyond the propaganda of the CCP (Yuan, 2005). 
 
This case reflects issues in terms of women’s liberation in the Maoist period. As 
discussed earlier, a nation state that is dominated by males and masculine standards 
directly influenced the construction of national identity. In the case of women in 
Maoist China, Chinese women’s roles and images were constructed by national 
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interests, which were also formed by masculine standards and ideology. The scripts 
about the liberation of Chinese women were written by men, and women could only 
perform it rather than shape it. It was men who designed women’s roles and 
constructed the values of femininity and masculinity rather than women themselves. 
 
In Maoist China, women’s roles were designed for masculine politics by a masculine 
Marxist such as Mao. The major way that gender shapes politics is through men and 
their benefits, their notions of manliness, and masculine micro and macro cultures. 
Additionally in Maoist China, women’s roles were reconstructed along with the 
deconstruction of traditional women’s roles. Women were strongly influenced by the 
Marxist notion that workers are the producers of capital and thus the worker is 
honoured and valuable. The social reality is that productive labour as a masculine role 
was placed into subject position and the family role as a feminine role was subaltern. 
Participation in social production and politics was viewed by the CCP as an 
opportunity to facilitate women’s emancipation and gender equality. 
 
Feminists point out that the subject position of women cannot only account for material 
conditions (Grewal & Kaplan, 2002; Spivak, 1990). Women in Maoist China had 
many unresolved gender issues – for example, as discussed earlier, Mao forbade 
Chinese women to represent their own understandings about women’s liberation 
during the Cultural Revolution. The most important factor for the improvement of 
women’s subject position in Maoist China was thought to be the assistance of the state 
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rather than the efforts of women themselves. Hence Li (2005) argues, “Class reduction 
theory was not a solution to women’s equality and Mao’s authoritarianism suppressed 
women’s independent seeking of equality. Thus, inequality persisted under Mao’s call 
of substantive equality for Chinese women” (Li cited in Yuan, 2005). Therefore, I will 
explore the question of whether Maoist gender discourse achieved gender equality by 
examining gender representations in the revolutionary opera films in next chapters. 
 
   Conclusion 
 
This chapter briefly reviewed gender constructions from Confucian gender discourse 
to Maoist gender discourse. It first investigated the connections between the canon of 
masculinity and orthodoxy of manhood rooted in yin–yang philosophy. Through 
mapping the configuration of masculinity and manhood in ancient China, it found that 
feminine traits played an important role in constructing an ideal manhood such as 
junzi-hood. Nevertheless, Confucianism is a patriarchal and misogynist discourse that 
isolated women. 
 
In addition, this chapter explored the interaction between the reconstruction of Chinese 
masculinity and the construction of national identity during the Cultural Revolution. It 
revealed a logical connection between the reconstruction of Chinese manhood and 
nationhood through mirroring hegemonic masculinity in the context of anti-
 149 
imperialism and decolonisation. This was undertaken through the comparison of the 
different roles of feminine and masculine power in terms of the configuration of 
Chinese manhood that played in different historical contexts. It uncovered the paradox 
associated with feminist issues such as the liberation of women through modernisation 
and decolonisation, in particular the case of women in the Cultural Revolution. 
Through the global process of modernisation and decolonisation, the alliance of 
Marxism and state feminism indeed transformed the subordinated position of women 
into a legitimate but also an unexamined subject position in the Cultural Revolution. 
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Chapter Five: Masculine Honour, Feminine 
Shame: The Reconstruction of Gender in the 
Revolutionary Opera Films 
    
   Introduction 
 
In Chapter Four, I examined power trajectories between masculinity and femininity in 
a sociocultural discourse from Confucian China to Maoist China. In the context of 
revolutionary opera films, both the text and discourse of revolutionary opera films are 
influenced by the sociopolitical and sociocultural discourses. By applying feminist 
critical discourse analysis, this chapter explores how gender meaning is a major 
constituent of power relations between masculinity and femininity, and the 
understanding of gender relations as a central point of intersection of structural power, 
stratification and subjective identity formation (Butler, 1993; Haywood & Ghaill, 1997; 
Cronin, 2000; Harris, 2004; Scott, 2000). 
 
This chapter examines gender relations by analysing the gender representations of five 
films: The Red Lantern (1970, Cheng Yin), Shajiabang (1971, Wu Zhaodi), On the 
Docks (1972, Xie Tieli), Song of the Dragon River (1972, Xie Tieli) and The Red 
Detachment of Women (1972, Cheng Yin). I chose these five films for attention in this 
chapter because the female protagonists in these films are revolutionary heroines and 
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this enables my analysis of gender relations and ideologies in the revolutionary opera 
films. The gender relations among revolutionary males, revolutionary females and 
counter-revolutionary males are examined in order to deconstruct the power structure 
in the discourse of each film. This chapter explores how ideas are conveyed through 
film images, including through the deployment of cinematography, mise-en-scene, 
costumes, shots, colour and lighting combined with Chinese cultural specificity and 
Maoist ideology, to reconstruct the meaning of gender. 
 
Firstly, this chapter investigates how the adoption of yin–yang symbolism in the 
revolutionary opera films ideologically and culturally reconstructs gender meaning. 
Characters are portrayed in a positive light, and those represented in a negative way in 
the revolutionary opera films have been chosen for analysis. They are examined as 
representations of socialist gender paradigms in terms of the revolutionary opera films. 
This gender paradigm works as a gender discourse that is derived from social power, 
which according to Marxist/Maoist ideology, and works logically by producing and 
reproducing hierarchical relations. Secondly, the identification of character traits and 
interactions/relations will be used to understand and illustrate gender in revolutionary 
opera films. The gender order and gender performance in the revolutionary opera films 
are revealed by analysing the gender relations and decoding the images of villains, 
heroes and heroines. From a view of social constructionist feminists, this chapter 
finally provides feminist critiques in terms of masculinist power, Maoist gender 
politics and women’s identity in the revolutionary opera films. 
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  Ideological Construction of the Yin–Yang Semiotics 
 
Several scholars claim that a motivation of the Cultural Revolution was the 
deconstruction of traditional values and culture including Daoism, Buddhism and 
particularly Confucianism (Holmes & Welch, 1969; Zhang & Schwatz, 1997). Whilst 
revolutionary operas still deployed the traditional culture such as yin-yang symbolism, 
it has been observed that these films identified the revolution as yang and the 
counterrevolution as yin (Denton, 1987; Mittler, 2003; Roberts, 2010). For example, 
Denton (1987) points out that powerful and valued characters such as revolutionary 
heroes/heroines refer to yang, and yin symbols are always linked to counter-
revolutionary figures in the revolutionary operas. 
 
The traditional Beijing Opera itself is a complex symbolic system; the music, mise-en-
scene, costumes, actions, props and make-up contain different meanings in the operas 
discourse.  In the case of the mise-en-scene, traditionally, there are minimal props 
such as a stage curtain, a table and chair(s) on the opera stage. The meanings of the 
table and chairs are flexible in the Beijing Opera. They can signify mountains, beds, 
bridges, towers, clouds and thus only one table and few chairs can construct a space 
on the stage that signifies a room, a battle, a palace and so on (Qi, 1998). For Chinese 
audiences, it is common and necessary to use their imagination and knowledge to 
decode meanings on the stage while they are watching the Beijing Opera.  Therefore, 
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the revolutionary opera films used the signification of furniture and props from 
traditional Beijing Opera, bringing them into the cinematic realm. Significantly, yin-
yang symbolism is applied to divide the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary class 
in the revolutionary opera films. 
 
I examined the eight revolutionary opera films by using evidence in mise-en-scene 
(elements in front of the camera such as setting, lighting, costume, make-up or 
character actions) and symbolism (ideas or qualities represented by symbols and the 
mise-en-scene) in the revolutionary films. I found that Marxist ideology has been 
incorporated into the yin-yang symbolism in order to divide revolutionary and counter-
revolutionary class, and also constructed a radical understanding about feminine and 
masculine power relations in the revolutionary opera films. 
 
In the revolutionary opera films, linguistic symbols based on yin-yang symbolism 
plays a role in the construction of unequal positions between masculine and feminine 
characters, which respectively refers to revolutionary and counter-revolutionary class. 
The contrast between revolutionary yang (masculine), and counter-revolutionary yin 
(feminine) is distinct in Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy. For instance, the 
revolutionary territory is named the Black Dragon Valley（⿊⻰镇） and counter-
revolutionary domains are named Tiger Mountain (威虎⼭) and Nipple Mountain (奶
头⼭). In the yin-yang symbolic system, a dragon always signifies yang  and a tiger 
only signifies yin and thus the Chinese phrase dragon yang (阳⻰) and tiger yin（阴
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虎).  Importantly, a dragon always plays a symbolic role in signifying masculine 
power and control, because the ‘dragon’ is a phallic symbol in relation to male 
sexuality in Chinese culture. For example, in the book of The Dragon and The Phoenix, 
Chou (1973) indicates that dragons refer to men’s penile quality and male potentiality 
in the Chinese cultural context. In contrast, from a Daoist perspective, tigers are a pure 
feminine symbol which means essence of water, and water is extreme yin43. Besides, 
the breast is a prevalent feminine symbol that can also be read as a yin symbol. The 
name ‘Breast Mountain’ not only identifies counter-revolutionaries as yin, but also 
genders the counter-revolutionary as feminine (Roberts, 2010. P.229). Therefore, the 
feminine is ideologically constructed with a negative connotation. 
 
In addition, the facial colour of characters is another symbol to divide revolution as 
masculine/yang and counter-revolution as feminine/yin. In the eight revolutionary 
opera films, there are only two facial colours, all the revolutionary characters including 
heroes and heroines, have the facial colour red, and the counter-revolutionary villains 
are coloured as white. In the context of the traditional Beijing Opera, the facial colour 
of characters has black, red, white, green, blue, purple, yellow and gold. The different 
facial colour of characters contributed to audiences immediately distinguishing 
personality of characters on the stage. (Qi, 1998) For example, the red colour always 
signifies a good, honest and brave figure in the traditional Beijing Operas. In the classic 
                                               
43  See Zhong, (2015), Zhong Lu Daoist Book[zhong lu dao ji], Chung Huw Book, Beijing.  
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novel of  the Romance of Three Kingdoms (三国演义), a superhero named Guan Yu 
has a red face and thus the red face became a symbol referring to heroes in the symbolic 
system of Beijing Opera. Furthermore, Kam Louie (2002) elaborates that Guan Yu 
（关⽻） has become the God of War in Chinese Culture, therefore his red face 
directly signifies yang (male) essence, masculinity, justice and masculine power. Due 
to the ‘red face’ being a typical symbol of power and yang, all the heroes and heroines 
have a red face in the revolutionary opera film. In contrast, according to Romance of 
three Kingdoms, Cao Cao（曹操）is an insidious villain and no one can read his mind 
because of his pale poker face. By comparing the red face of Guan Yu to the white 
face of Cao, Cao thus signifies yin, slyness and evil in the symbolic system of Beijing 
Opera. 
 
In the eight revolutionary opera films, villains such as the feudal landlord in The Red 
Detachment of Women; the KMT military in Azalea Mountain, Shajiabang and The 
Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy; Japanese invaders in The Red Lantern, and 
American military in The Raid on White Tiger Regiment consistently have a ‘white 
face’. The villains like Qian Shouwei in On the Docks and Wang Guolu in Song of the 
Dragon River who spy into the revolutionary masses have not been portrayed with a 
distinct ‘white face’, however they are the only figures who do not have a ‘red face’ 
in these films. In contrast, all revolutionary figures including heroes, heroines and 
revolutionary masses have the facial colour red. For example, at 53 minutes into The 
Red Lantern, the scene where the main hero Li Yunhe arrives at Hatoyama’s house, 
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the camera uses a close-up shot to highlight Li’s face. Li’s face is red, bright and 
shining, his wide eyes outlined with black eyeliner. Then, the camera moves right and 
adopts a long shot to introduce the villain Hatoyama who has an unhealthy pale face. 
Similarly, in The Red Detachment of Women, the hero Hong Changqing has a ruddy 
face and the villain Nan Batian has a wan face. In the scene in which the heroine Fang 
Haizhen questions the spy in On the Docks, it is obvious however Qian’s face is not 
as pallid as other villains, Fang’s face looks much more sanguine than Qians’ face. On 
the one hand, it is reasonable to indicate that the symbol of facial colour plays an 
important role to distinguish the good and evil figures in the revolutionary opera films. 
Since the facial colour of heroines is red, it contributes toward identifying the 
revolutionary force as yang in relation to power and justice regardless of biological 
sex by the Chinese audiences. Therefore, yin-yang symbolism plays a crucial role in 
the reconstruction of gender in the revolutionary opera films. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, I elaborated that feminine characteristics refer to yin but 
yin does not directly refer to evil or powerlessness in traditional yin-yang philosophy. 
In contrast to Western dichotomous lines of masculine and feminine, yin-yang 
philosophy treats masculine/ yang and feminine/ yin as dynamic equal beings in the 
same circle with symmetrical power relation. In a Confucian gender discourse, 
Confucianism is a patriarchal ideology that discriminates against women, however it 
empowers and highlights the feminine traits in the constitution of ideal manhood, 
Junzi-hood. By incorporating the Marxist theory of ‘class’, the revolutionary opera 
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films endorse yang, which signifies revolution, masculine and power, which leads to 
yin being linked to counter-revolution, feminine and powerlessness. 
 
Through the symbolic contrast between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary, the 
revolutionary opera films ideologically changed the traditional understanding of yin 
and yang. There is a tendency in the revolutionary opera films to construct hierarchal 
power structures where representations in the counter-revolution depict yin as evilness 
and powerlessness in contrast to revolution as yang (justice and power). This poses 
several questions from a feminist perspective, firstly, has femininity/the feminine as 
yin been devalued and marginalised in the revolutionary opera films? Does the 
construction of an oppositional binary structure of ‘revolution’ and ‘counter-
revolution’, yin and yang, have the power structure of masculinity and femininity to 
transform from two balanced subjects into two hierarchally ordered groups? Has there 
been a shift whereby the traditional value for both yin and yang, an equal value for 
masculine and feminine as informing each other is now a binary which works to 
ground and value the masculine? The following sections will explore these questions 
through a feminist perspective. 
 
   Disempowerment of Feminine Characteristics by 
Devaluing Confucian Masculinity 
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In Chapter Four, I discussed how feminine characteristics played an important role in 
the constitution of Confucian masculinity and how this Confucian masculinity 
contrasts to hegemonic masculinity. As I mentioned in the Chapter Introduction, 
Confucianism was the first target to be destroyed and Confucian values were 
questioned and eventually corrupted during the Cultural Revolution (Zhang & 
Schwartz, 1997, pp.197-202). Through examining the revolutionary opera films, I 
found that the Confucian masculinity account of Confucianism was also deconstructed. 
By incorporating Maoist ideology such as anti-imperialism and nationalism in the 
revolutionary opera films, the filmic discourse ideologically produced tensions 
between ‘revolutionary masculinity’ and ‘Confucian masculinity’.  Therefore, this 
chapter argues that through the construction of revolutionary masculinity of toughness, 
courageousness, aggressiveness and divisiveness, Confucian masculinity functioned 
as a feminine symbol, and feminine characteristics were disempowered in the social 
constitution of gender meanings in the revolutionary opera films. 
 
Firstly, Confucian culture was identified as a type of feminine culture, evidence can 
be found through decoding the mise-en-scene in the revolutionary opera films. Echoing 
discussions earlier, based on yin-yang symbolism, the Confucian culture is portrayed 
as yin and feminine in the filmic discourse. For example, in The Red Lantern, in the 
scene where the main hero Li Yuhe is invited by chief villain Hatoyama to visit his 
house. The camera first uses a high angle and full shot to frame Hatoyama’s house. 
The room of a Japanese villain is full of traditional decorations and furniture. The 
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interior window frame is Japanese in style, which can be read as a typical cultural 
symbol to signify traditional Japanese culture.44 The Chinese round dinner table and 
two chairs of Chinese Ming style have been put into the centre of the stage. The 
Japanese lacquer wine cups and a wine pot have been placed on the top of the dinner 
table. When the camera moves to right to introduce Hatoyama, it first uses a close shot 
to highlight a wood-print of a geisha which hangs on the right wall. In summary, the 
mise-en-scene in terms of the room of Japanese military is an East Asian style, rather 
than a Western European style. 
 
From a traditional Confucian perspective, the decoration in Hatoyama’s room is 
exquisite and elegant, demonstrating the good taste of the house owner who is a person 
from the upper class. Through the combination of cinematic strategy and yin-yang 
symbolism, the understanding of decoration that signifies traditional Confucian culture 
has been challenged in the revolutionary opera films. Confucian cultural codes do not 
signify the orthodox cannons, but feminine symbols in the revolutionary opera films. 
For instance, the extreme low-key lighting makes the room look gloomy, the delicate 
decoration such as the lacquer wine cups looks soft and feminine. In traditional China 
and Japan, the wine cups were usually made of different materials. By comparing with 
bronze and porcelain wine cups, the wooden lacquer wine cups are made of wood and 
                                               
44 Since Confucian Culture had historically influenced the cultural sphere of East Asia including 
China, Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea, Japan and Vietnam, and thus traditional Japanese culture 
has been identified as a segment of Confucian World or Sinic World (Sun, 2002). In Japan, Confucian 
culture played a major role in the development of Japanese culture and politics, particularly during the 
6 th to 9th centuries. 
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the lacquering red looks more feminine than metal and pottery. Most importantly, the 
close shot and low-key light create an erotic sensation in terms of coquettish geisha 
that makes the whole room look more feminine (see Fig. 3). The geisha is not a 
Confucian symbol, but in the traditional Confucian context (including in Japan), a 
female image is forbidden to appear in a scholar’s living room or study room because 
of misogynist thinking. Ironically, the films discourse not only sets the image of geisha 
in this room but also uses a close shot to highlight it in order to send the political 
message, the counter-revolution refers to Confucianism which belongs to yin 
(feminine). 
 
In contrast, the image of revolutionary culture is depicted as a form of modernised, 
Westernised and ‘masculine’ culture in the revolutionary opera films. As introduced 
in Chapter Four, China desired to be a modern country like the West since the 
nineteenth century. Thus, the Cultural Revolution is also a national revolution which 
was a process of deploying a Western model of modernity in order to throw off 
imperialism (Berry, 2016). In the case of the revolutionary opera films, the films 
incorporate numerous Western cultural codes while introducing the revolutionary 
culture. For example, in the film of On the Docks, the mise-en-scene establishes a 
context of modernisation and industrialisation through the representation of iron ships 
anchored on the Huang Pu dock in Shanghai. Modern industrial equipment such as 
delivery trucks, wire ropes and cable ropes are put on the docks. A giant electric tower 
stands on the dock and a giant slogan “long live the general line of the party (总路线
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万岁)” hangs on the electric tower. Similar to other revolutionary films, extreme-high 
lighting is always applied in this film to signify Maoist China is ‘bright’ and ‘hopeful’. 
Moreover, the ships, trucks and electric tower signify Maoist China as a modernised 
and industrialised country likened to Western technological power. Importantly, the 
giant electric tower can be interpreted as a masculine symbol which signifies the 
modernisation and industrialisation on the one hand. On the other hand, the giant 
electric tower can be read as a phallic symbol which denotes men’s sexual power that 
emphasises the revolutionary yang (masculine). 
 
Indeed, the Cultural Revolution was a political and social movement within the process 
of Chinese modernization. Mao aimed to construct a new national identity against 
imperialism and simultaneously to develop a communist state. As discussed in Chapter 
Three, the revolutionary opera films played significant role in propagating Maoist 
ideology during the Cultural Revolution. By examining interactions between 
revolutionary heroes and villains, I found that through incorporating Marxist ideology 
into the revolutionary opera films, it changed Chinese traditional understanding of 
masculine paradigms, and only revolutionary masculinity as the legitimated 
masculinity signifies revolutionary power in the filmic discourse. In contrast to 
Confucian masculinity, feminine traits had been identified as unvalued characteristics 
that were deleted from the configuration of revolutionary masculinity. Consequently, 
feminine characteristics were disempowered, marginalised from the social 
construction of gender meaning/identity in the revolutionary opera films. 
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There is a scene in Shajiabang in which Diao Deyi, who is the KMT military leader 
secretly meets with a Japanese emissary in his house. The mise-en-scene of this room 
is a typical Chinese style, which indicates Diao Deyi is a civilised military character 
influenced by Confucianism. In this scene, properties including the antique Chinese 
wooden window frame, Ming style furniture, and white porcelain tea bowls play the 
role of cultural symbols that signify traditional Chinese culture. Importantly, there is a 
wooden plaque which hangs on a girder that is placed into the centre of this room. 
However, the director Wu Zhaodi applies a low-key lighting, four traditional Chinese 
characters ‘li xiu jue de’ can be read on the plaque (see Fig. 1). The four Chinese 
characters ‘li xiu jue de’(⾪修厥德) on the plaque quote from The Classic of Poetry 
(诗经), which is one of the Five Confucian Classics.45 In The Classic of Poetry, the 
poem of Hymn to King Wen says, “Keep we in memories, King Wen’s wise and bright 
decrees. Knowing from the time we laid. Our first offering at his feet, till today, when 
by his aid, this great realm is made complete, they have been the augury, of our State’s 
prosperity.” (⽆念尔祖，⾪修厥德。永⾔配命，⾃求多福。)（Allen, 1891. p. 457） 
 
 
                                               
45 There are five Confucian Classics (五经) in the Confucian canon. They are The Classic of Poetry 
(诗经), The Book of Documents (尚书), The Book of Rites (礼记), The Book of Yi (易传) and Autumn 
Annals (春秋). The book of Classic of Poetry is the most important book in the five Confucian 
Classics.   
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FIGURE 1. SHAJIABANG (1971) 
 
In the case of the film Shajiabang, it could be argued that the plaque serves as an 
ideological articulation that transfers Confucian scholars into the counter-
revolutionary class. As elaborated earlier, the classic allusion in terms of li xiu jue de 
means “In the memory of King Wen and his virtues”. In terms of the wen–wu paradigm, 
which was elaborated in Chapter Four, “it was only after Confucianism took hold that 
wen became progressively more dominant for the upper class, resulting in shi (⼠) later 
associated with ‘scholar–officials’… that a scholar is considered to be no less 
masculine than a soldier (Louie, 2002, p. 11).” In other words, it can be interpreted 
that wen refers to the scholar class (shi), which was the dominant class in ancient China. 
In Confucian gender discourse, when a man practises wen masculinity, he is practising 
his political power and authority because of the dominance of wen over wu. Due to the 
fact that the wen–wu paradigm has a significant class implication (Louie, 2002), 
properties like the plaque highlights wen, thereby serving as an ideological articulation 
that incorporates Marxist ideology. For example, the notion of class places the 
Confucian scholars in the counter-revolutionary class in a revolutionary discourse. 
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Thus, the film constructs a tension that wen/Confucian value equals the idea of 
counter-revolutionary masculinity that has been practised by counter-revolutionary 
men. In contrast, the revolutionary class embodies a revolutionary masculinity that 
refers to modernised and revolutionary values. 
 
Moreover, Roberts (2010) observes that costumes play an important role in the 
construction of the personality of characters on a stage. Roberts elaborates, “the 
primary visuality of stage costume means that it has a direct and powerful impact on 
the way an audience understands a character on stage” (Roberts, 2010, p. 85). 
Traditional Beijing Opera, as I discussed earlier, contains a complex symbolic system. 
It is not only the symbol, such as costume or make-up, coding the character’s 
personality on the stage, but also the characters give meanings to these symbols. Since 
a positive character appears on the stage, audiences automatically read everything 
(costumes, make-up, gestures) in relation to this positive character as positive (Qi, 
1998). As innovations to the Beijing Opera, there are numerous Western imports in 
the revolutionary opera films, but Chinese audiences may not change their logic to 
understand the revolutionary opera films. They potentially apply a stereotypical way 
to interpret codes in relation to a positive character that must contain positive meanings. 
Costumes therefore can serve as an ideological articulation in the revolutionary opera 
films to state the political message. 
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For example, there is a scene in The Red Detachment of Women where the male 
communist Hong Changqing is disguised as an overseas businessman to celebrate the 
birthday party of chief villain Nan Ba Tian. In this scene, Hong Changqing dresses up 
as a “modern” man with a white tailored uniform, a black bow, a white hat and white 
brogues. In contrast, the majority of villains are in traditional gowns and one is in a 
tailored Zhongshan suit (see Fig. 2). The Western tailored suit with padded shoulders 
visually increases the width of shoulders of Hong Changqing and makes his body look 
more masculine than the villains. On the contrary, the loose silk robes hide the villains’ 
shoulders and hips and thus their bodies look soft and feminine. Also, the film 
employed a low-angle shot to capture the revolutionary hero and a high-angle shot to 
frame the villains, thereby making the Communist hero look much taller than the 
villains. 
 
Through the comparison of the costumes between villains and heroes in The Red 
Detachment of Women, it can be argued that the costumes are not only referring to 
different forms of masculinity but also signify different classes. The majority of 
villains are dressed in the traditional silk robes that have been identified as a 
representation of the scholar class. In ancient China, the silk robe is a very luxurious 
cloth so that only scholars and the noble class could afford it. Besides, Confucian 
China as a hierarchal state only empowered the scholar class who had political power 
to dress in silk robes; other classes such as businessmen and farmers were only allowed 
to wear cotton or linen clothes (Shen, 2011). Therefore, in the revolutionary opera 
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films, the traditional, effeminate silk robes are a symbol not only signifying that the 
villains belong to the scholar class, but also emphasised the political privilege that they 
embodied through their exclusive dress. Moreover, the Zhongshan suit is also named 
the “modern Chinese tunic suit”, which was designed by Sun Zhong Shan (孙中⼭), 
the founder of KMT (also known as The Nationalist Party or Kuomintang). The 
Zhongshan suit was the national dress for males, in particular, the official dress for 
government leaders during the period of Republic of China from 1928 to 1949. In  
The Red Detachment of Women, it can be read as a political symbol to distinguish the 
KMT and the CCP. 
 
In contrast, the white Western suit plays a role of a political symbol that functions as 
an identification of an underground communist and his modernist aesthetic in this film. 
Historically, fashionable dress are the typical image of the underground communists 
who endorsed “self-adornment” for its underground activities (Hung-Yok, 2003). For 
example, the famous Chinese writer Mao Dun recalls that male communists were 
fashionably dressed in Western-style business suits as “disguise” (Mao Dun, 1981, 
1996, p. 224). Mao’s daughter Li Min also recalls that communists were all in 
Westernised dressed if they left Yan An ( 延安 ) for political missions. Male 
communists put on Western suits and women wore dress (Hung-Yok, 2003). By 
comparing the colour of clothes in The Red Detachment of Women, it is clear that the 
soft silk robes worn by villains are dark, such as black and magenta referring to the yin 
shades, because they have been identified as the counter-revolutionary class. In 
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contrast, Hong Changqing is in a white suit not only due to white being a colour of 
yang on the basis of yin–yang symbolism, but also the “the colour of white always 
signifies professionalism and modernization in Maoist China” (Chen, 2003, p. 381). 
Roberts (2010) argues, “China’s political weakness in the face of Western aggression 
led to a rejection of traditional dress as effeminate, and the pursuit of strong, fit bodies 
capable of guiding the nation to modernization” (p. 104). Particularly for Chinese 
communists, Marxism is a modern philosophy deriving from the Western 
Enlightenment and is their revolutionary Bible to understand the modernist aesthetics 
and politics. In the revolutionary opera films, Hong’s white Western suit is evidence 
to claim that while the CCP’s ideology is against the bourgeois, they are a 
representation of modernity in Chinese history. 
 
Although Hong is disguised as a modern businessman to trick the villains in this scene, 
the film still highlights his revolutionary heroism as “nationalist” rather than 
portraying him as a “bourgeois man” that the Cultural Revolutionary should counter. 
For instance, the camera first uses an extreme close-up shot to emphasise Hong’s face 
in this scene. His red face, bright eyes and rosy lip immediately help audiences to 
distinguish the Western-dressed communist from other pale-looking villains. In the 
book of Spider Eater, Rae Yang (1997) describes an imaginary image of the 
revolutionary hero in the Cultural Revolution: “Tall and vigorous, he is like a Greek 
Warrior. His every movement is nimble and graceful. His eyes are the brightest stars 
in the sky of a clear autumn night. His lips are warm and rosy as intoxicating as the 
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finest red wine” (p. 104). Yang’s memoir indicates that a macho and robust aesthetic 
flourished in the Cultural Revolution. Thus, the image of Hong Changqing in The Red 
Detachment of Women indeed represents the rhetorical paradigm of a communist hero 
that satisfies the audience’s imagination. 
 
Most significantly, tensions between revolutionary and Confucian masculinity can be 
observed through gender performance between Hong and the villains. In another scene, 
Hong Changqing stands in the centre of the frame and all villains are looking at him 
and making a low bow to convey their respect for him. However, Hong Changqing is 
looking at the front and draws up his back (see Fig. 2). From a Confucian perspective, 
a bow is a body sign in relation to hierarchies that is widely used to show reverence 
for someone of a higher class. For example, The Analects records, “When Confucius 
entered the duke’s gate, he would bow his body in, as though the gateway would not 
accommodate his height”.46 Besides, The Analects also indicates that the bow is not 
only a political routine for official business 47  but also a significant Confucian 
mannerism that all Confucian scholars should learn and practise in their daily life. 
                                               
46 See “When Confucius entered the duke’s gate, he would bow his body in, as though the gateway 
would not accommodate his height. He never stood in the middle of a gateway; he never trod on the 
threshold. When he walked past his lord’s position, his expression would be serious and he would step 
rapidly. He would speak as if it were difficult for him. (入公门，鞠躬如也，如不容。立不中门，
行不履阈。过位，色勃如也，足躩如也，其言似不足者。摄齐升堂，鞠躬如也，屏气似不息
者。出，降一等，逞颜色，怡怡如也。没阶，趋进，翼如也。复其位，踧踖如也。) The 
Analects, Chapter Ten An online Teaching Translation, 
http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Analects_of_Confucius_(Eno-2015).pdf 
 
47 See “When junzi carried a jade tally of official business, he would bow his body, as though he 
could not hold it up. When he held it high, it was as though bowing; when he held it low, it was as 
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FIGURE 2 . HONG CHANGQING AND VILLIANS IN THE RED DETACHMENT OF WOMEN (1972) 
 
In The Red Detachment of Women, all villains bow to Hong Changqing but he does 
not bow to them. Here, the bow can be read as an ideological articulation to represent 
tensions between revolutionary and Confucian masculinity. Importantly, in the scene 
of making bows, an elder villain who looks like a Confucian scholar is standing at the 
edge of the frame makes the lowest bow to Hong Changqing (see Fig. 2). It could be 
argued that the figure of elder Confucian scholar signifies Confucianism, which 
endorsed dual power in the Chinese context. Firstly, as I noted in Chapter Four, 
Confucian concept of “filial piety” asks the younger generations to respect elders and 
thereby an elder must be more powerful than the younger. Secondly, scholars as the 
dominant class in traditional China deserved the respect from all other classes. Based 
                                               
though about to confer it. His expression was serious, as though fearful, and he stepped as though he 
were following a line.” (执圭，鞠躬如也，如不胜。上如揖，下如授，勃如战色，足缩缩，如有
循。享礼，有容色。私觌，愉愉如也。) The Analects of Confucius, Chapter 10, An online 
Teaching Translation, http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Analects_of_Confucius_(Eno-2015).pdf 
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on the Confucian ethic, younger people such as Hong Changqing must make a bow to 
the elder scholar to convey his respect and modesty for this powerful person in a 
traditional Chinese context. Yet in the discourse of revolutionary opera films, Hong 
Changqing is the male protagonist who signifies Communist ideology and 
revolutionary masculinity, which is placed in a superior position compared to the 
Confucian ideology and soft masculinity in the revolutionary discourse. As the 
youngest but most powerful figure that signifies the “young” and “powerful” Marxist 
ideology, he is empowered to destroy the Confucian values and thus he needs not bow 
to the elder scholar to show his respect for elder scholars (Confucianism). 
 
Through examining tensions between Confucian and revolutionary masculinities, it 
can be further argued that an orthodox masculinity has been deconstructed in the 
revolutionary films’ discourse. The Confucian masculinity is not identified as an ideal 
manhood, but a feminine being that has been marginalised, devalued and rejected. 
Simultaneously, a revolutionary masculinity that refers to Western and modern values 
has been identified as the ideal masculinity in the revolutionary opera films. 
 
Evidence can be also found in the interaction between communist Li Yuhe and 
Japanese villain Hatoyama in the film The Red Lantern. In the scene where Hatoyama 
meets Li Yuhe at Hatoyama’s home, as a Japanese invader Hatoyama plays a role that 
represents Confucian masculinity in the discourse of film. He speaks literately, moves 
softly and behaves tenderly, which all refer to Confucian canons of junzi-hood. In 
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contrast, the heroic figure of Li Yuhe, who represents justice, seems stronger, more 
aggressive, confident and robust than Hatoyama. For instance, when Li Yuhe enters 
Hatoyama’s home, he immediately sits down without asking the permission of 
Hatoyama. Within Confucianism, it is an extremely rude behaviour for a younger guest 
to sit down before an elder master. Another rude action that can be interpreted as 
deconstruction of Confucian values is that Li starts to smoke and does not offer 
Hatoyama a cigarette. Based on the concept of filial piety, the younger should first 
offer the elder food, drink and cigarettes to show their humbleness. 
 
From a Confucian perspective, the crucial point in practising Confucianism is ren48, 
which could be embodied through filial piety represented by etiquette. However, in the 
film of The Red Lantern, Li Yuhe displays rebellion, ignoring Confucian rules not only 
because he is more powerful than Hatoyama, but also because Confucian values were 
identified as hypocritical and counter-revolutionary in the Cultural Revolutionary 
discourse. For instance, the propagandist comics The Evil Life of Confucius indicate 
that the concept of ren is the crucial point of Confucianism that motivates people to 
care for other people. However, ren was also read as a counter-revolutionary value that 
restricts revolutionary consciousness. 49  In the film’s discourse, Hatoyama stands 
behind Li Yuhe while Li Yuhe is sitting and smoking with legs widely open, signifying 
his masculine power. Hatoyama speaks softly, but looks very nervous and stares at Li 
                                               
48 See Chapter Four regarding ren. 
49 Translated from “仁是孔老二反动思想的核心。“仁”就是爱一切人， 这分明是骗人的鬼话” 
in Ba Jing, 1974, The Evil life of Confucius, Shanghai People’s Publishing, Shanghai. 
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Yuhe. In contrast, it seems that Li Yuhe ignores him by looking straight ahead and 
laughing a lot, which conveys his confidence, courage and power. In summary, the 
discursive evidence leads to the conclusion that the gender performance of Hatoyama 
is more civilised and feminised than Li Yuhe, while Li is more powerful and 
masculinised than Hatoyama (see Fig. 3). 
 
 
FIGURE 3. LI YUHE & HATOYAMA IN THE RED LANTERN (1970) 
 
By establishing tensions between soft masculinity and revolutionary masculinity, and 
feminine characteristics including ren and li in relation to Confucian masculinity, 
feminine characteristics are identified and rejected. As discussed in Chapter Four, 
Confucian masculinity is treated as ‘the other’ by hegemonic masculinity. The 
revolutionary opera films also applied an “Orientalist gaze”50 to portray Confucian 
                                               
50 According to Said (1977), the term “Orientalist gaze” refers to “Orientalism as a Western style for 
dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient. The Orient is not only adjacent to 
European invention, and had been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting 
memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences.” (p. 3) 
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masculinity as a passive, submissive and subordinate being. Consequently, Confucian 
masculinity has been marginalised, and the revolutionary masculinity refers to 
Western and modern values that occupy the dominant position in the gender discourse 
of the revolutionary opera films. Through the construction of revolutionary 
masculinity as an ideal manhood of revolutionary ideology, the revolutionary opera 
films established a macro-culture to ensure masculinist power works by nationalism 
and Marxism. 
 
Feminist theorists demonstrate that the state is a masculine institution (Connell, 1995), 
and historical and modern processes indicate that nationalism and revolution involve 
masculine processes and activities (Pateman, 1989; Connell, 1995). Feminists 
recognise that nationalism becomes a feminist issue because “male theorists are 
typically indifferent to the gendering of nations” (McClintock, 1995; p. 357), yet state 
power always links to masculinity and manhood (Connell, 1995; Nagel, 1998). Social 
constructionist feminists emphasise that both gender and society are constructed by 
masculine or feminine structures (Jaggar, 1983) and “the interplay of gender with other 
structures such as class and race create further relationships between masculinities” 
(Connell, 1995, p. 80). Critical feminist discourse analysis, contributes to analysis of 
how state power interplays with masculinist power in the name of nationalism, and 
how this masculinist power dominates the understanding between Confucian 
masculinity and revolutionary masculinity in the revolutionary opera films. 
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In the revolutionary opera films, political discourse always interacts with gender 
discourse. As I noted in Chapter Three, the revolutionary opera films were propaganda 
mobilised to interpret and internalise Maoist ideology to Chinese audiences during the 
Cultural Revolution. The gender construction is also a political project during this 
period, thus meanings of feminine and masculine characteristics in the constitution of 
masculinity in the films are not only symbolically but also ideologically constructed. 
Based on a social constructionist feminist understanding, Interrante and Lasser (1979) 
identify “masculinism” as a historically patriarchal social system. They argue, 
“[M]asculinism could move beyond sex to a more complex division base on sex, class, 
and race. It could be seen as an aspect of social organization which reproduced class 
divisions by regulating sexual behavior from the upper to the lower classes” (p. 34). 
The identification in this research of representations of Confucian masculinity and 
revolutionary masculinity in the revolutionary opera films arguably can be understood, 
from a feminist perspective, to be a critique of ‘masculinism’ which maintains male 
dominance in the social construction of gender. 
 
Since the revolutionary opera films set a discourse of class struggle under nationalism 
and anti-imperialism, which I discussed in Chapter Three, hierarchal structures 
between revolutionary masculinity and Confucian masculinity in terms of 
revolutionary class and counter-revolutionary class have been established. Confucian 
masculinity refers to traditional culture as defined by the configuration of gender 
performance that is embodied by counter-revolutionary men. In order to enhance the 
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power position of the revolutionary class, revolutionary masculinity was authorised as 
the legitimate masculinity that dominates gender performance, gender order and 
gender relations in the revolutionary opera films. In contrast to the understanding of 
masculine and feminine power relations in ancient China that I elaborated in Chapter 
Four, semiotic definitions of masculine and feminine characteristics have been 
changed in the revolutionary opera films. In the revolutionary opera films, masculine 
symbols referring to revolutionary masculinity are master signifiers, and feminine 
symbols in terms of Confucian masculinity are symbolically identified with 
powerlessness or weakness. 
 
Therefore, Confucian masculinity and its feminine characteristics (wen, li, ren) are 
marginalised by the Marxist notion of class, nationalism and imperialism in the 
revolutionary gender discourse. It is not only that Confucian masculinity is a feminine 
symbol in the filmic discourse, evidence in the revolutionary opera films, such as mise-
en-scene, costumes etc., also indicate that feminine characteristics are devalued and 
disempowered in the sociopolitical and sociocultural constructions. Revolutionary 
masculinity interplays with masculinist power that can be viewed as a ‘masculinism’ 
as defined by Interrante and Lasser (1979), which further dominates the social 
construction of gender meaning in the revolutionary opera films. This masculine or 
male dominance is not only working through interactions between revolutionary men 
and counter-revolutionary men, but is also represented by power relations between 
heroines and villains. I will elaborate on this further in the sections below. 
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  Femininity as Alienation in the Revolutionary 
Discourse 
The term “alienation” is derived from Hegelian traditions in German philosophy 
(Meszaros, 1971). In Hegel’s The Phenomenology of The Mind, he defines the 
‘unhappy consciousness’ (únglückliches Bewusstseiń) as an alienated soul, which is 
conscious of itself as a divided being, or a doubled and contradictory being whose 
aspirations towards universality have been frustrated (Hegel, 1967). Karl Marx 
combined Hegelian philosophy and his thought of the capitalist mode of production in 
the interpretation of alienation. For Marx, a human being is a “species being” different 
from the being of other species, because humans (nature) have distinctive labouring 
activity. Therefore, under capitalism, workers are alienated from the products of their 
labour. The capitalist production is an objectification of human powers and abilities, 
rather than providing opportunity to augment essential human powers. 
 
In analysing the gender problems, the Marxist concept of alienation provides a 
theoretical framework relevant for feminist critiques, particularly the socialist feminist 
critique of women’s oppression and sexual politics. Feminist theorists argue, however, 
that traditional Marxist alienation is in less “scientific” writing and even Marx rarely 
uses the word alienation in his critique of capitalism (Jagger, 1983; Ollman, 1971). 
However, socialist feminists always use the concept of “alienation” to describe social 
relations and women’s oppression in relation to the working class, particularly in a 
capitalist society (Jagger, 1983; Ollman, 1971). Bertell Ollman (1971) emphasised that 
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Marx’s alienation has two significant features: it first refers to a fragmentation of 
humans and then splinters “human nature into a number of misbegotten parts” (p. 135). 
For socialists and radical feminists who apply a Marxist method to deconstruct 
patriarchal power relations in the capitalist discourse, women’s alienation is 
interpreted as a representation of capitalist oppression. In Constructing a Theory of 
Capitalist Patriarchy and Socialist Feminism, Zillah Eisenstein (1999) employs the 
classic Marxist concept of alienation as a revolutionary ontology to elaborate capitalist 
class structure and patriarchal domination. She explains that the concept of species 
being only exists in an un-alienated society. According to a Marxist theoretical 
framework, it is the capitalist economic and class structures that cause the patriarchal 
gender structure. The patriarchal control is expressed through sexual division of labour 
between masculine and feminine roles. For traditional Marxists, the real liberation of 
women means the end of sexual division of labour, and transference of women’s work 
from domestic work to public industry (Eisenstein, 1999). However, the understanding 
of Marx’s alienation should be revised because women’s alienation is more complex 
than women’s economic exploitation. Women can be alienated by economic or social 
conditions that suppress women’s own consciousness or freedom.  
 
As I noted in Introduction and Chapter Three, the revolutionary opera films followed 
Mao’s understanding of women’s oppression, which derives from Marxist 
interpretations of gender equality. Through examining the revolutionary opera films, I 
found that they incorporate Maoist ideology and reinterpret the Marxist concept of 
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alienation. The concept of alienation has become an essentially theoretical framework 
for explaining women’s oppression in the revolutionary opera films, which moves 
away from Marxist interpretation of women’s oppression under capitalism for the 
working class. In this chapter, I continue to argue that femininity does not vanish in 
the gender discourse of the revolutionary opera films. However, I add to the discussion 
that femininity is read as a symbol of women’s alienation, a representation of class 
oppression that is abolished in the revolutionary discourse but can be found in the 
counter-revolutionary discourse. Through the empowerment of masculinity and 
disempowerment of femininity, the revolutionary opera films thereby construct a new 
form of patriarchy that oppresses women’s femininity and denies the fact that 
femininity is part of human nature. 
 
For instance, in the film Shajiabang, the female protagonist A Qing (阿庆)is an 
underground communist who runs a teahouse in counter-revolutionary territory. The 
film ideologically divides her gender performance into two different forms. Similarly 
to other heroines in the revolutionary films, while she communicates with other party 
members she represents stereotypical masculine traits (according to gender norms), 
including daring, decisiveness and authority. In contrast, when she interacts with male 
villains, she has been portrayed as a conventional rural woman. Her haircut is a 
traditional bun that indicates she is a married woman, rather than the communist 
bobbed haircut. In the eight revolutionary opera films, she is the only figure who 
changes costumes three times, which means she is a woman who loves beauty. In 
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addition, her feminine “performance” is not only represented by her appearance but 
also embodied through her feminine behaviours. There is a scene when she first meets 
male villains in her teahouse and plays a female role of service provider, such as 
wiping desks and serving tea. Then, she lights cigarettes for the male villains in order 
to convey her submission to them (see Fig. 4). When a villain doubts her political 
identity, she intentionally performs her feminine weakness in order to avoid his 
suspicion. 
 
 
FIGURE 4. A QING & KMT MILITARY IN SHAJIABANG (1971) 
 
It is obvious that femininity does occur in the revolutionary opera films, but can be 
only found in counter-revolutionary discourse. In the case of Shajiabang, when A Qing 
is spying in the counter-revolutionary area, she should apply a feminine role to serve 
men, and use her femininity to please men or flirt with men. A parallel case is in The 
Red Detachment of Women, where it constructs a narrative that the destiny of Qing 
Hua is to be sold as a concubine or sexual servant before her participation in revolution. 
As a sexual object in the counter-revolutionary discourse, Qing Hua represents 
stereotypical femininity via her feminine body when she tries to escape from the 
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landlord. In contrast, in the revolutionary discourse, she is portrayed as a masculinised 
female warrior with a bobbed haircut and military uniform, on which I will elaborate 
in Chapter Six. 
 
According to Marxist theory, “sexual alienation itself is only one manifestation of a 
larger alienation from the body” (Bartky, 1982, p. 130), thus the sexual objectification 
of women’s bodies has been read by socialist feminists as the representation of 
women’s alienation (Bartky, 1982; Young, 1980). On the one hand, the sexual 
objectification, or de Beauvior’s (1961) account of feminine narcissistic alienation, 
forms women’s experience. On the other hand, “[s]exual objectification is a form of 
fragmentation and thus an impoverishment of the objectified individual; it involves 
too the implicit denial to those who suffer it that they have capacities which transcend 
the merely sexual” (Bartky, 1982, p. 130). Therefore, both radical and socialist 
feminists such as de Beauvoir (1961), Young (1979, 1980) and Bartky (1982, 1990) 
treat sexual objectification as the representation of women’s alienation. 
 
It could be argued that the revolutionary opera films adopt both radical and socialist 
feminists’ understanding of alienation into gender discourse and simultaneously 
construct a radical thinking of women’s oppression. Through integration of Maoist 
ideology and Marxist conception of alienation, the films establish a radical equation: 
femininity equals alienation, which is represented by sexual objectification. The 
revolutionary opera film thus politically constructs a revolutionary gendered 
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understanding that a woman should perform masculinity rather than femininity, and 
this understanding challenges the stereotypical understanding that women and only 
women can have a feminine identity. Therefore, the conflicts between femininity and 
women’s potential to embody masculinity represent the dominance of masculinist 
power in the gender discourse of revolutionary opera films. Femininity in the 
revolutionary films discourse has been identified by a number of negative elements 
such as oppression, lowliness and feebleness. It is not only because femininity is too 
trivial and cannot reflect the sublimity of the heroine (Cui, 2003), but also that 
femininity has been identified as women’s alienation in the revolutionary discourse. 
 
In the case of The Red Detachment of Women, the name of the female protagonist was 
changed from Qiong Hua（琼花）in Xie Jin’s film (1960) to Qing Hua (清华) in the 
revolutionary opera film. This is explained by Roberts (2010), who argues that: 
 
The names of the characters and places in each of the model works were subjected 
to extensive careful revision, indicating that the symbolism attached to them is 
significant, and if the names of characters or places were left unchanged from those 
in original works or from those of ‘real-life’ models it was not by chance, but because 
those names were considered appropriate to convey the required messages about the 
nature of the characters or places (p. 228) 
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In the Chinese cultural context, the name of Qiong Hua means “verdant jade green 
flower” which is a purely feminine name. However, the opera film of The Red 
Detachment of Women was asked by Jiang Qing to fulfil the principle of “three 
prominences” to emphasise positive and heroic characters. Therefore, the name of 
Qiong Hua was viewed as too feminine to satisfy revolutionary needs and thus she was 
renamed by Jiang Qing as Qing Hua, which means “clear and pure China” (Chen, 
2002). In the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, Mao met Red Army guards 
in the Tiananmen Square and critiqued a female Red Army guard’s name that was too 
feminine. He argued that her name “Song bin bin” (宋彬彬) should be replaced by 
“Song yao wu”（宋要武）(Xu, 1999). In Chinese, bin bin means literacy and yao wu 
means “using violence”. In the Cultural Revolution, Mao’s words always indicated the 
correct political orientation and this possibly resulted in the name of female protagonist 
in The Red Detachment of Women being changed from Qiong Hua to Qing Hua. 
 
Roberts (2010) further elaborates, “verbal linguistic systems can convey messages 
about gender in numerous different ways ranging from the gendered meaning of names 
to the cultural understanding of certain forms of language use as either more feminine 
or more masculine” (p. 162). In the case of The Red Detachment of Women, the 
transformation of the protagonist’s name plays a symbolic function through linguistic 
systems that not only represent sociocultural changes, but also indicate the power 
structures of revolutionary gender discourse. Bing bing refers to Confucian 
masculinity (junzi-hood) and was identified as a feminine characteristic that was 
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viewed as the wrong political orientation by Mao (e.g. Qiong Hua as a purely feminine 
name definitely should be abandoned in revolutionary opera films). In the film’s 
discourse, the name of Qing Hua rather than Qiong Hua as an ideological articulation 
conveys a political message: a revolutionary woman should perform masculinity and 
cast off her femininity because femininity equals women’s alienation. 
 
In addition, it is important to notice that all counter-revolutionary figures in the eight 
revolutionary opera films are males. There was only one female negative character 
named Hu Diemi (胡蝶迷) in the original fiction of Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy. 
However, this female villain was dropped in the adaption to a revolutionary opera film. 
In contrast, all female characters in the revolutionary opera films are identified as the 
revolutionary class. Significantly, half of the eight opera films placed heroines in the 
centre of power. For instance, Ke Xiang is the military leader in Azalea Mountain. A 
Qing, as an underground communist, is the supervisor of the communist agent in 
Shajiabang. Both Jiang Shuiying in Song of Dragon River and Fang Haizhen in the 
On the Docks are playing a role of party branch secretary. However, Qing Hua is not 
the central heroic figure in The Red Detachment of Women; she is replaced from the 
position of female protagonist by the male hero Hong Changqing by the ending of the 
film. 
 
In these five revolutionary opera films, the heroic females are assigned masculine roles 
including as political and military leaders, and all present masculine traits (according 
 185 
to gender norms), such as being capable, resourceful, upright, courageous, intelligent 
and steadfast. In other words, regardless of the discourses of socialist construction or 
revolutionary war, they have been depicted as intellectual, powerful and capable 
participators in the public sphere. Roberts (2010) points out that it was a shift that 
women are positioned in central heroic roles in the traditional operas. She further 
argues, “for women in heroic roles to constitute half of the total protagonists of the 
revolutionary opera was therefore a very significant cultural change in the 
representation of women in this popular form of traditional culture” (Roberts, 2010, p. 
41). 
 
The heroic roles in terms of women in the revolutionary opera films not only produced 
a remarkable cultural change but also reconstructed women’s gender roles. Initially, 
women were assigned political roles. This was very likely due to the fact that Marx 
and Engels treated women as an oppressed class rather than only a sex. From 
traditional Marxist understanding, patriarchal power works through the sexual division 
of labour in our society between masculine and feminine roles. Stereotypical feminine 
roles in gender norms restrict women’s participation in social production and thus 
leads to women’s oppression. Marxists such as Mao normally applied the historical 
dialectic method and economical determinism to analyse power relations. Engels’ 
work The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State and Marx’s Economic 
and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 both demonstrate women as a class who were 
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oppressed based on women’s inferior economic position in the capitalist power 
structure (Engels, 1968; Marx, 1968). 
 
Based on theories of Marx and Engels, the way socialist feminists challenge patriarchal 
power is through critiques of power because it is rooted in the distinction between 
women and men. For instance, socialist feminist Zillah Eisenstein (1999) elaborates: 
 
The study of women’s oppression, then, must deal with both the sexual and economic 
material conditions if one is to understand oppression rather than merely understand 
economic exploitation. Patriarchy is defined to mean a sexual system of power in which 
the male role is superior in possession of power and economic privilege. Patriarchy is the 
male hierarchical ordering of society. Sex roles themselves are understood to be units of 
power and oppression. Women’s position in this power structure is defined as derived, 
not from the economic class structure, but from the autonomous patriarchal organisation 
of society. (p. 202) 
 
By approaching a Marxist method of political economy, it seems that Maoist ideology 
treats sexual division of labour as the historical basis of women’s subordination. From 
that point of view, the solution to women’s oppression is thus to transform different 
biological sexes to equal human labour. In the case of revolutionary opera films, it is 
clear that female protagonists are assigned roles of political and military leaders that 
are stereotypical masculine roles. It could be argued that the masculine roles of 
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heroines function as an ideological apparatus that interpellates Marxist theory, and that 
the oppression of women is based in the divisions of gender roles. However, Azalea 
Mountain introduced Ke Xiang as a widow and that Qing Hua’s family had been 
murdered by enemies. Traditional gender roles such as daughters, wives and mothers 
in relation to other female protagonists are not mentioned in the revolutionary opera 
films. Although we cannot identify that women escape the oppression of traditional 
sex roles in the revolutionary opera films because all the films are set in the public 
sphere, however by highlighting women’s masculine roles, the revolutionary opera 
films indeed establish a hierarchical division of sex roles. “Doing” masculine roles and 
participating in the public sphere, particularly participation in economic and political 
spheres, are not only ways of practising revolutionary consciousness but also a way of 
exploring liberation in a revolutionary discourse. Therefore, the understanding in the 
revolutionary gender discourse of women’s gender roles transforms feminine roles to 
masculine roles. Meanwhile, women are empowered “doing” masculine power and 
authority in the public sphere further reshapes women’s gender performance and 
gender relations. 
 
In summary, the revolutionary opera films intended to send political messages to 
Chinese audiences during the Cultural Revolution. Firstly, women are alienated by 
femininity in a way that is similar to the way that workers are alienated by work.51 
                                               
51 In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 Manuscripts, Marx (1968) argued, “The 
worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He is at 
home when he is not working, and when he is working he is not at home.” (p. 110) 
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Secondly, from a Mao’s point of view, sexual alienation through the sexual 
objectification of women had led to women’s oppression and exploitation (the solution 
to this being the masculinisation of women). Also, femininity and feminine roles 
constitute women as outsiders of political power and economic privilege by restricting 
women’s participation in production on a large social scale. Most significantly, 
femininity may construct a social existence of women through sexual alienation, but it 
limits women’s capacity or potentiality of revolutionary consciousness and activity. 
 
Previously I elaborated how masculinist power works through a feminist critique of 
“masculinism” in terms of gender relations between revolutionary masculinity and 
Confucian masculinity in the revolutionary opera films. This section focuses on 
analysing how masculinist power works through gender relations between 
revolutionary heroines and feminised villains in the revolutionary opera films. Firstly, 
the power structure between heroines and villains can be read via their physical 
differences. By comparing male villains and female protagonists in the eight 
revolutionary opera films, all counter-revolutionary males are clearly physically 
smaller and shorter than the female protagonists. For example, in the military battles 
in The Red Detachment of Women, all male villains are portrayed as powerlessness 
when interacting with the female protagonist. Moreover, film directors always apply 
high-angle shots to make the villains look smaller, and low-angle shots focusing up on 
heroines and highlighting their power through contrast. Importantly, the female 
protagonists as women are physically taller and stronger than the counter-
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revolutionary men, which implies that the power gap is a class division rather than by 
sex. 
 
In addition, male villains are not only portrayed as physically short and small, but also 
have been depicted as spiritually cowardly and weak. For example, the fighting scenes 
in The Red Detachment of Women, Azalea Mountain and The Taking of Tiger 
Mountain by Strategy all demonstrate a power gap between male villains and female 
revolutionary warriors. It is not only the male soldiers that are very brave and powerful 
but also the female soldiers who are stronger and more aggressive than enemies. For 
example, in The Red Detachment of Women, the female protagonist Qing Hua fights 
enemies with swords and without hesitation shoots dead the chief villain with a gun. 
Similarly, female protagonist Ke Xiang can fight five male enemies simultaneously 
with a sword in Azalea Mountain. In Taking of Tiger Mountain by Strategy, female 
militia member Chang Bao, who is without professional military training, is able to 
fight male enemies with a sword. In contrast, all villains are scared about the battles 
and always try to avoid interacting with the female warriors on the stage. These fight 
scenes indeed show masculine traits including toughness and courage embodied by 
heroines, and simultaneously mock villain’s feminine traits such as incompetence and 
flabbiness. 
 
Women are not only performing military masculinity in a military discourse, they also 
practise masculinist power within a social construction discourse. In the eight 
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revolutionary opera films, there are only two films—On the Docks and Song of Dragon 
River—set in the context of social construction in Maoist China rather than in a military 
context. Therefore I will use these two films to explore women’s gender performance 
through decoding conversations between revolutionary women and counter-
revolutionary villains. Here, it is important to point out that the linguistic deployment 
in the eight revolutionary opera films is different to revolutionary operas. During the 
Cultural Revolution, the different adaptions of revolutionary operas in different 
regions adopted their own dialect on the stage. Although both Mandarin and other 
dialects are Chinese, the latter sound different and can only be understood by their 
regional audiences. Thus, the film versions use Mandarin rather than regional dialects, 
which would facilitate a political message that would be understood by all Chinese 
audiences (Berry, 2016). 
 
In the film On the Docks, there is an interaction between counter-revolutionary spy 
Qian Shouwei (钱守维) and revolutionary heroine Fang Haizhen (⽅海珍). Qian is a 
weather spotter, but Fang suspects him as a spy who aims to destroy the revolutionary 
construction. While Qian is following other labours on the docks to carry wheat bags, 
Fang stops him and starts the interrogation. 
Fang: Dispatcher, it is the first time you are doing such heavy job. You must be very tired.
（调度员， 你第一次干这么累的活， 够累的了。) 
Qian: No, No, I am not tired. I can stick it out. (不累，不累， 我能坚持到底。) 
Fang: Hold on! Is the shipping job ready? （等一下! 装船的工作准备好了吗？） 
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Qian: Labours and machines are all ready.  (人力机械都安排好了。) 
Fang: Then, how about the rain-proof equipment? （防雨设备呢？） 
Qian: I contacted the weather station and the observatory said it will be dry tomorrow. 
(明天不下雨， 我和气象台联系过了。) 
 
At this moment, it starts raining outside. Qian’s lie has been immediately uncovered. 
Fang Haizhen immediately raises her voice and uses an aggressive tone to interrogate 
him. 
“So, that is why you told everyone to put the wheat bags outside, right? … If we follow 
your instructions, we will miss the shipping time and sowing season, is it a disaster?”（所
以， 你把小麦放在露天，对吧? …..要是听了你的话，外轮不能起航，稻钟误了农
时，会造成什么严重后果?） 
Qian steps back and cannot answer Fang’s questions. He only says one word, “The”, 
then keeps silent. 
 
Rojo and Esteban (2005) argue, “in the communication dimension, the primary notion 
of authority is associated with masculinity, so that not only are images of women in 
positions of responsibility marked by gender, but also their communication behaviour” 
(p. 74). According to Rojo and Esteban’s arguments, it is possible to argue that the 
linguistic patterns of women in the revolutionary opera films are characterised by an 
underlying feature of power and authority. Firstly, their voice is sonorous which means 
they are powerful and confident because they are in a superior position and dominate 
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the communication. In contrast, the villain’s speaking voice is squeaky, which signifies 
that he is weak and in a subordinate position. Moreover, the tone of voice in terms of 
female leaders is assertive in giving orders. In other words, the female leaders are not 
only put into a powerful position in the discourse of revolutionary opera films, but are 
also “doing” power and authority by performing masculine traits in this discourse. 
 
Song of Dragon River is another case to clearly illustrate the power of female 
leadership in the interaction between Jiang Shuiying and Wang Guolu. In this film, 
Wang Guo Lu (⺩国路) is a spy who attempts to destroy the plan of offering water to 
help another community. When his real identity has been exposed by the female 
protagonist Jiang Shuiying (江⽔英), she accuses the counter-revolutionary villain 
with harsh words: “Wang Guo Lu! Do not perform anymore. Before the liberation, 
you did ride roughshod over everyone, occupied lands, killed people, the evidence is 
conclusive. … You are an evil counter-revolutionary villain, you are guilty!” （王国
路!你不要再表演了。解放前，你骑在人民头上，作威作福，霸水占田，杀人害
命，铁案如山。你是死心塌地的反革命，罪恶滔天!）Then, Jiang Shuiying looks 
extremely angry, she steps forward and attempts to slap Wang Guo Lu. The villain is 
so scared, he immediately steps back and falls on the ground. 
 
In the case of Jiang Shuiying, she is not a stereotypical feminine image, but a woman 
who represents masculinist power according to traditional gender norms that place 
women in an inferior and passive position; Jiang is placed into a subjective and positive 
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position while interacting with men. Her subjective position is expressed through a 
process of “masculinist performance” based on the stereotypical understanding of 
gender performance. Her voice is resonant and attitude is assertive. She directly judges 
the villain without posing any questions. She also applies words such as “evil” and 
“guilty”, which imply her powerful position where she dominates the discourse. She 
attempts to slap the enemy (Wang Guolu) without hesitation. In contrast, in this 
communication, Wang Guolu as a male villain is always silent. Michelle Royer (1990) 
argues that characteristics such as silence, madness, passivity, negativity and 
multiplicity are evaluated as stereotypical feminine characteristics according to the 
masculine/feminine dichotomy. 
 
Evidence can also be found in the power gap between revolutionary women and 
counter-revolutionary men that constructs a ‘social closure’ through the masculine 
speech of female protagonists. Socio-linguistic scholar Bernstein (1975) argues that 
the form of “social closure”52 and exclusive control in the linguistic field is expressed 
through powerful people d communication by restricting subordinates’ access to them. 
                                               
52 Social closure is a sociological theory described by Max Weber, which refers to the practice of 
preserving privilege by restricting other people’s access to resources and rewards. Weber describes 
social closure as a central mechanism by which commercial and property classes (the wealthy and 
elites) legitimise their social status while at the same time reproduce their life-chances and secure 
social and political domination.  
 
 
 
 
 194 
According to the definition of social closure, it is “a process of subordination whereby 
one group monopolises advantages by closing off opportunities to another group of 
outsiders beneath it which it defines as inferior and ineligible” (Murphy, 1998, p. 8). 
In the case of On the Docks, Fang Haizhen shows her capacity for management and 
decision-making. As a superior, she poses several questions to Qian Shouwei, which 
implies that she knows technically how to organise work and she has authority to give 
orders to him. It seems that her linguistic manner is not aggressive because she is 
asking questions rather than directly accusing the villain. The fact is that she 
strategically constructs a “linguistic closure” or “social closure” by using her power 
and authority so that the villain cannot access the communication. In Song of Dragon 
River, Jiang Shuiying establishes a solid “social closure” that the villain cannot access 
by any explanation. In other words, the female protagonists speak in a way of 
traditional masculine speech that places them into a dominant position in the power 
circulation of the workplace, which subverts conventional understanding of gender 
norms. 
 
 
 Feminist Critiques from a Social Constructionist 
Perspective 
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As I highlighted in this thesis’s Introduction, different feminisms contested women’s 
identity and Maoist gender discourse during the Cultural Revolution. Essentialist 
feminists were concerned about gender identity of masculinised women because they 
view ‘femininity’ as women’s innate essence, and therefore they identified the 
masculinisation of women during the Cultural Revolution as genderless (Chen, 2009; 
Cui, 2003; Dai, 1995; Huang, 2016; Pei & Ho, 2006). Socialist feminists such as Lu 
(2010) used a Marxist feminist framework that emphasises economic–political bases 
and concludes that Maoist gender politics during the Cultural Revolution is a form of 
state feminism, and women indeed achieved gender equality in this period. While Lu 
(2010) gives a comprehensive picture of Maoist gender discourse, Wang (2017) points 
out that a feminist critique of masculinist power is important but absent in existing 
feminist critiques of Maoist gender discourse. By approaching revolutionary opera 
films with a social constructionist framework, the following sections will apply a 
feminist critical discourse analysis to analyse interrelations among masculinst power, 
women’s identity and Maoist gender politics (ideology) in the revolutionary opera 
films. 
 
Social constructionism offers feminists an approach to understand that gender 
identities are not naturally given, but rather are a social and cultural construction of 
symbolised concepts of “sex”, “gender”, “race”, “naturalness” or “essential qualities” 
(Butler, 1990; Hooks, 1992; Spivak, 1988; Wilson, 1997). “Women’s identities are not 
natural givens but produced by signifying practices and ideologies, discourses 
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motivated or determined by power, and our identities are contingent politico-cultural 
and historical constructions” (Fiaccadori, 2006, p. 12). As I discussed earlier, 
essentialist feminists argue women in the Cultural Revolution were represented as 
genderless, found that femininity is abolished and that there is no gender or sexual 
difference in the Maoist gender discourse. However, through exploration of the 
revolutionary opera films, I found there is gender difference. Both femininity and 
feminine characteristics do exist in the gender discourse of revolutionary opera films, 
however the meaning of gender has been reconstructed by Maoist ideology and 
masculinist power. 
 
From a feminist constructionist perspective, it is important to move beyond the 
biological difference that emphasises women as a female being, and instead treats 
gender as a hierarchal power structure that is constructed socially, culturally and 
ideologically. The gender difference is not universal and gender difference cannot 
equal biological difference. For example, Butler (1990) offers the insight of “gender 
performativity” that opens up ways of understanding gender construction that is not 
necessarily connected with biological categories. Halberstam (1998) also argues that 
masculine or feminine gender performance occurs regardless of biological sex. Social 
constructionists including Weeks (1985), Nimmons (2002) and Duberman (2002) 
criticise essentialism. They argue that gender difference is not natural, but is created 
by relations of social power. There is no so-called inner essence or core to the 
self/identity, gender identities are produced and reproduced by different social 
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structuring effects of power (Duberman, 2002; Nimmons, 2002; Weeks, 1985). In 
short, gender is not sex, but relationships between different biological categories or 
power hierarchies between masculinity and femininity that are constructed by social 
power under patriarchy. 
 
Thus, women’s identity in the revolutionary opera films is produced by Maoist 
ideology and masculinist power, and is also a contingent political–cultural 
construction. The revolutionary gender discourse reconstructs the understanding of 
women’s nature from the point of view of Marxist epistemology that I will elaborate 
clearly in Chapter Six. In contrast to the essentialist claim that emphasises “the 
biological sex” as women’s nature, women’s identity given by Maoist ideology is an 
emphasis on their class difference rather than sexual difference. Traditionally, a gender 
discourse is constructed within patriarchal power that biologically divides women and 
men into two hierarchal classes and men dominate women. However, the gender 
discourse of the revolutionary opera films dramatically deconstructs the conventional 
understanding about gender norms that men and only men can perform masculinity 
and women represent femininity. In the discourse of revolutionary films, women as 
the revolutionary class have been arranged into the schema of yang, which is the 
masculine side in the opera films. By incorporating Marxist ideology that femininity 
is alienation, women are empowered to practise masculinist power and counter-
revolutionary men are designed to perform femininity. By analysing gender relations 
between villains and heroines via decoding semiotic articulations that serve the 
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vehicles of power in a film circulation, the hierarchy between masculine heroines and 
feminine villains is clear. 
 
The gender discourse of revolutionary opera films does not annihilate or minimise 
gender differences, but establishes a hierarchal structure of masculinity/masculine and 
femininity/feminine through Marxist notions of class and ultimately changed the 
meaning of gender. Firstly, it epistemologically changes the understanding of yin–
yang philosophy that fundamentally constructs the meaning of gender in the Chinese 
context. As I noted in Chapter Three, the revolutionary opera films are propagandistic 
tools in the period of the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, its political function 
determines the purpose of adoption of yin–yang philosophy in the cinematic semiotics 
is not interpreting the social structures, rather changes political–cultural structures and 
achieves the goal of so-called ‘Cultural Revolution’ in China. By linking yin 
(femininity, feminine) and yang (masculinity, masculine) to Marxist class theory, it 
deconstructs symmetric power between yin and yang. Masculinity and masculine 
characters are granted superiority, and femininity and feminine characters are placed 
in an inferior position in a “masculine–feminine gender structure” (Jaggar, 1983). 
 
Social constructionist feminists demonstrate that the conception of class is the key for 
Marxists sexual/gender politics to understand women’s oppression (Jaggar, 1983; 
Millet, 2000). In terms of Maoist gender politics, I found it is the masculinist power 
that divides people into two classes. Through the process of construction of binary 
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oppositions of masculinity/masculine and femininity/feminine, the masculinist power 
respectively positions the revolutionary class and the counter-revolutionary class into 
the top and the bottom of a sociopolitical power structure. Through this polarised logic, 
a contrast between Confucian masculinity and revolutionary masculinity is established 
in the revolutionary opera films. In this contrast, Confucian masculinity and 
revolutionary masculinity are the set of symbols for feminine and masculine, thus 
Confucian masculinity is placed in an inferior position. The marginalisation of 
Confucian masculinity metaphorically indicates that Confucian values lost power in 
the constitution of orthodox manhood, and revolutionary masculinity as a legitimate 
masculinity is authorised into the constitution of Chinese manhood. Marxist notions 
of class link masculine and feminine characteristics that culturally construct a 
hierarchy of masculine and feminine character-type structures, and feminine 
characteristics were disempowered in the social constitution of gender meanings. 
 
Therefore, Maoist ideology works on gender politics that produced a type of 
masculinism to maintain male dominance in the gender discourse of revolutionary 
opera films. Femininity has been devalued and marginalised while masculinity, and 
only revolutionary masculinity, is empowered as the gender subjectivity in 
constructing the identity of the revolutionary class. Thus, both revolutionary men and 
women are masculinised in this gender discourse. Femininity and feminine elements 
do not disappear but are identified as representations of the counter-revolutionary. It 
is embodied by counter-revolutionary men and only applied by women in interactions 
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with counter-revolutionary men in a counter-revolutionary discourse. Given the lack 
of understanding of Marxist alienation, the revolutionary opera films make radical 
equations: femininity equals alienation and feminine role equals class oppression. The 
revolutionary opera films thereby aim to achieve a “rhetorical” equality by abolishing 
femininity and devaluing feminine characters, rather than deconstruct hierarchal 
relations between masculinity and femininity, or the concept of gender. 
 
For some socialist feminists, Maoist ideology is a type of state feminism and Maoist 
gender politics in the period of Cultural Revolution is a socialist feminist movement 
(Lu, 2010; Wang, 2005; Wang, 2017;). Indeed, all feminists agree that feminism is a 
feminist philosophy and politics in order to address women’s oppression in a 
patriarchal society. From a vision of social constructionist feminists, a feminist critique 
of equality defines inequality, and a feminist critique of women’s oppression defines 
women’s liberation in historical variation of gender structures. As discussed earlier, 
Maoist gender politics apply Marxist methodology and epistemology, “like believing 
that the future society must be designed by its future inhabitants and that the immediate 
task is to struggle against specific forms of oppression” (Jaggar, 1983). Marxist 
alienation is therefore the theoretical framework of Maoist gender politics to interpret 
relations between femininity, women’s oppression and gender equality. According to 
classic Marxism, women’s alienation in relation to femininity is a conditional term that 
merely describes the alienation of sexual division of labour under capitalism. However, 
the Maoist ideology ignores human biology, human society and physical environment, 
 201 
generalises women’s alienation as universal phenomenon and thus attempts to achieve 
gender equality through abolishing femininity. In other words, femininity is not read 
as women’s natural characteristic by Maoist ideology, but a representation of women’s 
alienation, the epistemological reason of women’s oppression, an obstacle of human 
labour or praxis in a revolutionary discourse. Yet, alienation, oppression and 
femininity are not equivalent concepts and they are not the same thing. Thus, Maoist 
gender politics in the revolutionary opera films cannot be identified as feminist politics, 
but a masculinist politics producing another form of patriarchy to maintain masculinist 
domination. 
 
Rosalind Petchesky (1978) demonstrates the key point of feminist politics: 
 
A feminist politics that aims at abolishing all forms of hierarchy so as to restructure 
personal relations as well as relations among peers has to reach and transform the 
social organisation of work, property and power. It is a program that penetrates both 
to the core of self and to the heart, or heartless center of the male domain, for it will 
require a restructuring of all social institutions to change our subjective experience in 
this way. (p. 233-244) 
 
If Petchesky’s argument is used to think about the opera films, then it follows that 
Maoist gender politics cannot be identified as a feminist politics, and Maoist gender 
discourse in the revolutionary opera films is not gender equality. Gender hierarchy and 
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imbalanced power are represented by relations between masculine revolutionary class 
and effeminate counter-revolutionary class, rather than stereotypically embodied 
through feminine women and masculine men. Masculinity and only revolutionary 
masculinity is considered as the constituent of revolutionary class identity, and 
masculine roles, masculine values and masculine power are concentrated in the gender 
construction. Patriarchal power is not working through imbalanced power structures 
between women and men, but works via hierarchal power relations between 
masculinity and femininity. The new patriarchal paradigm thus reshaped women’s 
gender role, gender performance and gender relations with men. Women are identified 
as a masculine identity. Women’s bodies are not sites for performing femininity, but 
targets of practicing masculinist (Irene & Lee, 1988, p. xiv). Similar to Rubin’s (1994) 
assumption, “[women] are not only oppressed as women, women are oppressed by 
having to be women or men as the case may be” (p. 204). In the revolutionary opera 
films, women’s liberation has not been accomplished. However, they are not oppressed 
as being feminine women, they are oppressed by their masculine identity and 
masculinist power. I will elaborate women’s oppression by a masculine identity and 
masculinist power in Chapter Six. 
 
   Conclusion 
 
Through feminist critical discourse analysis, this chapter found that the gender 
discourse of revolutionary opera films constructed an asymmetric power structure that 
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endorsed masculinity as a superpower, and femininity as powerlessness. Initially, by 
applying traditional yin–yang symbolism, the revolutionary opera films ideologically 
divided revolution as yang and counter-revolution as yin, which constructs a tension 
between masculinity and femininity. Femininity and feminine characters thereby had 
been devalued because revolution as yang aims to deconstruct yin, including counter-
revolution and femininity. By incorporating Marxist alienation in the revolutionary 
opera films, femininity simply equals alienation that embodies women’s oppression. 
 
In addition, through the analysis of interactions between villains and heroes, I found 
that Confucian masculinity had been marginalised in the context of revolutionary 
opera films. Film directors applied a “modern” gaze to feminise the image of 
Confucian masculinity, therefore the Confucian values and its power structure in terms 
of masculinity and femininity had been deconstructed. Feminine characters have been 
disempowered in the socially gendered construction. Moreover, the analysis of gender 
relations between masculine heroines and feminine villains further demonstrates that 
masculinist power is authorised as the gender subjectivity in the gender discourse of 
revolutionary opera films. 
 
Thus, the reconstruction of gender in the revolutionary opera films unmasks another 
form of patriarchal domination. Patriarchal power in the revolutionary opera films does 
not work through maintaining a hierarchal relation between men and women, but 
works by producing a polarised power structure between femininity and masculinity. 
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On one hand, devaluing femininity through the feminisation of the counter-revolution 
can be understood as the first phase to establish a logical link between femininity and 
alienation. On the other hand, the feminist critique provides a compressive 
understanding about Maoist gender discourse. In the revolutionary opera films, Maoist 
gender politics is not a feminist politics. It is a masculinist politics that produced a 
masculinism to maintain masculine dominance. Women have not achieved gender 
equality in the Maoist gender discourse but granted the masculine identity and are 
oppressed by masculinist power.
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Chapter Six: Patriarchal Power and Ideological 
Apparatuses: The Image of Female Warriors in 
the Revolutionary Opera Films 
 
   Introduction 
 
Chapter Five of this thesis explored how the power relation between masculinity and 
femininity was influenced by Maoist ideology that influenced the understanding of 
women’s identity in the revolutionary opera films. This chapter continues to use 
feminist discourse analysis to investigate how sociopolitical ideology constructs the 
images of women, particularly the female warriors in the revolutionary films discourse. 
This chapter considers how images of female warriors as a form for ideological 
productions can be interpreted as ideological apparatuses that articulate Maoist 
ideology. 
 
Two revolutionary opera films, The Red Detachment of Women (1972) and Azalea 
Mountain (1974), are selected for research analysis in this chapter. They have been 
selected because in order to examine the image of female warriors, it is necessary to 
explore the militant discourse. The stories of these two films are both set in a period 
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of Chinese wartime, in the 1930s, so they become the most appropriate for analyses. 
The female protagonists, Ke Xiang in Azalea Mountain (1974) and Wu Qinghua in 
The Red Detachment of Women (1972), are fictional figures produced by these 
revolutionary opera films. However, these two figures refer to female warriors as the 
‘Red Army Girls’（女红军）53, who were actual historical women. The exploration 
of gender representations of Ke Xiang and Wu Qinghua in the militarised discourse 
designed by the films enables a coherent understanding of women in relation to gender, 
power and ideology in the CCP’s historical context. By applying the feminist approach, 
this chapter examines how the representation of female warriors play a role of 
ideological apparatuses through their body and gender roles, and how patriarchy 
incorporates ideology that works on women in the film’s discourse. It further facilitates 
to investigate power relations between masculinity and femininity in the discourse of 
wartime as depicted in sets of the revolutionary opera films. 
 
 
   An Overview of The Red Detachment of Women 
(1972) 
 
There are three film versions of The Red Detachment of Women: 1960 (Xie Jin), 1970 
(Li, Chengxiang; Wang, Xixian; Jinag, Zhuhui), and 1972 (Cheng Yin). The original 
                                               
53 The term of Red Army Girls refers to female warriors in The Chinese Worker’s and Peasant’s Red 
Army, which was created in 1928 during the period of Chinese Civil War. 
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version was produced in 1960, and both ballet version and opera version were filmed 
during the period of the Cultural Revolution. These three versions of The Red 
Detachment of Women and the image of female protagonists were the most popular 
and influential films in Maoist China (Cui, 2003; Roberts, 2010). The film script of 
the original version of The Red Detachment of Women (1960) had been first published 
in the Journal of Shanghai Literature in 1959 and filmed by director Xie Jin in 1961. 
Since this film won a number of prizes in 1962, famous Chinese writers including A 
Jian (阿坚) and Tian Han (田汉) 54 were asked to adapt this prize-winning film into 
a libretto that could be staged as part of a larger festival presented in modern Beijing 
opera on contemporary themes (Harris, 2010). In July 1964, the Beijing Ballet School 
created a dance rendition of The Red Detachment of Women, which adopted the ballet 
of Western art forms but was based on the Chinese socialist experience. 
 
During the Cultural Revolution, the ballet version of The Red Detachment of Women 
was filmed in 1970 and the revolutionary opera version was filmed in 1972; the latter 
authorised as one of the eight “model works” by Jiang Qing (Cheng 2010; Harris, 
2010). In February 1972, the ballet of The Red Detachment of Women (1970) was 
watched by US President Richard Nixon and highly praised by Mao as “a successful 
revolution, a wonderful work and showing the correct political orientation” (Harris, 
                                               
54 Tian Han (1898-1968), Romanised as Tien Han, was a leader and pioneer of revolutionary music 
and films, as well as a drama activist, translator and poet. The lyrics of national anthem of the 
People’s Republic of China was adopted from Tian Han’s most famous work ,The March of the 
Volunteers (义勇军进行曲) which produced in 1934.  
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2010). Roberts (2010) has argued that the image of gun-wielding female soldiers in 
The Red Detachment of Women (1970) were not only the typical representation of 
women during the period of the Cultural Revolution for the Chinese, but also the best-
known female image of this period for Western audiences. 
 
The original film (1960), ballet (1970) and the revolutionary opera film (1972) of  
The Red Detachment of Women all have the same narrative. The films of The Red 
Detachment of Women (1960, 1970, 1972) dramatised an actual story of women in the 
Chinese Red Army in the 1930s and created a heroine who suffered oppression, but 
ultimately grew into a devout communist warrior. The opera film of The Red 
Detachment of Women (1972), tells a story of the female protagonist Wu Qinghua (吴
清华，hereafter as Qing Hua), who is enslaved to a regional landlord in Hainan Island 
(named as Hainan province in contemporary China) but follows the guidance of a 
communist leader (Hong Changqing) and joins the female revolutionary detachment. 
Qing Hua fails to free herself from the landlord Nan Batian (南霸天), a circumstance 
used to signify class oppression. This proletarian revolution transforms her gendered 
role from a female slave into a female warrior, from a social victim into a social saviour. 
By studying Maoist ideology, such as “only by emancipating all mankind can the 
proletariats achieve its own emancipation (只有解放全人类，才能解放无产阶级自
己)”, Qing Hua enhances her understanding in terms of emancipation from individual 
liberation into a proletarian emancipation. Ultimately, Qing Hua performs masculinity 
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in order to accept a masculinised gender role and a political identity of communist 
warrior. 
 
Due to the film’s extensive public dissemination, it has become one of the most 
prevalent narratives in China and enjoyed extremely high exposure. As one of the eight 
model works, The Red Detachment of Women played a primary role in reconstructing 
gender representations in the Maoist era (Harris, 2010). For example, female soldiers 
in this film were portrayed as adamant, valiant, loyal, youthful, strong and determined. 
Cui (2003) argues that in The Red Detachment of Women (1960), “woman is shaped 
as a discursive device and semiotic code for the construction of a master narrative of 
communist and revolutionary history” (p. 79). This is similar for all productions of The 
Red Detachment of Women (1960, 1970, 1972); as media praxis they not only 
participated in constructing a gender discourse, but also reflected this gender discourse 
in Maoist China. 
 
   The Father, the Daughter 
 
In the final scene of Xie Jin’s The Red Detachment of Women (1960), an extreme long 
shot captures a group female soldiers carrying the communist red flag and guns to 
march. Simultaneously, the thematic song lends connotations to the image: 
 
March on, march on, female soldiers shoulder serious responsibilities, and 
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women embody deep enmity. In the past, Hua Mulan joined the army for her 
father. Nowadays, the red detachment of women carry guns and fight for 
proletarians. (向前进，向前进，战⼠的责任重，妇⼥的冤仇深.古有花⽊ 
兰代⽗去从军，今有娘⼦军扛枪为⼈民.) 
 
The thematic song of The Red Detachment of Women (1960, 1970, 1972) initiates and 
ends the film, making a link between the narrative of Red Detachment of Women and 
a legendary figure, Hua Mulan (hereafter as Mulan). Mulan is a cross-dressing woman 
warrior created in the “Ballad of Mulan” (⽊兰辞) during the Northern Dynasty (220–
589 ). The Ballad of Mulan created a story about a young woman who masqueraded 
as a man to join the army in her father’s place. As discussed in Chapter Four, women 
were not allowed to access the public sphere in traditional China. Therefore, Mulan as 
a fictional heroine became an allegory and provided an alternative for women. To 
access the public sphere, women have to perform a masculine role such as a solider. 
 
Scholars point out that this story of Mulan demonstrates a cultural specificity that 
women can participate in the public sphere in the Chinese context (Kingson, 1975; 
Cheung, 1990). For example, Julia Kristeva (1977) demonstrates, “Hua Mulan 
establishing a prototype that has served as model of many Chinese girls and women 
who have wished to abandon a strictly feminine role and gain access to the political 
sphere” (cited in Cui, 2003, p. 89). However, feminine identity and femininity have to 
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be cast off in order to enter the public sphere because feminine dress, behaviour and 
roles restrict women’s activities (Cheung, 1990; Yau, 1990). 
 
Mulan, the legend of a masquerading, cross-dressing woman warrior, therefore 
established an Asian female heroism (Cheung, 1990). Because of this, King-Kok 
Cheung (1990) argues that many Chinese women had a belief that through transferring 
their “female-self” into a “heroine” to act against oppression and possibly demonstrate 
their power, they must act like a man. For instance, in the book The Woman Warrior, 
Marine Hong Kingson (1975) introduces how Mulan as an allegory inspires a Chinese–
American girl shifting her feminine identity into a cross-dressed woman warrior 
fighting against racism. Moreover, the transformation to masculinisation indeed 
proves her “power” by applying violence and playing a role as warrior. This story not 
only reveals how a Chinese–American woman acting against racial discrimination in 
America is inspired by Mulan, but also elaborates how female heroism has been 
popularised in Chinese culture. Thereby, the story of Mulan was adopted by the CCP 
and further constructed as a gender allegory of a female warrior in the name of the 
revolution during the Cultural Revolution. 
 
It is reasonable to argue that the film of The Red Detachment of Women (1972) is an 
ongoing narrative of the Ballad of Mulan, and the female detachments are 
reproductions of Mulan. In terms of the legend of Mulan, it is important to point out 
that the motivation of Mulan in joining the army is prompted neither by revenge nor 
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by personal honour but filial piety for her father (Cheung, 1990).55 In order to echo 
the narrative of Mulan in the discourse of revolutionary opera films, the role of father 
was replaced by the CCP, a symbolic father, meanwhile the oppressed women in China 
were portrayed as symbolic daughters. 
 
In The Red Detachment of Women (1972), the female protagonist Qing Hua is an 
orphan and when she was a child all her family were murdered due to oppression. 
However, she finds her ideological family and father: the proletarian class and 
Chairman Mao, and thereby transforms into a female soldier who fights for her father. 
There is a scene where Qing Hua first arrived at the revolutionary manor, the Red 
Cloud Village（红云乡), and finds a group of female soldiers. The camera cuts to a 
close-up to highlight Qing Hua’s face. She looks extremely excited and jumps to hold 
one woman’s hand and ask forwardly, “Is the Red Cloud Village here? (这是红云乡
吗？)” The female soldiers are friendly and give Qing Hua a positive answer: “Yes, it 
is exactly the Red Cloud Village!（是 ，这就是红云乡。)” Then, the film establishes 
a medium shot to feature Qing Hua and a small group of female soldiers looking happy 
and satisfied. Qing Hua warmly holds every soldier’s hands and speaks, “Finally, I 
found you! (我可找到你们了!)” In the following scene, the male protagonist Hong 
Changqing appears and introduces the masses to Qing Hua, “Qing Hua, they are all 
                                               
55 Translated by author of this thesis, as “Ballad of Mulan” describing “Last night I saw the draft 
posters, the Khan is calling many troops, the army list is in twelve scrolls, on every scroll there is 
father’s name. Father has no grown-up son, Mulan has no elder brother. I want to buy a saddle and 
horse, and serve in the army in father’s place.” (昨夜见军帖，可汗大点兵。兵书十二卷，卷卷有
爷名。阿爷无大儿，木兰无长兄。愿为市鞍马，从此替爷征。) 
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your family. (清华，他们都是你的家人。)” In this scene, the camera uses a long shot 
to capture all the female warriors and masses on the stage. Here, the role of masses not 
only signifies the proletarian class but also intends to establish a unified relation 
between the female protagonist and the masses. In other words, the film sets up an 
ideological articulation to convey a political message that proletarian are a “class 
family” regardless of blood kinship. Particularly, the oppressed women should 
recognise their class identification as the proletarian class according to Maoist 
ideology. 
 
In The Red Detachment of Women (1972), when the female leader of the red 
detachment observes whipping scars on Qing Hua’s arms, she does not ask Qing Hua 
“Who did this?”, but directly poses her question, “How did the villain Nan Batian 
torture you? （南霸天是怎么折磨你的?)” The camera, applying an extreme close-
up, quickly cuts to the resentful face of male protagonist Hong Changqing who 
signifies CCP authority. Hong looks extremely upset and tells Qing Hua, “Qing Hua, 
they are all your class sisters and brothers. The same as you, they have been exploited 
by the counter-revolutionary forces for many generations. If you are suffering class 
oppression and bitterness, do tell them!（清华，他们都是你的阶级兄妹，和你一样，
祖祖辈辈当牛做⻢，你有什么苦有什么恨就对他们说吧！)” 
 
Then, an extreme long shot is used in the film to set a scene of “speaking bitterness”.  
It is important to point out this scene only occurs in the version of the revolutionary 
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opera films. In Xie Jin’s The Red Detachment of Women (1960), the female protagonist 
proves her revolutionary motivation by showing her body’s scars, rather than 
“speaking bitterness”. In The Red Detachment of Women (1970), the ballet version 
does not have any conversation between different characters. Yet in the opera version 
of The Red Detachment of Women (1972), all people gather together and Qing Hua 
stands in the centre, cries and sings: 
 
For thirteen years, what I am suffering is deeply hiding in my heart. However, when I am 
facing my family today, I should speak out all my bitterness and miseries. The landlord 
Nan Batian is an extremely evil person who bullies villagers for many years. He killed 
my parents and cruelly dropped their corpses into a river. Oh, my poor parents, they were 
killed merely because they could not afford the land rent…  (十三年，一腔苦水藏心
底，面对亲人， 吐不尽这满腹冤屈。南霸天，凶残歹毒， 横行乡里，逼租讨债打
死我爹娘，抛尸河里。爹娘啊…..) 
 
Li Li (2010) offers an insight that assists in interpreting this scene of “speaking 
bitterness’ in the revolutionary (opera) films 
 
[T]he revolutionary film strives to offer its audience not only the spectacular 
revolutionary battles, but also articulation of the most basic moral sentiments. Arousing 
mass sympathy and tactfully deploying it for the support of the communist revolution was 
crucial in Mao’s evolution as the leader of the CCP…So, to speak (bitterness) is the CCP’s 
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unique version of melodrama that is geared to make sense of revolutionary experience 
and to forge a proletarian morality to represent. (pp. 53-54) 
 
For example, in The Red Lantern (1970), where there is a scene of “speaking 
bitterness”: Grandma Li tells the female protagonist Tie Mei (铁梅) that they are not 
biological family, but an adopted family, a class family. The biological father of Tie 
Mei and the husband of Grandma Li were communists and were executed in a railway 
strike in the 1920s. Consequently, the male protagonist Li Yuhe (李⽟和), another 
communist (the communist representative in this film) and Grandma Li composed a 
class family to raise Tie Mei. In this scene, Grandma Li elaborates that their “family 
relation” is related by class rather than blood and thus emphasises the importance of 
revolutionary heritage. She says to Tie Mei: “Tie Mei, the heavy responsibility of 
revolution is on your shoulders now. Do not cry, treat your father as an icon and be 
strong and tough as iron. (铁梅啊，革命的重担就落在了你肩上。你不要哭，学你
爹，心空胆壮志如刚。)” 
 
In the same way as the function of Hong Changqing in The Red Detachment of Women 
(1972), Li Yuhe, the figure of “class-based father” functioned as a symbol of the CCP 
in The Red Lantern. In the execution scene, Li Yuhe attempts to tell Tie Mei that he 
and Grandma Li are not a real family and wishes to replace her family identity with a 
class identity. However, Tie Mei who has already learned the truth from Grandma Li, 
kneels down and says to Li Yuhe, “Father, don’t say any more, you are my real father.
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（爹，您别说了，您就是我亲爹。)” Here, the film establishes an ideological 
articulation to implant women’s class consciousness into the traditional identity of 
filial daughters. To acknowledge the class-based father as Tie Mei’s real father and to 
kneel down signifies her filial piety and loyalty to her father. 
 
As discussed earlier, another similar scene of “speaking bitterness” appears in the 
opera version of The Red Detachment of Women (1972) that articulates Maoist and 
Marxist ideology in terms of “internationalism” and “class unity” through arousing the 
sympathy of proletarian masses. For Lenin’s perspective, “There is only one kind of 
real internationalism that is to work selflessly to promote revolutionary movements 
and revolutionary struggles” (Lenin, 1985, p. 168). In the case of The Red Detachment 
of Women (1972), the cinematic strategy is initially establishing a narrative of Qing 
Hua as an orphan and a weak woman who has no biological family to rely upon. In 
addition, while Qing Hua is speaking of her bitterness, the camera simultaneously cuts 
to the masses and highlights their shared extreme sympathy with Qing Hua. Here, the 
film constructs an ideological articulation that Qing Hua as a member of proletarian 
class should unite the whole proletarian class and follow the instruction of CCP to 
liberate herself. 
 
It is clear in the revolutionary opera films that biological fathers of female protagonists 
are absent and they were replaced by another power figure: the communist 
representative. Thereby, the CCP plays the role of a symbolic father and Chinese 
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women serve as a symbolic daughter. Similarly in the “Ballad of Mulan”, the filial 
daughter cross-dressed and transformed her identity from a feminine identity into a 
masculinised identity that identity not only allowed “the daughter” to enter her father’s 
world, the public sphere, but also authorised her rights to fight in the name of her father. 
In the same way as Mulan, the female warriors (the symbolic daughters), serve the 
army that aims to complete the mission of their fathers (the CCP), which means that 
women’s liberation is not led by personal needs of the women themselves, or by an 
agenda to emancipate women. 
 
In summary, the film adopts the narrative of the “Ballad of Mulan” but also transforms 
the narrative from the Confucian ideology of filial piety into Maoist ideology of loyalty 
to the CCP. According to Confucianism, filial piety (xiao, 孝) is a virtue of respect 
for one’s kinship, parents, elders and ancestors. Confucius once said, “[I]n serving his 
parents, a filial son severses them in daily life; he makes them happy while he 
nourishes them; he takes anxious care of them in sickness; he shows great sorrow over 
their death that was for him; and he sacrifices to them with solemnity” (cited in 
Charlotte, 2004, pp. 2-3). From a Confucian perspective, filial piety is not only a sort 
of loyalty to one’s parents, but also a display of ren (benevolence), which I have 
explained in the earlier chapters. Thus, filial piety is central to Confucian role ethics 
and is not only associated with one’s parents, but also in relation to one’s devotion to 
the state (Chang, 2010). 
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However, kinship parents, in particular a kinship father, is absent in The Red 
Detachment of Women, and it has been replaced by an abstract and symbolic father 
(the CCP) associated with communist ideology. Consequently, the traditional 
understanding of filial piety based on blood kinship in Confucian China has been 
replaced by Maoist ideology and class struggle. The alliance of “Ballad of Mulan” 
with revolutionary politics therefore produced a new revolutionary discourse that a 
filial daughter plays a role of female warrior who fights for the father’s ideology while 
internalising masculine values and standards designed by her father, and benefits her 
father rather than herself. Therefore, the narrative of “Ballad of Mulan” in The Red 
Detachment of Women successfully serves as a mechanism of what is discussed in 
Chapter Three as Althusser’s interpellation (Dai, 2000). Also, this interpellation aims 
to arouse an acknowledgement that the father (the CCP) should require “filial piety” 
from his daughter (Chinese women). In other words, the patriarchal relationship 
between daughters and fathers still exists in the revolutionary opera films, but the 
figure of fathers has been transformed symbolically. 
 
In Chapter Four, I discussed how in Confucian China, women’s gender roles were as 
supporting actors for men, particularly their fathers, husbands and sons. It was the view 
of the CCP that these traditional gender roles led to women’s oppression, however 
from a feminist perspective this type of women’s oppression has not changed 
fundamentally in the revolutionary opera films. Gayle Rubin (1994) demonstrates that 
the kinship system under patriarchy leads to women’s subordination based on 
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biological sexuality. The figure of the biological father is abolished in the 
revolutionary opera films, although the kinship system is still there. The replacement 
of the biological father by symbolic father (the CCP) in the opera films also represents 
the sociology of kinship. Within the kinship system in the discourse of revolutionary 
opera films, women are exchanged as Mulan (revolutionary daughters), thus enforcing 
subordination and satisfying the father’s needs. In terms of the new ideological 
representation of Mulan, the benefit for Chinese women is that they are not restricted 
by traditional gender orders and are allowed access into the public sphere while 
practising masculinist power like men. However, the cost to women is that they should 
fight for the “fatherhood” rather than personal aspirations or desires (or for those of 
women mere broadly) and they have to do it in a masculine mode. Similarly to Mulan, 
in order to access the public/political sphere and struggle for her father, women should 
drop their feminine identity and perform masculine traits, behaviours and roles. In the 
case of The Red Detachment of Women (1972), the sublime and masculinised warriors 
demonstrate women’s masculine subjectivity and women’s enthusiasm on the 
revolutionary screen. 
 
As I remarked in Chapter Five, Marxist epistemology indeed impacts Maoist gender 
politics that endorses women’s participation of social constructions, which reflects an 
emphasis of sexual division of labour in the revolutionary opera films. By establishing 
a social discourse such as nationalism or militarism in the revolutionary opera films, 
women’s roles are still produced by men for men’s needs that do not reflect women’s 
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freedom but masculinist domination. Feminists conclude that nationalism and 
militarism are masculinist projects (Pateman, 1989; Connell, 1995). In these 
masculinist projects, women’s roles are “[w]ritten primarily by men, for men, and 
about men, and that women are by design for satisfying men’s needs” (Nagel, 1998, p. 
243). In the revolutionary opera films, on the one hand, women indeed achieved 
conditional freedom through social participation in the public sphere by practising 
masculine roles and masculinist power. On the other hand, women are still designed 
to fill a role of supporter for masculinist politics, rather than active feminists who 
struggle for female/feminine consciousness. Echoing Nagel’s argument (1998), in the 
revolutionary opera films, women are oppressed by masculinist power, their gender 
roles are designed by masculine/male dominance. From a social constructionist 
feminist perspective, the question is how the masculinisation of women as an 
unexamined gendered subject has been actually marginalised by masculinist politics 
in the name of class emancipation? In order to address this question, sections below 
will examine how the image of female warriors is constructed by Maoist ideology in 
the revolutionary opera films. 
 
  The Image of Female Warriors 
 
As elaborated earlier, the revolutionary narrative paradigm in terms of women’s 
emancipation constructs a gendered discourse that is ideological. In the revolutionary 
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gender discourse, women as the oppressed social class is not only a sexual category, 
but is highlighted as also a class category: the proletarian class, the revolutionary class. 
The engagement between communist heroine and female victim constantly conveys 
the message that the females will remain oppressed in traditional feminine identity. 
Then, the film strategically incorporates Marxist ideology into a gender discourse; for 
example, the transformation of the image of female protagonist Qing Hua is an 
allegory of revolutionary narrative that elaborates the Marxist ideology in terms of 
class operation. Femininity equals alienation, feminine women as a symbol of class 
oppression is only emphasised by counter-revolutionary force in the old society, which 
I discussed in Chapter Five. Therefore, a woman, as an individual and a social victim, 
can only be emancipated by being a member of the revolutionary collective and 
struggling for proletarian emancipation. In order to participate in the emancipation of 
oppressed women, The Red Detachment of Women (1972) thereby initiates a filmic 
genre that advocates masculinisation of women by erasing women’s femininity while 
raising masculinity as the ideal. 
 
In the film The Red Detachment of Women (1972), the image of women has been 
portrayed differently between the counter-revolutionary region and the revolutionary 
world. As discussed earlier, the female protagonist Qing Hua represents visible 
femininity when she tries to escape from the Coconut Village (椰林寨) because the 
landlord will sell her as a female servant. In this scene, she dresses in the traditional 
red coat that hugs her breast and waist and she has a long braid. She looks very angry 
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and aggressive but still projects female allure and beauty (see Fig. 5). In contrast to 
this feminine image, once Qing Hua joins the female detachment, she is portrayed as 
a female warrior, a masculinised image. This includes being presented with a bobbed 
haircut and military uniform; in addition, she always acts and represents masculine 
traits such as daring, determination and aggression (see Fig. 6). 
 
 
Figure 5 QING HUA IN THE COCONUT VILIAGE, THE RED DETACHMENT OF WOMEN (1972) 
Figure 6.QING HUA AS A FEMALE WARRIOR, THE RED DETACHMENT OF WOMEN (1972) 
It could be argued that women’s haircuts represent their gendered roles and political 
identity in the revolutionary opera films. In traditional China, long hair was read as the 
representation of femininity and the only orthodox hairstyle for women. Since the 
period of the ‘May Fourth’, a bobbed haircut was generally viewed as a symbol of a 
female communist by Chinese society. There is no Marxist elaboration for Chinese 
female communists’ bobbed haircut, but it indeed functions as an ideological symbol 
in the Chinese context. 
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The bobbed haircut can be recognised as a Western 1920s style that represented 
women abandoning the old rules of femininity and fashion. Along with the first 
women’s movement, women were allowed to participate in social work and achieved 
the right to vote in Western democracies. Consequently, cutting off women’s long hair 
became a symbol of independence and strength equal to men. This perspective 
possibly influenced Chinese Nationalists, including Chinese communists, in the 1920s. 
Moreover, during this period, communist-led women’s movements were focused on 
female workers who lived in urban areas. Female communists, as female workers, 
were active participants in manufacturing labour. It is very likely that it was through 
these workplaces that they were able to access the new communist ideals, and thus 
accepted this modern perspective. During this period, many female communists had 
cut off their long hair, which is a symbol of femininity and national identity in 
traditional China—and therefore, cutting off the hair signified the rejection of 
traditional China. In traditional China, Han Chinese56, including men and women, 
never shaved their hair in their life and only Buddhists could cut off their hair. 
Moreover, hair is a political symbol of Han identity. For example, Philip & Kuhn 
(1990) argue, “The queue worn behind a shaved forehead, was the headdress of 
China’s Manchu rulers. It was also universally prescribed, on pain of death, to be worn 
by Han Chinese males as a symbol of allegiance to the ruling dynasty” (p. 45). 
Historically, in the beginning of Qing dynasty, to protect their Han identity many Han 
                                               
56 The term Han Chinese refers to Han ethnic group, which is the largest ethnic group and making 
about 92% of the total population in Mainland China. 
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males would choose death rather than cutting their hair. However, Han females were 
allowed to keep their long hair and avoided this tough choice. 
 
Therefore, women’s bobbed hair had been treated as a radical action by the Chinese 
Nationalists that dominated China from 1928 to 1949, and which changed gendered 
roles and Confucian morality. For instance, in order to act against communists, 
propaganda during this period always portrayed female communists as “naked women” 
with bobbed haircuts who freely cohabited with men and lacked morality (Thakur, 
1997, p. 42). For instance, since the “white terror”57  time when the Nationalist 
Kuomintang killed thousands of communists and their sympathisers, women with 
bobbed haircuts in Hunan and Guangdong were subject to execution as communists 
(Snow, 1967). Consequently, images of the bobbed haircuts became an ideological 
symbol of revolutionary, independent women and represented the image of female 
communists, which was produced and reproduced in Communist propaganda. 
 
The typical bobbed haircut of female warriors in the revolutionary opera films has a 
fine fringe and straight hair smoothed behind the ears and cut straight at the nape of 
the neck. The bobbed haircut is the dominant haircut for female communists, a symbol 
that represents the CCP and revolutionary power. In The Red Detachment of Women 
(1972), all women are identified as the revolutionary class but the power gap among 
                                               
57 The term ‘white terror ‘refers to the violent suppression of Chinese Communist Party by 
Kuomintang (Nationalist Party, or KMT) in 1927 in Chinese cities such as Shanghai, Guangzhou and 
Changsha.    
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different political roles can be indicated through their haircuts: all female soldiers and 
female communists have bobbed haircuts, old female peasants have the traditional 
haircuts such as a bun and young female peasants have long braids. In the Chinese 
context, the bun haircut is a typical haircut for married women, referring to the gender 
roles of wife and mother, meanwhile only unmarried girls can have a long braid, 
therefore the long braids represent the gender role of daughters. 
 
Through examining the eight revolutionary opera films, I found a similarity that the 
majority of female protagonists who are female communists have short, masculinised 
bobbed haircuts. For instance, Ke Xiang（柯湘), the military leader of the peasant 
army and the representative of the CCP in the film Azalea Mountain (1974); Fang 
Haizhen (⽅海珍), the party secretary in On the Docks (1972); Jiang Shuiying (江⽔
英), the party secretary in Song of the Dragon River (1972); and the female warriors 
in The Red Detachment of Women all have bobbed haircuts. The only exception is the 
female communist A Qin who spies on the counter-revolutionary force in Shajiabang 
and embodies visible femininity that I elaborated in the Chapter Five. On the other 
hand, other revolutionary females including Changbao (常宝 ) in Taking Tiger 
Mountain by Strategy and Tie Mei (铁梅) in The Red Lantern are still wearing a long 
braid because they are not yet communists. Therefore, it is reasonable to claim that the 
bobbed haircut functions as a signifier of communist identification in the revolutionary 
opera films. 
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Because bobbed haircuts have been only worn on female communist/soldiers in the 
films, this kind of modern and masculine haircut thus plays a role of filmic articulation 
to indicate the power gap between female communists and ordinary women. In the 
case of The Red Detachment of Women (1972), women as peasants and female slaves 
still have traditional haircuts because they have not endorsed any political roles such 
as warriors. In contrast, women’s traditional gender roles such as wife, mother and 
daughter cannot be read through the bobbed haircuts but their political role as a 
political leader or solider is directly indicated. In the case of the female protagonist 
Qing Hua, she has a very long braid when she is a female slave; however, the haircut 
immediately changes to the bobbed haircut when she transforms into a brave, strong 
and mature female soldier (communist). 
 
Thus, in this film, the bobbed haircuts indeed function as an ideological articulation 
that indicates female soldiers/communists with short haircuts are more powerful, and 
have a stronger revolutionary sense compared with other female figures with 
traditional haircuts. On the one hand, it can be debated that the masculinised haircut in 
the revolutionary opera films embodies the communistic aesthetic, a combination of 
simplistic and modern aesthetics. On the other hand, it can be interpreted that the 
process of communist revolution for Chinese women is in accordance with de-
feminisation, and a more masculine appearance embodies a strong determination of 
revolution. 
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While the context and ideology in Hollywood films are different to Chinese opera 
films, the work of scholar Yvonne Tasker enables some insight into understanding that 
etiquette and dress codes in films has an ideological function. Yvonne Tasker (2014) 
argues that costume and behaviour produce meaning in the Hollywood films, such as 
“the masculinized heroines in ‘male’ clothes are most explicitly to do with cross-
dressing” that “construct a tension between femininity and masculinity” (p. 90). In a 
similar way, the military uniform of female soldiers that combines the tailored Maoist 
suit and the military uniform of the Red Army explicitly represents a tension between 
masculinity and femininity in the film The Red Detachment of Women (1972). The 
military uniform with padded shoulders increased the width across shoulders of female 
warriors; a belt at their waist creates a visual effect of the male torso (see Fig. 6 & 8). 
 
In addition, the camera always uses a low-angle shot to represent the female warriors 
on stage, which makes them look stronger and taller. Furthermore, in the same way as 
the bobbed haircut, the military uniform signifies masculinist power, which constructs 
a meaning that masculinity is more valuable and powerful than femininity. For 
example, in Xie Jin’s The Red Detachment of Women (1960), when the film first 
introduces another female soldier Hong lian, a child bride who was married to a dead 
man and has slept with a wooden sculpture representing her husband for 10 years, she 
appears dressed as a man and is on her way to look for liberation. While she follows 
the female protagonist and finally arrives in the Red Stone Country, she takes off the 
male clothes and dresses as a woman again. However, in the following scene, she 
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always wears the same military uniform. Therefore, The Red Detachment of Women 
(1960, 1972) employs the military uniform as a specific rhetoric and a significant 
signifier that links the Maoist poem “Chinese women love military dress more than 
makeup (不爱红妆爱武装)” (Mao, 1961, p. 264). Thus, the military uniform of female 
warriors constructs an extra-cinematic image of women. The image of cross-dressing 
heroines that incorporates Maoist ideology points to the instability of the traditional 
gendered order, where women can masquerade masculinity though dropping their 
femininity to free themselves. 
 
Significantly, gendered behaviours in terms of the female warriors also produce 
ideological meanings in The Red Detachment of Women (1972). Thus, a comparison 
of female warriors between the revolutionary opera films and traditional Beijing Opera 
on the opera stage will enhance the understanding of women’s gendered performance 
in the revolutionary discourse. In traditional Beijing Opera, figures of female warriors 
are named as dao ma dan (⼑⻢旦), who often fight with weapons on the stage. By 
comparing the performance of female warriors between the traditional Beijing opera 
and the female warriors in the revolutionary opera films, I discovered that the female 
warriors in the revolutionary opera films are more powerful, violent and aggressive. 
 
In the traditional Beijing Opera, women are typecast as four female figures that signify 
different gendered roles. The young and unmarried girls are named as Hua dan (花旦), 
the married women are called Qing yi (青衣 ), the elder women as mothers or 
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grandmothers are usually named Lao dan (老旦) and the women as female warriors 
are named dao ma dan (刀⻢旦). In the case of female warriors such as dao ma dan 
in the traditional opera, they still embody distinct femininity through body language, 
however they perform a masculine gendered role on the stage. Similar to other female 
figures such as Hua dan and Qing yi, dao ma dan have modest smiles and demurely 
lowered faces that identify their feminine identity. In addition, they still perform 
stereotypical feminine behaviours in the traditional Beijing opera such as the 
powerless gestures of “orchid fingers”（兰花指), “cloud hands” (云⼿) and gentle 
moving such as “gliding gait” (⼨步), which indicate they are females. It is important 
to note here that the gestures of “orchid fingers” and “cloud hands” are not only playing 
a rhetorical role in portraying women’s beauty and softness in traditional Beijing 
Opera, but also serve as cultural symbols that signify different meanings in different 
contexts. 
 
For example, Qi (1998) elaborates there are more than 200 gestures of women’s 
fingures and hands in the traditional Beijing Opera, and each of them signifies different 
meanings. Usually, women’s fingures should slightly close and stretch skyward within 
palms faced downward to look like an orchid; and put their hands in the front of their 
breasts as “cloud hands”. These are two stereotypical gestures for all female figures, 
including dao ma dan, when they are first shown onstage in Beijing Opera (see Fig. 
7). Using fingures to directly point to someone is a rude and aggressive gesture in the 
Beijing Opera, thus this gesture can be merely used by the female warriors such as dao 
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ma dan when they fight with enemies (Qi, 1998). In other words, even figures of dao 
ma dan should follow the orders of stereotypical gender performance, however, they 
are playing a masculine gender role as soldiers in the arena of Beijing Opera. For 
instance, when a dao ma dan is first shown in the arena of Beijing Opera, she gently 
moves with “gliding gait” and uses a gesture of “orchid fingures” to touch her hair and 
simultaneously looks at her shoes to signify she is concerned about her appearance and 
feminine manners. While she is speaking to positive male characters, she always uses 
a gesture of “cloud hands” that put her hands in the front of her breast with eyes looking 
down and soft voice, which all convey her submission to males. 
 
Figure 7. DAO MA DAN IN TRADITIONAL BEIJING OPERA 
Figure 8 THE FEMALE WARRIORS IN THE RED DETACHMENT OF WOMEN (1972)  
 
In contrast, women’s gender performance is different in the revolutionary opera 
because it is treated as a new style of Beijing Opera that communicates a new ideology, 
which I elaborated in Chapter Three. Therefore, gestures and movements of the female 
warriors in The Red Detachment of Women (1972) differ from figures of dao ma dan 
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in the traditional Beijing Opera. In the case of The Red Detachment of Women (1972), 
there is a group of female soldiers discussing the tactic of attacking the Coconut 
Village without men’s supervision. In this scene, the female warriors look very 
confident, brave and intelligent. Their gestures are not modest anymore but convey 
strength and courage. They smile, speak and laugh openly with each other. Their 
movements convey strength, their fists clenched and they stand with legs apart like 
male soldiers in the film. The body language of the women not only reflects a break 
with traditional roles, but also indicates they are practising power and authority within 
a masculine gendered role (see Fig. 8). 
 
Most importantly, traditional feminine gestures including orchid fingures, cloud hands 
and gliding gait, as a typical liangxinag（亮相）that characterised traditional Beijing 
Operas, have been totally abandoned in the revolutionary opera film. In traditional 
Beijing Opera, liangxiang means a character should keep a same pose for a few 
seconds when he/she first appears on the stage in order to draw audience attention (Qi, 
1998). Instead, an extremely masculine gesture, a (raised) fist, becomes a new 
liangxinag pose that has been commonly used by female warriors and female 
communists in the revolutionary opera films. Significantly, the revolutionary opera 
films combined the liangxiang pose in Beijing Opera and cinematic language to 
highlight the communist heroines. Different to traditional Beijing Opera, the 
deployment of filmic elements in the revolutionary opera films thus makes the new 
liangxiang pose, the fist, which not only engages the audiences’ attention to the 
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heroines, but also clearly signifies their political identity that a traditional liangxiang 
pose cannot represent. 
 
For instance, in the opening scene of The Red Detachment of Women (1972), the 
female protagonist Qing Hua is arrested and put in a dark jail and a male jailer is 
torturing her. The spotlight on Qing Hua combines with a close-up shot, focusing on 
her clenched fists within chains, red switch marks on her arms, her bright but angry 
face, and the diegetic sound to signify that she is suffering whipping. This close-up 
shot lasts for three seconds, and then the camera slowly cuts to a long shot. Qing Hua 
raises her fists and stands on a stone in the centre of the screen. She is distinguished 
from the male villains on her left and two female peasants on her right, because they 
look much lower than her. Here, the cinematic elements clearly communicate the 
significance of Qing Hua in this film and also introduce a new female liangxiang pose 
to audiences. Since this moment, the audiences realise that Qing Hua is a positive 
figure, and women’s liangxiang pose is not a traditional feminine style such as orchid 
fingures or cloud hands in the revolutionary opera films. 
 
Echoing the first appearance of Qing Hua, Azalea Mountain uses a similar filmic 
strategy to introduce the female communist Ke Xiang to audiences. After 16 minutes 
into the film is the scene where Ke Xiang is facing her public execution. The film first 
deploys a high angle and long shot to frame the execution ground, a traditional local 
government building with villainous guards. Then, Ke Xiang’s voice is sounded: the 
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camera slowly pans to the door until an extreme close-up shot to highlight the old door 
knockers. Suddenly, the door is opened and, similarly to Qing Hua’s appearance, Ke 
Xiang’s liangxian pose is also an upraised right fist, however, her hands are chained 
(see Fig. 9). Then, an extreme close-up is used in order to highlight her bright and 
daring face, and the bobbed haircut. The scene in this film features a stereotypical 
figure of sublime female communist, purposefulness and fearless. 
 
Figure 9. KE XIANG IN AZALEA MOUNTAIN (1974) 
Figure 10. KE XIANG VS. VILLIANS, AZALEA MOUNTAIN (1974) 
 
Traditionally, the raised fist is a typical masculine gesture that represents masculine 
power (Kimble & Olson, 2006). Meanwhile, it is a popular symbol that signifies 
strength, defiance and unity with oppressed people, and therefore it becomes an 
important element in many propagandists works. For example, there is a famous 
American WWII propagandist poster named “We Can Do It”58 that was produced by 
J. Howard Miller. It depicts an inspirational image of a female worker who raises her 
fist and the word balloon exclaims, “We can do it”. Scholars indicate that the gesture 
                                               
58 The poster of “We can do it” is commonly known as “Rosie the riveter”. 
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of upraised fist in this poster is not only signifying power but also “functioned as a 
means of communal identification” and “a gesture affirming backstage solidarity” 
(Kimble & Olson, 2006, p. 552), and in its original design was a symbol of female 
capability, which later became one of feminist solidarity. Similarly, I found that the 
raised fist not only attempts to embody the physical power of female warriors, but also 
plays an ideological articulation of “class unity” in the revolutionary opera films. 
 
In The Red Detachment of Women (1972), after Qing Hua ignored a military regulation 
and attempted to kill the landlord by herself for her personal revenge, the communist 
leader Hong Changqing asks her a question: “What and whom are you fighting for?” 
Initially, Qing Hua cannot address this question by herself because her consciousness 
of class unity is vague. However, after a political class and studying Marxist/Maoist 
ideology “only by emancipating all mankind can the proletariats achieve its own 
emancipation (只有解放全⼈类，才能解放⽆产阶级⾃⼰)”, Qing Hua ultimately 
acknowledges that she can only free herself when she subordinates personal desire of 
emancipation to Maoist ideologies. The motivation of revolution is to unite all 
proletarian class to struggle for emancipation, rather than struggle for individual 
revenge. In this scene, she is cross-dressing in the blue military uniform, stands with 
legs widely apart and clenches two fists, which looks extremely daring and steadfast 
(see Fig. 6). 
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Here, the film plays a role of Althusser’s ideological state apparatuses59 that implants 
what Claude Lefort (1986) defined in the notion of People-As-One: 
 
Identification of the people with the proletariat, of the proletariat with the party, of the 
party with the leadership, of the leadership with the Egocrat60. The logic of identification, 
secretly governed by the image of the body, accounts in turn for the condensation that 
takes place between the principle of power, the principle of law and the principle of 
knowledge. (p. 299) 
 
Lefort’s theory enables a feminist critique of the oppression of women, which is a 
structural feature in the gender discourse of the revolutionary opera films. Within 
people as one, women play a role of an identification of class unity of the proletariat 
in the revolutionary opera films. The clenched fist, a masculine gesture, signifies class 
unity and revolutionary power, and it has been widely applied by all heroines in the 
revolutionary opera films. Except in The Red Detachment of Women (1972), the image 
of female clenched fists repeats in each revolutionary opera film, particularly including 
Fang Haizhen in On The Docks (1972), Jiang Shuiying in Song of the Dragon River 
(1972) and Ke Xiang in Azalea Mountain (1974). In these three films, the clenched fist 
continually appears when female protagonists attempt to mobilise the awareness of 
class unity and class struggle for the masses. 
                                               
59 See explanation of the term “apparatuses” in Chapter Three. 
60 By the definition of Lefort (1986) in “logic of identification [in totalitarianism], secretly governed 
by the image of the body”, the ‘egocrat’ means the ultimate figure of power.  
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Social constructionist feminists such as Alison Jaggar (1983) argue that a class society 
is characterised by different interests and values that reflects different class’s 
specificity, however the ruling class dominates justification of the social reality and 
knowledge. Traditional Marxism treats all existing knowledge as ideological and only 
a classless society can produce “[a]n undistorted knowledge about genuinely scientific 
representation of reality” (Jaggar, 1983, p. 359). In other words, for traditional 
Marxists, a society regardless of its political regime cannot produce an undistorted 
social reality unless it is a classless society, which never existed or is existing in human 
history. Historically, Maoist China was a class society, but rather a classes society. It 
was a society named “Dictatorship of the proletariat”61, where the proletarian class as 
the ruling class controlled state power. Therefore, Maoist gender discourse in the 
revolutionary opera films is not only ideological, but also reflects the values and 
interests of the ruling class (the proletarian class). This gender discourse only 
highlights similarities of women’s oppression in the proletarian class; differences 
between women’s oppression in other classes have been ignored. In the revolutionary 
opera films, all women are identified as the proletarian class who are forced to share a 
same interests and values with male proletariats. Obviously, women are oppressed in 
                                               
61 The term “dictatorship of the proletariat” refers the proletarian class as ruling class that has 
controls of state power. “Dictatorship does not necessarily mean the abolition of democracy for the 
class that exercises the dictatorship over other classes; but it does mean the abolition of democracy (or 
very material restriction, which is also a form of abolition) of democracy for the class over which, or 
against which, the dictatorship is exercised.” – Vladimir Lenin (1918), The Proletarian Revolution 
and the Renegade Kautsky, Collected Works, Vol. 28, Publisher Moscow, Moscow, p. 235.  
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a patriarchal society, however women cannot be simply identified as proletarian class, 
and the proletarian values and perceptions cannot equal all women’s own interests. 
Women’s own interests are different among different classes, races, religions and 
cultures. Through mobilisation of women into revolutionary oneness, revolutionary 
opera films incorporated the female identity into a collective class identity. By sharing 
a proletarian identity with men, women have to drop their own interests and 
incorporate masculinist interests in the gender discourse of the revolutionary opera 
films. The masculinist interests have become the masculinist power, which thus 
controls women’s bodies and transforms the female body into an ideological apparatus. 
Therefore, from a social constructionist feminist perspective, the proletarian values are 
the same as other ruling-class values that distort reality and knowledge that are also 
produced ideologically but might give women a false consciousness in different ways. 
 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1979) argues the human body is a “machinery of 
power” that explores power, breaks power and rearranges power. Political discipline 
produces a subjected and practised body by manipulation of its elements, gestures and 
behaviour, which Foucault defined as a “docile body” (p. 138). Consequently, the 
“micro-physics of power” controls bodily activity, the body’s time, its space and its 
movements (p. 28). Historically, women are like men: they are the subject of many 
disciplinary practices in the process of gender construction. Women are born as 
females but not feminine; women are socially constructed as feminine. In a traditional 
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patriarchal paradigm, patriarchal power works through the inferiorisation of women 
by constructing a feminine body. 
 
In the case of the traditional Beijing Opera, there is a significant gender difference 
between women and men in their gestures, movements and bodily comportments. 
Even though the dao ma dan plays a masculine gender role as warrior on the stage, 
they are far more restricted than male warriors in the feminine gesture, posture and 
movement. In other words, their body language conveys Confucian values and feudal 
ideology; women’s status is inferior to men in a hierarchy of gender in Confucian 
China. However, the dao ma dan is practising masculine power through a masculine 
gender role, but it does not mean she can change her inferior status, therefore, her body 
is still engendered as the “docile body”, the feminine body. Applying Foucault, female 
bodies in the traditional Beijing Opera can be interpreted as sites of patriarchal power. 
Feminine bodily disciplines, such as “orchid fingers”, “cloud hands” and “gliding gait” 
reveals that patriarchal power produces a gender/sex hierarchy that is embodied via a 
feminine and “docile body”. 
 
By incorporating Marxist ideology into the disciplinary practice of the female body, 
the understanding of a women’s “docile body” has been fundamentally changed in the 
revolutionary opera films. An ideal women’s body is unnecessary as an inferiorised 
and feminine body, but as ideological apparatuses interpellate revolutionary ideology. 
In the revolutionary opera films, gender difference between female soldiers and male 
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soldiers in their gestures is ambiguous. Women are moving like men; behave like men 
in a masculine way. Masculine disciplinary power invades the female body and allows 
women to break the feminine bodily discipline. In the gender discourse of 
revolutionary opera films, it is masculinity rather than femininity that works into the 
construction of women’s class identity. In the revolutionary opera films, the liangxiang 
pose of a masculine gesture as the clenched fist is highlighted in their discourse. This 
new liangxiang pose replaces conventional feminine gestures such as “orchid fingers” 
and “cloud hands” that assist in the constitution and identification of women’s (class) 
identity. The masculine gesture ensures that the female body displays the collective 
identity of an oppressed social class. In women’s bodily representation, the female 
body thereby plays a role of ideological apparatuses that signify larger social issues: 
class oppression and class revolution. 
 
In the films’ discourse, it seems that feminine bodily discipline cannot restrict the 
female body, but the female body is a still site of patriarchal power and regulated by 
masculine disciplinary power. To reject the stereotypical femininity and traditional 
feminine body display is based on the Marxist notion of alienation and sexual division 
of labour62; it cannot be simply interpreted as representation of bodily liberation, which 
is women’s body as a target of masculinist power in another way. In the revolutionary 
opera films, the female body is required to display masculine/political power in order 
                                               
62 See discussion in terms of Marxist notion of alienation and sexual division of labour in Chapter 
Five.  
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to articulate Marxist ideology; thereby masculinist power controls women’s 
movements, gestures and behaviors. Based on Foucault’s definition, the masculinised 
women’s body can also be identified as the “body” that plays a role of “machinery of 
power”. However, patriarchal power is not working through the inferiorisation of 
women; the hierarchy between masculinity and femininity is highlighted in the 
discourse of the films. Without the deconstruction of masculinity and femininity, the 
transformation of the female body from a feminine body to masculine body cannot be 
identified as an activity of women’s liberation. Similar to the Dao mao dan in the 
Beijing Opera discourse which represents a traditional form of discipline on women, 
the place of the female body in the films’ discourse also mirrors the new form of social 
discipline and its control supplanting the old discipline. 
 
 
   Military Masculinity, Phallocentrism 
 
Louie (2002) indicates, “In traditional Chinese culture, the sword is a symbol of male 
power, and ultra-masculinity” (p. 28). Meanwhile, in traditional Beijing Opera, figures 
of dao ma dan such as Hua Mulan and Mu Guiying63 are often fighting with weapons 
                                               
63 Mu Guiying is a female character of Yang family（杨家将) in traditional Beiing Opera. She was 
trained in the military by her family when she was a child, and selected her own husband through 
defeating him in combat. After her husband and the other men of Yang family were killed by enemies, 
she and the other widows of Yang family continually defended the nation. Thus, Mu Guiyin is the 
same as Mulan and she was another reputable heroine of many traditional operas and novels.   
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such as qiang64 and swords on the stage. Thus, as female warriors, they embody 
masculine traits and masculinist power through outward symbols such as the weapons. 
Under a patriarchal ideology, military weapons such as swords and guns are always 
linked to masculine/phallic power, because phallocentrism65 is a dominant ideology 
in a male-dominated society. However, even in a patriarchal society, it also allows 
women to participate in phallic power by using a symbolic phallus, such as a guns or 
sword. For instance, Deleuze (1991) claimed, “[j]ust the absence of a penis need not 
indicate lack of the phallus, its presence likewise need not indicate possession of the 
phallus” (p. 68). In the case of Hollywood films, the figures of women with guns in 
action movies are identified as “phallic women” who borrow masculine attributes and 
characteristics from men (Rikke, 2014). 
 
In the analysis below, this chapter will investigate how props such as weapons signify 
masculinist (phallic) power in the film of The Red Detachment of Women to 
incorporate Maoist ideology and contribute in the mobilisation of military masculinity 
for female warriors. Initially, there is a scene in The Red Detachment of Women (1972) 
when Qing Hua first arrives at the Red Cloud Village, and the female leader of the red 
                                               
64 Qiang (枪), a type of spear, was an important weapon in ancient China. The common qiang had a 
long staff and a steel-mounted tip, and was used for long-distance combat. Meanwhile, a double-
edged straight sword was named jian (剑) and a single-edged sword with a lajwood-wrapped handle 
was named dao (刀). In ancient China, swords including jian and dao were used for hand-to-hand 
combat.  
65 The term comes from Freudian psychoanalysis. Phallocentrism means the phallus, the signifier of 
the symbolic order of masculine power, and is privileged as the dominant perspective. (Davison, K. G.  
(2007), p. 475) 
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detachment gives Qing Hua a gun and teaches her Mao’s words, “In order to 
participate in the revolution, you should carry a gun (⾰命求解放，唯有拿起枪).” It 
could be argued that this scene echoes Maoist famous dictum “Political power comes 
out of the barrel of a gun! (枪杆⼦⾥出政权)”, which appears in the opening scene of 
the film of The Red Detachment of Women. From Mao’s perspective: 
 
A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing essays, or painting pictures, or doing 
embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, merciful, 
courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is an insurrection, a movement 
accompanies with violence that one class aims to overthrow another class.66 (Mao, 1961, 
p. 18) 
 
According to Maoist ideology, the film thus continually concerns itself with the 
importance of using weapons and violence by women. For example, The Red 
Detachment of Woman (1972) applies a two-minute long shot to introduce a group of 
women performing a sword dance and represents them training with swords and guns. 
The plot of the sword dance in this film echoes the sword or qiang dance of dao ma 
dan in the traditional Beijing Opera, which highlights the military masculinity 
embodied by female warriors. However, it is important to notice that while figures of 
dao ma dan are fighting with enemies, the physical interactions between males and 
                                               
66 Translated by author of this thesis from “革命不是请客吃饭，不是做文章，不是绘画绣花，不
能那样雅致，那样从容不迫，文质彬彬，那样温良恭俭让。革命是暴动，是一个阶级推翻另一
方阶级的暴烈的行动.” Mao, Z.,D. (1927). Mao Zhedong Collected Works, 1961, 2ed, p. 18. 
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females are avoided. Thus, female warriors often use a dance of playing weapons, 
particularly “playing qiang (耍花枪)” to signify the fight. As I discussed in Chapter 
Three, from the Confucian perspective, the military is an imperfect and unnecessary 
power that should be avoided in many contexts. Therefore, in the traditional Beijing 
Opera, it is routine that figures of dao ma dan can only apply a sword/qiang dance to 
signify a fight. Consequently, in the Chinese culture, “playing qiang” became a phrase 
to mock someone, such as women who pretend to have abilities but do not possess 
them. 
 
There is a difference between the female warriors who are “playing qiang” in 
traditional opera and female soldiers in The Red Detachment of Women (1972). The 
female soldiers in The Red Detachment of Women (1972) are not afraid of violence 
and physical fights; they do have actual military abilities. In addition, the camera 
always applies a close-up shot to highlight how female warriors actively kill enemies 
with guns and swords without hesitation. In a battle between the villains and the Red 
detachment of women, Qing Hua mobilises other female warriors: “Comrades, we are 
all the class sisters who used to be the suffering female maids and slaves. We cannot 
forget how to break the chains and carry a gun; we know what and whom we are 
fighting for, and the triumph is always belonging to us! (同志们，我们这些当丫鬟做
奴⾪当受苦受难当阶级姐妹，我们忘不了是怎么扭断锁链拿起了枪， 我们懂得
是为了什么为了谁来打仗，胜利永远是我们的！)” 
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Here, the gun signifies phallic power that has been emphasised again by the film. In 
the following scene, a half-minute long shot clearly portrays how Qing Hua fights with 
an enemy and finally kills him. In this fighting scene, Qing Hua represents extreme 
aggression and bravery. The diegetic sound between the sword of Qing Hua and the 
gun of the male villain demonstrates it is a “real war” rather than “playing qiang”. 
Finally, Qing Hua, the active, aggressive “phallic woman” uses her sword to kill the 
male villain, which signifies the castration of the counter-revolutionary force by 
revolutionary power. Particularly in the final scene of this film, Qing Hua shoots the 
evil landlord Nan Batian and speaks, “Today, our proletariats have guns and will 
destroy all your counter-revolutionary class (今天⽆产阶级枪在⼿，要让你反动阶
级全灭亡)”. Here, this plot is linking the narrative of Mulan and constructs a meaning 
that challenges the stereotypical understanding of gender within the gender norm. The 
phallus is male; however a revolutionary woman as revolutionary daughter can 
transform to the phallic woman, the warrior who possesses phallic authority and power 
if she fulfils his father’s wishes and his goals. In other words, filial daughters such as 
Qing Hua have an authorised gun/the phallic power to access the public sphere to 
kill/castrate enemies in order to fight the battle of her father, which signifies the class 
revolution or class emancipation. 
 
Significantly, in the revolutionary opera films, the phallic power not only can be 
borrowed by women, but women can practise stronger phallic power than men. In 
Azalea Mountain, when the female protagonist Ke Xiang has become the leader of the 
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peasant army, there is a scene where a group of male soldiers gather together and query 
her military capability and leadership. One soldier complains, “If a woman can lead 
an army, how can we show men’s strength? I reject to follow her instructions! (⼥的
能带兵,男爷们还有什么威⻛？她的命令我不听！)” Then, he draws his pistol and 
points to Ke Xiang, “You female communist, look, what is this? This is not an 
embroidery needle.（⼥共产党员,这是什么,这不是绣花针.)” Ke Xiang quickly 
disarms his weapon and all male soldiers are shocked. They praise her: “It is 
unbelievable that you are not only good at agricultural labour, but also capable with 
military （想不到，打仗劳动，⾏家⾥⼿）.” This scene illustrates that men are sexist 
against women because it threatens their own masculinity but it supports a feminist 
perspective in showing that women are able to undertake work that is traditionally the 
domain of men. 
 
Similarly to the female warriors in The Red Detachment of Women (1972), Ke Xiang 
is the one and the only one female warrior in Azalea Mountain who embodies distinct 
masculine traits such as courage, inner direction, autonomy, mastery, group solidarity 
and advanced military skills. She controls her sorrow after her husband (a male 
communist) was executed by enemies and continually participates in the revolution. 
She uses sophisticated military strategies to find out the hidden traitor in the army, and 
successfully rescues the trapped comrades from villain’s prison. In the battle scene, 
she is the only figure who can use a sword fighting five enemies simultaneously on the 
stage (see Fig. 10). Thus, the film discourse ensures a power gap between Ke Xiang 
 247 
and other male warriors here; Ke Xiang possesses more powerful military power than 
male warriors, very likely due to the fact that she is the Party representative who 
signifies the authority of the CCP in this film. 
 
The female soldiers as phallic women embody masculine power and political authority 
in the revolutionary opera films and therefore from a feminist perspective, it can be 
argued that the phallus equals power and authority and it is a patriarchal ideology. For 
example, Ivey argues: 
 
In patriarchal culture the illusion that the penis is the phallus leads to the production of 
gendered subjectivities, in which masculinity is privileged over ‘castrated femininity’. In 
this way the phallus, valorised, but empty signifier, comes to symbolise power and 
gendered authority. (Ivey, 2007, p. 476) 
 
Based on my analysis of the revolutionary opera films, they incorporate this patriarchal 
ideology into the concept of women’s liberation and gender equality. On the one hand, 
female warriors are empowered by holding a gun or sword: the phallic power for their 
own use. It directly challenges the traditional gender hierarchy and indicates that 
women could liberate themselves through applying “masculinist power”, such as the 
military masculinity. On the other hand, guns and swords are viewed as phallic 
symbols in the phallocentric discourse. Therefore, the film highlights the importance 
of the power of guns and swords that signify the phallus, and can be understood as the 
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emphasis of misogynist ideology. Through mobilising women to celebrate the military 
power in the film, it could be argued that the Maoist ideology that claims sexual 
equality during the Cultural Revolution is rhetorical. 
 
A parallel example is the Soviet Union, another communist regime where a 
comparison could contribute to an understanding of Maoist gender discourse. In terms 
of the Soviet Union, Connell argues, “It claimed to achieve sex equality through 
allowing women access to all public spheres” (2002, p. 24). Although, Connell further 
argues: 
 
They (women) are openly dominated by men, they marginalize women, and they wave 
together their nation-building with an aggressive masculinity that at times spills over into 
a warrior ideology. It is, on the face of it, a stunning historical reversal-from a system of 
gender equality to a militant, misogynist patriarchy…. The celebration of a strong, 
competitive masculinity can be seen as a means of adjusting to this new, hostile and 
potentially overwhelming environment. (p. 24) 
 
 
From a feminist perspective, the significant issue is the revolutionary discourse in the 
revolutionary opera films offer women a delusion or false consciousness that they 
could achieve freedom by using violence. Based on Connell’s argument, it can be 
argued that the revolutionary opera films constitute a macho discourse that advocated 
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violence (masculinist power) in order to echo Maoist ideology. As I elaborated in 
Chapter Three, all the revolutionary opera films are set in a “militant” or 
“revolutionary” discourse. Indeed, concepts of war, revolution and violence are always 
twisted and interplayed. For example, political philosophers such as Hanna Arendt 
(1963) elaborated relations among war, revolution and violence in her work On 
Revolution. She claimed, “To be sure, not even wars, let along revolutions, are ever 
completely determined by violence” (p. 18). However, Hannah Arendt (1969) 
emphasises in On Violence, “violence can be justifiable, but it never will be legitimate” 
(p. 52). In contrast to Arendt’s theory, “violence” derives from Maoist ideology in the 
revolutionary opera films that is not a justifiable action, but the legitimate power in the 
revolutionary discourse. In the name of class unity and class struggle in the 
revolutionary opera films, both women and men have to value violence as the 
legitimate way to struggle for freedom. In the case of The Red Detachment of Women 
(1972), the brave and aggressive female warriors in the film convey Maoist ideology 
that women should have a strong sense of violent revolution and believe in military 
power as the dominant power in the class struggle. Women were placed into a subject 
position only through applying masculinist power such as military masculinity or 
violence. Gender equality in the film’s discourse is rhetorical equality; women actually 
have been marginalised because their feminine power is ideologically deleted and 
phallic power is endorsed in a phallocentric discourse. In this phallocentric discourse, 
women cannot realise the delusion in terms of phallic power they have endorsed. They 
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are forced to internalise the masculinist value to fight for freedom by using violence, 
but the fact is that the “freedom” itself disappears through the process of violence. 
 
    Sexual Difference 
 
In the revolutionary opera films such as The Red Detachment of Women (1960, 1970, 
1972), it seems that the image of women is not designed to objectify them as sexual 
objects. For example, Cui (2003) and Dai (2000) both argue that the image of women 
in these films is under the gaze of the CCP rather than the gaze of men’s sexual desire. 
Cui (2003) also claims that the visual presentations of bodies of female soldiers in The 
Red Detachment of Women (1960) have no sexual significance and only embody class 
significance. Indeed, the image of female soldiers in the film is not designed for men’s 
sexual pleasure but for ideological mobilisation. However, the masculinised image of 
women who are casting off femininity and performing distinct masculinity does not 
mean sexual difference disappears in the revolutionary opera films. Meanwhile, 
audiences can invest their own sexual desires in the images of these masculinised 
women, however these “ideal images” intend to desexualise. 
 
However, I found that evidence in terms of sexual and gender differences in the 
revolutionary opera films indeed exist in the films’ discourse. For instance, in The Red 
Detachment of Women (1972), although female soldiers and male soldiers are dressing 
in the exact same uniforms, the fact is that sexual differences can be read through their 
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bodies. In The Red Detachment of Women (1972), the red detachment’s military 
costumes fit closely to the breast, waist, hips and upper legs. In comparison with the 
male soldiers, the narrowness of the women’s waists is emphasised by the belt, and 
slimness of the women’s necks is highlighted by the bobbed haircuts. Male soldiers 
have a shorter haircut than women’s bobbed haircuts, and the tailoring for their necks, 
shoulders, waists and backsides are more masculine than the female soldiers. 
Importantly, a narrow waist and slim neck are normal standards of feminine beauty in 
different cultural contexts. 
 
Hung-Yok (2003) indicates, however, that while the image of women during the 
Cultural Revolution has been identified as masculinised, the communists did not reject 
the concept of beauty. Echoing Hung-Yok’s argument, I found that the “masculine” or 
“puritanical” asceticism in the film’s discourse did not change women’s natural beauty. 
The actresses of female protagonists in the revolutionary opera films also have visibly 
feminine or pretty faces. For example, the actress for Ke Xiang in Azalea Mountain 
named Yang Chun Xia (杨春霞) played the character Baigujing (⽩⾻精) in the TV 
drama Journey to the West (⻄游记,1982), which is a female demon who uses her 
feminine beauty to seduce men in order to drink their blood. Through the comparison 
between the image of Ke Xiang and image of Baigujing, it is possible to claim that the 
actress Yang Chun Xia has a feminine appearance and both images are beautiful. The 
difference is the understanding of beauty in different political and cultural discourses. 
The image of Baigujing, which uses traditional feminine costume and cosmetics, is a 
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sexualised feminine image (see Fig. 11). The image of Ke Xiang without heavy 
makeup represents the natural beauty of the actress, which is a women’s modern look 
(see Figs. 9 & 10). 
 
 
Figure 11. IMAGE OF BAIGUJING IN THE JOURNERY OF THE WEST (1982)  
 
Evidence shows that cross-dressing female soldiers in The Red Detachment of Women 
(1972) could also arouse men’s sexual desire/pleasure through their bodies, although 
are not designed for men’s sexual desire. In an interview in a Dutch television 
documentary on revolutionary opera, a man recalled that when he was looking at the 
naked legs of the female warriors in the ballet of The Red Detachment of Women, he 
felt sexual desire for female bodies.67 
 
In addition, Chen (2002) also elaborates, “Today, looking back, I am aware that my 
treasuring of these images was not unrelated to their voluptuous appeal and bodily 
beauty, which was securely disguised by the focus on an ideologically correct story 
                                               
67 See Yan Tingyue “Yangbanxi: The Revolutionary Model Opera” (Netherlands: VPRD/Scarabee 
Film Produkties Nederland, 2005). 
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and by equipping the womanly body with a ‘manly spirit’.” Roberts (2010) therefore 
argues that the revolutionary operas played a dual role of both promoting revolutionary 
aesthetic and meanwhile representing female bodies through female performers 
themselves (Roberts, 2010). Using the audience member’s response here is not 
attempting to argue that cross-dressing female warriors in the film are playing a role 
of sexual object for satisfying men’s sexual desire. The aim is to collect evidence to 
examine if the female body in The Red Detachment of Women retain feminine 
significance, although women have been ideologically masculinised. 
 
   Conclusion 
 
Through the detailed analysis of selected films in this chapter, I found that image of 
female warriors serves as ideological apparatuses in the revolutionary opera films. 
Firstly, the narrative of The Red Detachment of Women is an ongoing narrative of the 
Ballad of Mulan, which links the image of warriors and masculinisation of women. By 
applying the logic of patriarchal kinship, the father in the legend of Mulan has been 
replaced by the CCP, and the female warriors play a role of symbolic daughter. 
Meanwhile, the feudal ideology of Confucian “filial piety” in the legend of Mulan has 
been replaced by Maoist ideology of “loyalty of the CCP” and “class struggle”. 
Through incorporating Maoist and Marxist ideology into the film of The Red 
Detachment of Women, the image of female warriors has been portrayed as masculine. 
The masculinised haircuts, clothes, gestures and behaviours of female warriors in the 
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film function as ideological articulations. These ideological and semiotic articulations 
not only play a role of the identification of female communists, but also construct a 
meaning of what revolutionary consciousness is and only links to masculinity rather 
than femininity. The image of women plays a role of identification of class unity, and 
women’s identity is thus subordinated to class identity. Meanwhile, the female body 
is site of masculinist power and the “ideological apparatus” is restricted by masculine 
discipline rather than feminine discipline. 
 
In addition, I found that the gender discourse in the revolutionary opera films is not 
only ideological but also patriarchal. Through decoding the image of female warriors 
in The Red Detachment of Women and Azalea Mountain, I also found that the 
revolutionary gender discourse is a misogynistic and militant discourse. This militant 
gender discourse constructs an interesting example of gender performance: woman can 
perform masculine behaviours and roles that differ from the conventional gender norm. 
This militant gender discourse constructs a new gender norm that equals women’s 
gender subjectivity to masculine subjectivity. However, women are allowed to access 
the public sphere through the process of masculinisation in the militant discourse, and 
the celebration of militant masculinity represents a phallocentric and misogynist 
patriarchy. The ideal gender equality in the revolutionary opera films is rhetoric 
equality. Women have been given a delusion of phallic power (violence) and thus have 
been marginalised in a phallocentric discourse. 
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Finally, evidence in Azalea Mountain and The Red Detachment of Women shows that 
sexual difference exists in the revolutionary opera films. Even though the images of 
female warriors are masculinised, the female body maintains natural femininity. This 
finding contests the dominant argument that the images of women in the revolutionary 
opera films are sexless. In fact, the image of women is far away from sexless; they are 
a means of masculinisation. The problem from a feminist perspective is that there is 
no value and no space for “feminine” ways of being. Although the feminine is 
constructed by culture, in this particular culture it is repressed.   
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
This thesis addresses the research question: During the Cultural Revolution how did 
Maoist politics influence the dominant representation of women in the revolutionary 
opera films (1966-1976)? As feminist research, this study applies an interdisciplinary 
theoretical approach that combines Foucault’s method, film analysis, feminist social 
constructionist framework and epistemology. This study treats gender as a process of 
social construction that contains cultural, ideological and historical specificities, while 
gender discourses are vehicles of knowledge and patriarchal (masculinist) power. The 
key contribution of this study is the use of feminist methodology and epistemology to 
examine female identity, and explore sociological connections between the 
masculinisation of women and patriarchal (masculinist) power in the context of the 
Cultural Revolution. A dynamic power relation between femininity (feminine) and 
masculinity (masculine) from traditional China to the Cultural Revolution has also 
been mapped and elaborated. This research also significantly contributes to gender 
studies, film studies and Chinese sociopolitical studies; the main contribution of this 
study is interdisciplinary as feminist critical discourse that is adopted to explore the 
ideological influences in representing women’s characters in the revolutionary opera 
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films. 
 
 
This study expands Roberts’s (2010) argument that the masculinisation of women in 
the revolutionary operas is neither “genderless” nor “gender erasing” by extending it 
to the revolutionary opera films, and identifies female identity in the revolutionary 
opera films as a masculine identity. Discussions and analysis presented in Chapters 
Five and Six provide significant evidence that gender and sex are not aligned with the 
masculine and feminine gender construction in the revolutionary opera films. Both 
revolutionary men and women are constructed as the masculine gender. They are all 
identified as the revolutionary class and share a collective identity that displays and 
values the masculine gender and expresses masculinist power through practising 
masculine gender roles. From a feminist perspective, women’s masculine identity as 
an identification of class unity in the revolutionary opera films represents women’s 
oppression as a structural feature in the Cultural Revolution. Women’s interests (both 
individual and of females more broadly) are absent; all women are integrated into the 
revolutionary oneness. Although the revolutionary oneness is a proletarian identity that 
embodies proletariats’ values and interests, it cannot equal women’s own values and 
interests that vary according to individual contingent circumstances (e.g. the 
intersections of class, race, religion and culture). 
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Gender identity is not natural but a process of social construction and performance; it 
can be shifted through social constructions (Connell, 1987, 2002). This study finds that 
in revolutionary opera films, women’s masculine identity is also a contingent political–
cultural construction. The masculinisation of women is not based on personal choice 
that Bem (1993) identifies as individual factors including biological hormones, 
personal behaviours, individual agency and cultural preferences. The masculinisation 
of women in the revolutionary opera films moves beyond the personal choice to 
political context, and plays the role of gender identity that reflects relations of 
masculine dominance, patriarchal ideology and gender construction in the specific 
context of the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, women’s masculine gender in this 
specific period is not only representing gender performativity, but also supports a 
feminist critique that women’s identity was produced, reproduced and socialised by 
patriarchal power and ideology of the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, this proletarian 
identity became the representation of masculinist power, thus masculinist power 
controls women’s bodies and transforms female bodies into an ideological apparatus. 
 
This study significantly highlights that women’s bodies are sites of masculinist power 
and play a role of ideological apparatus in the revolutionary opera films. By decoding 
images of women in the films, this thesis has revealed that women’s haircuts, clothing, 
gestures and behaviours are not only masculinised, but also function as ideological 
articulations. The masculinised bobbed haircuts, the military dress, the masculine 
gestures such as the clenched fists and the masculine speech, all demonstrate that 
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revolutionary consciousness only links to masculinist power in the films’ discourse. 
According to Foucault’s analysis of body and power, women’s bodies in the 
revolutionary opera films can be identified as sites of masculinist power to mobilise 
Maoist politics (ideology). By comparing the discourses in Beijing Opera with those 
in the revolutionary opera films, a discernible shift is evident in the gender 
performance represented. In the traditional Beijing Opera, female warriors are 
restricted by feminine bodily discipline on the stage, however they are playing a 
masculine role. In the discourse of revolutionary opera films, this study finds that an 
important shift is that the female body is controlled by masculine bodily discipline 
rather than feminine bodily discipline. Importantly, by exploring how the 
revolutionary opera films incorporate cinematic strategy into traditional opera’s 
elements such as liangxiang, this study highlights that women’s gestures and behaviors 
are masculinised in order to signify and reinforce Maoist ideology. Hence this study 
contributes to the disciplines of film study as well as cultural study in a political 
environment. 
 
However women’s bodies function as an ideological apparatus, female bodies and 
male bodies are visibly different in the revolutionary opera films. This finding contests 
Cui’s (2003) consideration that the gender discourse in the revolutionary films is 
sexless. Women in the revolutionary opera films are indeed masculinised, rather than 
sexless, and women’s bodies still maintain sexual difference. 
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Extending Roberts’s (2010) analysis of gender difference in the revolutionary opera, 
this study clearly elaborates gender hierarchy in the revolutionary opera films by 
exploring power relations between femininity (feminine) and masculinity (masculine). 
By comparing dynamic power relation between femininity (feminine) and masculinity 
(masculine) from traditional China to the Cultural Revolution, this thesis discovered 
that the revolutionary opera films maintain gender differences, but construct a 
hierarchy between masculine and feminine characteristics that reconstruct the meaning 
of gender in the Chinese context. Both femininity and feminine characteristics do exist 
in the gender discourse of revolutionary opera films, however the meaning of gender 
has been reconstructed by Maoist ideology and masculinist power. By addressing the 
power relation between the genders during the Cultural Revolution, this study 
contributes to the understanding of gender representations in films, thereby extending 
the knowledge base in relation to film and gender studies. 
 
The power trajectories between masculine characteristics and feminine characteristics 
from Confucian gender discourse to Maoist gender discourse are theorised, analysed 
and discussed in Chapter Four. It has been observed that feminine and masculine 
characteristics had an equal balanced/complementary value in the Confucian gender 
discourse. Hence, this study contributes to the understanding of gender disparities that 
existed during the Cultural Revolution as well as the role of political ideology in 
creating gender inequalities. The examination of the discourse of the revolutionary 
opera films in Chapter Five demonstrates that feminine characteristics lost value, 
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power and place in the process of gender construction. The academic significance lies 
in that this study discovers the epistemological shift of gender understanding from yin–
yang philosophy in Confucian discourse to Maoist discourse. In the Chinese context, 
epistemological understandings of gender derive from yin–yang philosophy. Thus, 
according to yin–yang philosophy, traditional understandings about an ideal manhood 
such as Confucian masculinity (juzi-hood) should represent a balance of masculine and 
feminine power. The revolutionary opera films incorporate cinematic elements of 
traditional yin–yang symbolism, and ideologically reconstruct the power relation 
between masculine and feminine beings. Counter-revolutionary class and values are 
all identified as feminine (yin), thereby Confucian masculinity and Confucian culture 
(values) are both feminine symbols that have been devalued and marginalised in the 
revolutionary opera films. Evidence of this was found through examining mise-en-
scene in Shajiabang, costumes, gender performance and interactions between villains 
and revolutionary heroes in The Red Detachment of Women (1972) and The Red 
Lantern. 
 
In contrast to the predominant statement of “the erasure of gender and sexuality” (Chen, 
2009; Cui, 2003; Dai, 1995; Huang, 2010; Pei & Ho, 2006), this study finds that 
femininity does not vanish in the revolutionary opera films, yet is coded as a symbol 
of women’s alienation. Evidence in The Red Detachment of Women (1972), Azalea 
Mountain and Shajiabang clearly demonstrates that femininity always links to 
counter-revolutionary ideology and is merely applied in the counter-revolutionary 
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gender discourse. By applying Marxist notions of alienation and sexual division of 
labour, the films’ discourse codes femininity as the representation of class oppression 
and a symbol of women’s alienation. The revolutionary opera films incorporate the 
notion of alienation into the gender discourse and construct a radical and unreasonable 
equation where women’s oppression or exploitation results from sexual objectification 
and traditional feminine roles due to femininity. The revolutionary opera film thus 
establishes another patriarchal paradigm, and this paradigm forces women to perform 
masculinity and abandon femininity. 
 
Unlike socialist feminists’ statements (Lu, 2010; Wang, 2005; Wang, 2017) that 
Maoist ideology (gender politics) is a feminist politics, and women indeed achieved 
gender equality in Maoist gender discourse (Lu, 2010)，this study argues that Maoist 
gender politics is a masculinist politics to maintain male dominance, and women were 
not liberated by Maoist gender politics and the “feminine” was not valued.  
 
Firstly, analysis of the asymmetrical and hierarchical division between masculine and 
feminine beings in the revolutionary opera films provides clear evidence that gender 
hierarchy is still maintained in the gender discourse of the films. Gender hierarchy 
interacts with power relations between the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary 
classes although only masculine roles, values and power are considered in the 
construction of the revolutionary class. Femininity and feminine roles, values and 
power have been devalued and marginialised in the gender construction. Masculinist 
 263 
power therefore is not working through imbalanced power structures between women 
and men, but works via hierarchal power relations between masculinity and femininity. 
From a feminist viewpoint, this finding importantly highlights that hierarchal binary 
identities are not always constructed through asymmetrical power relations between 
women and men. Power binaries could be produced by polarised structure between 
masculinity and femininity. Gender inequality and gender injustice are not always 
exhibited through the dominance of men over women, but processes of masculinist 
politics to disempower femininity or feminine beings. This study contributes towards 
understanding the significance and contribution of film study in understanding culture. 
 
Secondly, women’s gender role and gender performance were masculinised in the 
revolutionary opera films, however women were not liberated by masculine gender or 
by practising masculinist power. Compared to women’s oppression under the 
Confucian patriarchy, women were allowed access into the public sphere and 
participated in masculine gender roles, including as warriors and political leaders. By 
deconstructing narrative paradigms, such as the “Ballad of Mulan” in The Red 
Detachment of Women (1972) and The Red Lantern, this study has revealed that the 
patriarchal system still exists in the discourse of the revolutionary opera films. Similar 
to Confucian patriarchy, women’s gender roles in the Cultural Revolution were also 
designed by men, for men, and therefore cannot reflect female consciousness.  
 
Thirdly, this study also finds that the phallocentric discourse in the revolutionary opera 
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films offer women a delusion that they could achieve liberation by using violence as 
female warriors. By incorporating Maoist ideology into the revolutionary opera films, 
phallic power such as military masculinity and violence, has been emphasised in The 
Red Detachment of Women (1972) and Azalea Mountain, and violence became 
legitimised against oppression. This masculinist value gave women during the Cultural 
Revolution a delusion that they could achieve freedom by using violence and women’s 
feminine power is ideologically disempowered. Therefore, women in the revolutionary 
opera films are not liberated but actually have been marginalised by a phallocentric 
discourse. 
 
In conclusion, through feminist epistemology and methodology, this thesis has 
revealed the patriarchal form of Maoist politics (ideology) and elaborated how 
masculinist power was incorporated into Maoist ideology to shape the image of women 
in the revolutionary opera films. Through exploration of the revolutionary opera films, 
the main argument stresses that Maoist gender politics in the revolutionary opera films 
is a masculinist politics that produced another form of patriarchy to maintain male 
dominance. Women were not liberated in the Cultural Revolution, but rather identified 
as a masculine gender and oppressed by masculinist power in the gender discourse of 
the revolutionary opera films. Patriarchal power incorporated with Maoist ideology 
worked through devaluing femininity and feminine characteristics in the social 
construction of gender meanings, rather than maintaining conventional hierarchal 
sex/biological relations. Women’s bodies played a role of ideological apparatuses to 
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mobilise Maoist ideology, and were sites of masculinist power. This study is therefore 
significant in contributing towards the sociopolitical discipline. 
 
Despite the significance and scope of this study explained above, the thesis opens 
discussions at different levels. One potential extension of this study for further research 
could explore how Marxist/Maoist ideology incorporated with masculinist politics or 
modernism impact gender representations and cultural changes in China. For instance, 
by analysing representations of Confucian masculinity (juzi-hood) in films and TV in 
the Chinese context, further research could explore tensions between hegemonic 
masculinity and Confucian masculinity before and after Maoist China. 
    
To conclude, the examination of the revolutionary opera films in this research 
contributes new knowledge for understanding how Maoist gender politics (ideology) 
transformed women’s identity in film during the Cultural Revolution. The theoretical 
approach of the feminist critical discourse proves that women formed a masculine 
identity that enabled them to access masculinist power. This study also extends 
knowledge about gender equality in the revolutionary opera films, women’s gender 
role, and gender performance. The research finds that women’s bodies were still 
designed and controlled by masculinist power and politics, and shaped by nationalism 
and militarism. The hierarchy between masculine (masculinity) and feminine 
(femininity) is visible and has been elaborated clearly in the cinematic discourse. 
Hence, the study contributes significantly towards a cultural and historical 
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understanding of propaganda and gender within Chinese society as read through the 
filmic discourse of the revolutionary opera film.
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